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ABSTRACT. 
This thesis holds that the application of the archaeo- 
logical method, developed by the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault, to the field of anthropology reveals a hitherto 
hidden primitive episteme. Such a project represents a 
rejection of a search for a fundamental Truth, available 
through the traditional figures of rationality, either 
vertically in history or horizontally across cultures. The 
form of reason posited by this project does not have a 
constant and universal occurrence but is given in the dis- 
continuous figures of the episteme. The quest for a single 
manifestation of the conditions of validity in reason is 
replaced by a study of the conditions of possibility of the 
truths, discourses and institutions of a primitive peoples. 
The conditions of possibility for the emergence of the 
elements of primitive knowledge and practices are available 
through the application of the explanatory unities of the 
archaeological method. These unities replace the traditional 
explanatory role of the subject, with all of its psychologi- 
cal baggage, which has a central role in modern theories of 
rationality. The subject-knowledge link that dominates 
traditional anthropological analyses is replaced by a power- 
knowledge link that postulates the two axes of discursive 
and non-discursive concerns. The discursive axis is con- 
cerned with the objects, concepts, statements and discursive 
formations of primitive knowledge while the non-discursive 
axis is concerned with the systems of power that propagate 
and sustain those discourses. These two axes constitute the 
nature of the archaeology employed in this study. 
This thesis is sustained by both negative and positive 
evidence. The negative evidence takes the form of an anti- 
subjectivist thrust where the subject-dependent explanatory 
unities of the tradition are replaced by the positivistic 
elements of archaeology. The positive evidence primarily 
takes the form of a detailed analysis of the presence of the 
guiding codes of the episteme amongst the Trobriand Island- 
ers that give rise to their primitive knowledge and prac- 
tices. In this area, I make extensive use of Malinowski's 
ethnographic observations for their breath of detail and 
application without employing his subject-dependent psycho- 
biological conclusions. Further, I am proposing a transform- 
ative position such that orality becomes a feature of the 
episteme rather than its condition of possibility. 
The guiding codes of the Trobriand episteme take the 
form of enclosed oppositional figures that are everywhere 
related to space. The Trobriand episteme provides the condi- 
tions for the emergence of primitive discourses and orders 
the experiences of the Trobrianders. The guiding figures of 
the episteme are based in a form of complementary opposi- 
tion, causation as vitality and a dogma of topological space 
that give rise to primitive knowledge which is a form of 
divination. A significant part of this dissertation is taken 
up with an examination of the detail and limitation of these 
figures where ideas from Levy-Bruhl, Hallpike, and others 
are employed to produce the most appropriate configuration 
for my project. A particular form of language as the manipu- 
lation of real signs, rather than ideational signs, has its 
possibility in this configuration which has consequences for 
the type of knowledge produced. The form of knowledge appro- 
priate to the presence of such a model of language is magic. 
Writing has no possibility for emerging in this episteme 
and, therefore, there are significant consequences for the 
type of knowledge that can be maintained and propagated in a 
context which must utilise static tradition to the detriment 
of reflection. 
An archaeological analysis of the Trobriand Islanders, 
focusing on discourses on sex and marriage, the nature of 
tabooed sexual acts, economic relations arising out of 
marriage and the role of the polygamous chief, the nature of 
love-magic and magic in general, reveals a shared possibili- 
ty for all of these discursive realms in the figures of the 
episteme. These discourses are regulated by the presence of 
a fundamental opposition between a brother and his sister. 
This opposition forms the motif for primitive problematiza- 
tions and constitutes a vulnerable boundary which is the 
appropriate focus of taboos relating to sex and food, 
amongst others. 
This primitive episteme characterises the unity of the 
experiences of the Trobrianders. This experience is discon- 
tinuous with our own and does not involve a role for the 
individual ego. This project represents a worthwhile contri- 
bution to an understanding of human experience and knowledge 
in general which does not seek to reduce the natural diver- 
sity of man to just the monotonous experience of modern man. 
In conclusion, I tentatively speculate about the appropri- 
ateness of the Trobriand figures for primitive experience in 
general. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
Archaeology and Discourse. 
my aim is most decidedly not to use the categories of 
cultural totalities (whether world views, ideal types, the 
particular spirit of an age) in order to impose on history, 
despite itself, the forms of structural analysis. The series 
described, the limits fixed, the comparisons and correla- 
tions made are based not on the old philosophies of history, 
but are intended to question teleologies and totalizations; ' 
[Foucault 1972, pp. 15-16). 
1.1 Introduction. 
Anthropologists who analyse some primitive society in 
terms of the individual goals and strategies of its members 
may not be doing anything other than trying to understand 
that society in terms of our own experience rather than 
describing its episteme and understanding it within those 
terms. The same might be said of those who ascribe the 
primitive the same rationality as ourselves, such as Mali- 
nowski or Evans Pritchard, or of those who argue for the 
psychic unity of mankind, etc. In this study, I try to avoid 
such subject-centred approaches in favour of the positivis- 
tic elements of Michel Foucault's archaeological analysis. 
My thesis is that the application of archaeology to anthro- 
pology, in the field of Trobriand knowledge, reveals a 
hitherto hidden primitive episteme. That episteme, when 
elaborated, will make it possible to understand the natives 
of the Trobriand Islands within their own epistemological 
frame of reference. 
I am applying the archaeological method to the Trobri- 
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and culture in order to reveal the source of the validity 
and objectivity of their knowledge in an epistemological 
guiding code that takes the form of enclosed circular areas 
of bounded oppositions that rival one another. 
The uncovering of the episteme governing Trobriand 
knowledge has its condition of possibility only in archae- 
ology. The primitive episteme of the Trobrianders is cha- 
racterised by figures of asymmetric opposition and it is 
these guiding codes that make the knowledge of that culture 
possible. An understanding of the nature, efficacy and 
limitation of all primitive knowledge must surely be related 
to the project of the elaboration of these Trobriand epis- 
temic figures. I will tentatively suggest that the metaphor- 
ical figures outlined may have a more general application. 
I offer two types of evidence in support of my thesis. 
Firstly, there is the negative evidence of the anti-subjec- 
tivist thrust. In order to reveal the guiding figures of 
this episteme, I am setting out to offer an alternative to 
the entire terms of traditional anthropological discourses. 
The subjective-type explanations of culture and subject- 
dependent explanatory unities such as 'man', 'science,, 
'reason', etc. are set aside in order to appreciate the 
epistemic significance of the elements of the primitive 
Trobriand knowledge. These epistemic elements have a posi- 
tivistic nature that avoids problems of interpretation and 
meaning in the new anthropology. An analysis of the relation 
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between power and knowledge replaces the concern with the 
relation between the subject and his knowledge in the tradi- 
tional approach. The particular archaeology that is to be 
employed in this study, while not the genealogy of Fou- 
cault's later work, is nevertheless concerned with the 
power-knowledge relation that links discursive and nondis- 
cursive practices within the episteme. In this chapter, I 
examine the elements that focus on the nature of the discur- 
sive aspects of archaeology, specifically those explanatory 
and descriptive terms pertaining to knowledge, while in the 
next chapter, I examine that which pertains to the power 
aspect so that the two can be combined to reveal the exact 
nature of the archaeology that is to be utilised throughout 
this study. 
Secondly, the positive evidence that is offered is of 
two kinds. On the one hand, I propose a transformative 
position such that I make orality a feature of the episteme 
rather than its condition of possibility which is a view 
held by more traditional approaches. On the other hand, 
there is a detailed analysis of the guiding codes that give 
rise to the primitive bodies of knowledge and practices 
amongst the Trobrianders. These codes take the form of the 
enclosed bounded figures of opposition and provide the 
conditions for the possibility of primitive discourses and 
institutions within that culture. I offer a detailed account 
of how these codes function with respect to the Trobriand 
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discourses and practices focusing an kinship, wealth and 
magic. 
Archaeology is a form of analysis that was developed 
exclusively by Foucault. The method offers an alternative to 
the explanatory assumptions of the kind of approach that 
makes rationality, consciousness, agency, universal truth, 
etc. the core of the intellectual enterprise. In the place 
of a single central theme, such as truth, archaeology refor- 
mulates the problematic in terms of the discussion of the 
co-extension of knowledge. The anthropologist can relate 
cultural elements to the same epistemological era, the 
episteme, in the same way that the archaeologist can assign 
artifacts excavated at the same level to the same histori- 
cal period. The cultural elements appropriate to this 
project are not the subject-related components of tradition- 
al rationalist approaches, but the elements of discourse. 
Discourse is the basis of cultural praxis for the archaeo- 
logical method. 
Archaeology avoids a transcultural treatment of primi- 
tive cultures where native themes are held to be historical- 
ly constant figures. Archaeology also avoids universalist 
themes in favour of more local mo tifs and, as a consequence, 
eschews the type of transcultural analysis where a feature 
like orality is taken to be that which characterises all 
primitive experience. During the course of this study we 
will see that the figures of the episteme, through which 
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Trobriand knowledge is deployed, provide the possibility for 
an entirely oral culture and not vice versa. 
1.2 The episteme. 
Archaeology is a means for the analysis of discourse. 
It employs several important explanatory elements that 
replace the traditional unities of the subject-related 
approaches. The most significant one of these explanatory 
elements is the notion of the episteme. The episteme has an 
essential role in archaeology and an understanding of the 
meaning and function of this notion is a prerequisite for an 
1 
understanding of that method. The episteme represents the 
context within which the specific discourses emerge. Any 
discourse can only emerge within a specifiable historical 
context. For example, I will be examining the codes of 
knowledge governing the emergence of particular discourses 
that have their possibility in the context of the Trobriand 
culture. 
The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type of 
1. Both Foucault, in his own writings, and Merquior, in 
Foucault (see bib. ), have compared the notion of episteme 
to the noti*on of the paradigm developed by Kuhn in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (see bib. ). However, 
the episteme does not refer to conscious principles like 
those of the paradigm but its principles are located at a 
level beneath the conscious choice of theory or method. The 
episteme is strictly rule bound whereas the paradigm offers 
merely procedural directives. I think that it is more prof- 
itable to recognise that there are significant differences 
between the two models. If any emphasis is to be placed on 
one difference it must surely be the historical stress 
(historical apriori) that the epistemic context carries 
which is absent in the paradigmatic analysis. 
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rationality which manifests the unity of a subject, a spirit 
or a period [Foucault 1972, p. 191]. It is the historical 
condition for the possibility of discourse which manifests 
itself as different sets of epistemological guiding figures 
or philosophical theories. Since the elements of discourse 
are knowledge this implies that any particular piece of 
knowledge may be referred back to its guiding epistemic 
figure. The set of constraints and limitations that, at a 
given time, are imposed on a particular discourse can be 
apprehended by understanding the discursive inter-relations 
at the level of the particular epistemic figure. These 
limitations are not areas of ignorance but are what make the 
existence of epistemological figures and discursive func- 
tions in discourse possible. 
Foucault outlines three examples of different epistemic 
configurations which have provided guiding codes for the 
knowledge claims of their related epistemes. There is the 
Renaissance characterised by the epistemological figure of 
resemblance; the Classical Age of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries which is characterised by the philo- 
sophical theory of representation; and the Modern Age from 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries characte- 
rised by agency or consciousness. These three configurations 
provide, for Foucault, the three principal historical con- 
texts for the emergence of knowledge in Western civilisa- 
tion. They represent the three main ruptures, or disconti- 
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nuities, in our Western historical experience. They can 
provide us with concrete examples of how the episteme func- 
tions to relate all of its bodies of knowledge together in 
terms of its constituent figures, and how a limit is placed 
on the expansion of that knowledge. 
1.2.1 The Renaissance episteme. 
The fundamental code of knowledge operating during the 
Renaissance was that of resemblance. This epistemological 
figure characterised the knowledge and the discursive forma- 
tions (with their objects, strategies and theoretical 
themes) of this era. It determined the limitations of that 
knowledge, what features were included or excluded from it 
(the regularities) and the way in which the knowledge and 
discourses were formed. Resemblance had a formative role in 
the knowledge of Western culture up to the end of the six- 
teenth century. It made knowledge of things possible because 
it formed the fundamental structure of knowledge. 
Resemblance had four essential figures that determined 
the kinds of knowledge available in the Renaissance epis- 
teme. They were convenience, emulation, analogy and sympa- 
thy/ antipathy These figures were the means by which the 
1. Resemblance is a form of divination where convenience 
forms a linear chain of inter-locking circles of similari- 
ties; emulation forms a series of circles which reflect and 
rival one another; analogy forms a series of concentric 
circles; sympathy/antipathy is the force that holds these 
patterns together but at the same time prevents them from 
collapsing upon each other. 
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things of the Renaissance world were brought together and 
held apart. The bringing together of things that were near 
to each other in space and time, that looked similar or had 
analogous components, formed sixteenth century truth. 
Resemblance characterised the regularity of the discur- 
sive formations arising within the Renaissance episteme. 
only concepts characterised by resemblance could function 
within that context. The regularity that was formed consti- 
tutes a tight network of necessities that linked together 
all the elements of Renaissance knowledge. This regularity 
authorised theoretical choices and practical speculation 
while providing a link between desires and knowledge. In the 
Renaissance episteme, to possess knowledge meant to be able 
to show the system of resemblances that made things depend- 
ent on each other. Resemblance provided a chain of causal 
relations in the world. 
Resemblance encompassed empirical sciences, languages, 
philosophical pre-suppositions, superstitions and the natu- 
ral sciences. This epistemological figure provided the 
rational basis for all these forms of knowledge in this era. 
The archaeological analysis of the Renaissance shows us the 
inter-relations between these discourses (their shared 
regularity in figures of resemblance). They are not cha- 
racterised in terms of the truth of the rigorous sciences 
such as physics, chemistry or mathematics and the folly of 
the looser disciplines. Resemblance does not function by 
8 
recognising a duality in knowledge between truth and error, 
rational and irrational, etc. The archaeological rationality 
uncovered within this episteme recognises only one form of 
reason, resemblance, and this reason encompassed all of the 
true and false knowledge claims of that era. Certain types 
of mistakes were made possible in this way. The 'rational' 
figure of archaeology makes error possible in the same way 
that it constitutes the truth. The Order of Things deals in 
detail with the particular functioning of this epistemologi- 
cal figure. Another type of divination is available, in the 
primitive Trobriand episteme, where enclosed circular spaces 
rival one another in a complex way. The relations of the 
Trobriand episteme is the form of reason available to the 
natives and does not divide knowledge simply between truth 
and error. 
Foucault claims that, at the beginning of the seven- 
teenth century, Western knowledge ceased to be associated 
with the epistemological figure of resemblance [Foucault 
1970, p. 511. Resemblance became exclusively a source of 
error, where resemblances were regarded as mere chimera, and 
no longer a source of truth. The same can be said of the 
primitive knowledge when it was first encountered by Western 
European man. 
1.2.2 The Classical episteme. 
Classical thought excluded resemblance as the fundamen- 
tal experience and primary form of knowledge. The Classical 
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episteme is characterised by the philosophical theory of 
representation. This theory constitutes the particular mode 
of rationality of the knowledge claims of the Classical Age. 
The theory of representation provided the conditions for the 
possibility of Classical knowledge, from reflections on 
economics to analyses of language. The archaeological analy- 
ses of the knowledge of the Classical Age are made possible 
by an examination of the theories of grammar of that era: 
these theories can be found in the discipline of General 
Grammar. A study of Classical grammatical theoretical 
choices makes an archaeology of the economics and 
medical/botanical discourses possible and reveals the common 
regularity of these disciplines in a taxionomic strategy. 
Representation formed tables of knowledge in the Clas- 
sical age as opposed to the circular figures of resemblance. 
The study of General Grammar provides the strategies, 
techniques and theoretical choices, indeed, the whole group 
of discursive statements that define the elements of the 
epistemic figure of representation. Again, this is outlined 
in detail in The Order of Things. 
The analysis of representation determined all of the 
domains of knowledge of the Classical Age. Knowledge had its 
possibility in representation when representation represent- 
ed itself. In this way, language was regarded as simply the 
representation of words; nature was simply the representa- 
tion of beings; wealth was simply the representation of 
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needs [Foucault 1970, p. 209]. 
1.2.3 The Modern episteme. 
Foucault maintains that, in the later years of the 
eighteenth century, the Classical episteme was replaced by 
the Modern episteme in much the same way as the Classical 
had, in its turn, come to replace that of the Renaissance. 
Because of these epistemic replacements we can identify 
discontinuities in the history of Western knowledge. Such 
transformations cannot be explained in the archaeology of 
knowledge. However, their effects can be outlined [Foucault 
1970, p. 2171. The transformation from the Classical to the 
Modern episteme was not brought about by an increase in the 
objectivity of knowledge, or in a more precise technique in 
scientific research and information, or a few fortunate 
discoveries, or a little good luck or genius. On the con- 
trary, this change came about because of the break down of 
representation. Indeed, representation had its own possibil- 
ity for collapse built into it as a condition of its own 
existence. This collapse did not come from somewhere exter- 
nal to it. 
The guiding code of knowledge in the Modern Age is a 
configuration centred on human agency. In this figure, 
knowledge claims are produced by a knowing subject. The 
concepts of 'man' and 'self' have their possibility here, 
and individuals are constituted as subjects within this 
figure. Further, the activities of traditional historians 
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and anthropologists belong to this episteme. 
Human experience in general, where it diverges from the 
Western, allows us to identify further epistemological 
discontinuities. A primitive epistemic system may be added 
to those three outlined above. The Trobriand Islanders 
manifest the operation of an episteme that is characterised 
by the epistemological figure of asymmetry as a form of 
emulation, convenience and enclosed circular spaces. This is 
a divinational model and later I will examine in detail how 
these particular figures work and how this epistemic config- 
uration, in the context of the Trobrianders, which gives 
rise to their particular forms of knowledge, differs from 
the conventional Western epistemological figure of agency. 
1.3 The terms of archaeology. 
The notion of the episteme is the principal explanatory 
unit to be employed in archaeology. Other important concepts 
in the method include the notions of positivity, statement, 
discursive formation and regularity. The notion of positiviý 
ty refers to the way in which we can identify the rules 
that are employed in a discursive practice to form objects, 
strategies, concepts or theoretical choices. These rules 
constitute the preconditions of what functions as an item of 
knowledge or error within a particular episteme. In Western 
societies this knowledge often acquires the status of a 
science. However, we will see how it is that the Trobriand 
episteme contains no techniques for constituting its endemic 
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forms of knowledge in terms of an opposition between science 
and superstition since these divisions have no possibility 
there. Within contemporary knowledge the subject is formed 
in different ways according to the various objects, strate- 
gies and theoretical themes in operation in a particular 
knowledge configuration. Again, in the primitive experience 
we will learn how it is that this type of formation of the 
subject is absent. There cannot be knowledge outside of a 
particular discursive practice and, indeed, discursive 
practices can only be defined in terms of the knowledge that 
they produce [Foucault 1972, p. 193]. 
The positivity of a discourse characterises its unity 
within an episteme and allows us to say, once this unity is 
identified, that two people are using the same concept in 
the same way. The unity of a discourse, the limitations, 
functions, objects and theoretical choices that characterise 
that particular discourse, are encompassed by the notion of 
positivity. This conception of discursive unity replaces 
more traditional unities. Examples of the more traditional 
unities are that two people come from the same place, that 
they both speak English, French, etc., that they are both 
speaking at the same historical time, etc. These forms of 
continuity, concerning the speaking subject, are suspended 
in archaeology. The unity of positivity reveals to what 
extent subjects are talking about the same thing by placing 
themselves at the same level within the' same conceptual 
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field. The employment of the notion of positivity indicates 
that the search for continuity between discourses shifts 
from the author, or subject of the discourse, to discursive 
objects. This marks a move from an intentionalist analysis 
to a positivistic analysis. This move is made more markedly 
when nondiscursive material elements are taken on board in 
the power analysis. The discursive field is sought, and not 
the author of discourses. 
Positivity provides limits, or ways of identifying this 
discursive field. The grasping of the notion of the unity of 
positivity leads directly to a grasping of the notion of a 
shared representation. In this way, we can say that positiv- 
ity provides the condition for the possibility of meaningful 
communication amongst the subjects of an episteme in terms 
of its discursive elements which are shared representations. 
The analysis of statements operates without reference 
to a cogito since it does not pose the question of a speak- 
ing subject. This does not mean that statements are communal 
representations imposed on every individual. on the con- 
trary, statements refer to the totality of things that are 
said, the relations between them, the regularities, and the 
transformations that can be observed in them (Foucault 1972, 
p. 122]. All statements are made by individual speakers, 
but, in making a statement, a speaker takes up a position 
that has already been defined by the rules of the relevant 
discursive formation [Gutting 1990, p. 241]. A discourse is 
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possessed by a particular group of individuals in the sense 
of the right to speak, ability to understand, the capacity 
to use this discourse in decisions, institutions and prac- 
tices. For example, magical discourses are possessed by 
primitive peoples since these discourses are understood by 
them and effectively used by them. 
A statement is a functional unit of discourse that 
defines the possibility of the appearance of meaningful 
concepts. A concept only has meaning within the context of 
a statement. Statements show the function of sentences and 
propositions within particular discourses that are embedded 
in epistemic figures. Statements may have similar form but 
have different meanings; the meaning is determined by the 
rules for the construction of an expression. The rules 
governing magical formulae in the production of spells are 
good examples of primitive statements. These rules provide 
a contextual set of relations that include some sets of 
meanings and exclude others. In this way, the statement 
forms the contextual precondition for discursive meaning. 
A statement allows signs, whether marks, figures, 
traces or artifacts to be more than Just signs. During 
magical incantations the manipulation of the sign is not a 
mere mental activity but the manipulation of things in the 
world. This is the source of the efficacy of magic. A state- 
ment is the specific character that these signs have in a 
discursive formation. The statement puts a series of signs 
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into the specific forms required by the discursive formation 
[Foucault 1972, pp. 88-105]. 
A discursive formation is a large group of statements 
which is not simply a science, a discipline or a theoretical 
field but, rather, the term indicates more complex problems 
of continuity and location and more problematic unities than 
1 
the notions of science or discipline These new unities of 
discourse are necessary for an understanding of the primi- 
tive discourses of witchcraft and economics that are not 
reducible to a scientific rational for their unity. The 
statement provides the functional basis for the unity 
(positivity) of a discursive formation. For example, it is 
necessary to identify statements of witchcraft that form the 
functional basis of that discourse. 
A discursive formation can be questioned as to whether 
its forms have become established once and for all and have 
gone on developing in the same way through time; do they 
conceal other formations?; what sort of links can be recog- 
nised across the group of statements [Foucault 1972, p. 31]? 
We can ask of a large group of statements like primitive 
economics, what is the nature of its unity and on what that 
unity is based? What counts as an answer to this type of 
-------------------- 
1. In The Order of Things Foucault appeals to his reader to 
suspend thei-emo-re traditional unities in our understanding 
of history in order to facilitate entry to the archaeologi- 
cal method. 
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question is a series of gaps, differences and transforma- 
tions from our own economic experience. 
The rules governing a discursive formation do not have 
a transcendental status. These rules are simply the descrip- 
tion of the existing relations that pertain between state- 
ments. Archaeology deals neither with prediscursive experi- 
ence of things nor with the verbal forms produced by dis- 
course. Instead of a concern with ontological or linguistic 
questions, archaeology focuses on a group of rules that 
define the ordering of discursive objects. There is more to 
discourse than the designation of things by signs and ar- 
chaeology reveals and describes this [Foucault 1972, p. 49]. 
The regularity of a discourse is identified in terms 
of the conditions, or rules of formation, of the regulari- 
ties themselves. The regularity of discursive formations, 
the rules governing the appearance of statements, cannot be 
explained in terms of traditional concepts since the tradi- 
tion conceives of regularity in terms of an opposition 
between the regular and the deviant. Archaeological regular- 
ity does not refer to frequency of occurrence or probabili- 
ty. It is not a universalist apriori specification but an 
historical apriori. Regularity refers to the effective field 
of the appearance of statements. An example of this can be 
seen later in the conditions governing the emergence of the 
concept of incest, and the statements related to it in the 
Trobriand Islands. I will argue that the conditions govern- 
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ing the emergence of this concept demand a field of economic 
statements related to it. From these we can determine the 
conditions for the possibility of the emergence of the 
concept within that particular episteme. only archaeologi- 
cal analysis can reveal these rules governing the emergence 
of particular statements that have the function of express- 
ing sexual taboos. We will encounter these rules in detail 
in the later discussions. 
Discourse gives rise to certain organisations of con- 
cepts and groupings of objects. These organisations and 
groupings form themes or theories that are to be identified 
and interpreted strategically [Foucault 1972, p. 64]. Ar- 
chaeology questions how these strategies are distributed in 
history and whether they are necessary or chance encounters 
between different ideas or if there is a regularity between 
them that defines the common system of their formation. 
All of these discursive elements in archaeology, out- 
lined above, are dynamic and function at different levels 
and according to different rules of formation. Discursive 
elements are functional. Functions include such notions or 
1 
concepts as contradiction, comparison and change . The 
-------------------- 
1. Details of the role of comparison, contradiction and 
change are given in 'Archaeological Description, which is 
Part IV of The Archaeology of Knowledge. It suffices here 
to acknowledge that contradictions should not be sought in a 
discourse simply to point to a weakness in that discourse 
but must be analysed to explicate the productive function of 
contradictions: the ways in which contradictions operate at 
is 
discursive functions characterise the specific nature of any 
discourse. Therefore, a discourse may be defined in terms of 
its discursive functions. In turn, the discursive functions 
may be defined in terms of the strategic choices and theo- 
retical themes that are available within a particular 
episteme. 
The explanatory performance of the spisteme might be 
better understood by describing as circular the relation be- 
tween the discursive elements of archaeology and the central 
explanatory metaphor of the episteme; a relationship that 
Foucault likens to that between the branches and trunk of a 
tree. The study of the particular discursive formations, 
positivities, institutions, techniques for the circulation 
and limitation of discourses etc. reveals the nature of the 
central organising metaphor and generating themes for that 
episteme. These themes provide, in turn, the unity of these 
discourses and define the limits of what counts as a shared 
representation. This circular explanation will have to be 
employed as a means of providing an account of the Trobriand 
episteme. The central primitive epistemological figure for 
the production of knowledge, truth and power systems needs 
to be outlined together with its limitations. The resulting 
forms of knowledge highlight the presence of these figures 
-------------------- 
Continued 
different levels and give rise to new strategies and con- 
cepts within that discourse and, indeed, give rise to new 
disciplines. 
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as guiding codes in that knowledge. 
1.4 Archaeology. 
Archaeology is a method specifically designed for 
describing experience within its own historical context. In 
order to achieve this, it divides discourse into non- 
traditional unities (positivities), and investigates them by 
means of the unique notions of statement, discursive func- 
tion, regularity, etc. Archaeology encompasses discontinui- 
ties, gaps and new forms of positivity [Foucault 1972, 
p. 169]. Further, it distinguishes several levels within 
discourse; the statements themselves in their unique emer- 
gence; the appearance of objects, concepts, strategic 
choices within discursive formations; the derivation of 
rules of formation, and the substitution of one formation 
for another. Later, I will show that the primitive episteme 
of the Trobrianders is particularly static since there are 
no forms of discursive substitution that I could find. 
However, there is an abundance of examples of the other 
archaeological features. 
The guiding codes of knowledge of a particular episteme 
encompass the natural, social and human sciences, supersti- 
tions, witchcraft, philosophical pre-suppositions, etc. of 
that particular era. The specific codes of knowledge that 
have their possibility in a particular context can be cha- 
racterised by the identification of the epistemic figure 
governing the emergence of that body of knowledge in that 
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area. These figures enable us to identify the presence of 
non-sense, error or truth and knowledge in terms of the de- 
mands of a particular discursive formation, for example, 
effective witchcraft and ineffective witchcraft, and not 
just simply in terms of a singular and constant form of 
rationality associated with the development of Western 
philosophy. 
The archaeological method avoids the identification of 
universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge but instead seeks the contextual possibility for 
the meaning of the concepts that occur within the intellec- 
tual lives of subjects. This method endeavours to provide 
the conditions for the possibility of, for example, a primi- 
tive sexual ethics and the problematisation of questions of 
sexual experience within that primitive space. 
The archaeological analysis functions to identify 
discontinuities in the use of a particular concept such as 
'man' or 'experience'. Therefore, it is important at the 
outset to suspend a linear historical conception where the 
concepts of our knowledge are held, either to be absent due 
to the particular ignorance of a people at a particular 
time, or to be present at that time but to have remained to 
a large extent hidden from the participants in that 
episteme. The elucidation of the discursive context for the 
meaning of any notion involves a dismantling of the discur- 
sive functions, strategies, technologies, sciences, Judi- 
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cial treaties, medical themes, etc of the episteme in ques- 
tion. 
In the Western experience, both the abstract and empir- 
ical sciences, religious beliefs and disciplines of all 
sorts are influenced by the codes of resemblance, repre- 
sentation and agency within their particular time spans. In 
the same way, the beliefs and practices of the Trobrianders 
are determined by the particular codes of opposition in 
operation amongst them. In brief then, the archaeological 
hypothesis is that all of the intellectual activity of the 
Trobrianders obeys the same laws of a certain configuration 
of knowledge. Once these laws have been elucidated it is 
possible to identify epistemic contexts and themes and 
these allow meaning to be given to the concepts that emerge 
from this autonomous epistemological community. This repre- 
sents a project for the reconstruction of the Trobriand 
culture in terms of discursive and strategic elements. 
1.5 Archaeology and anthropology. 
Since the employment of archaeology in anthropology 
involves a form of reconstruction, it is appropriate to 
examine briefly Levi-Strauss's views on the problems that 
might be associated with such a project. In Structural 
Anthropology, he elucidates the different problems that 
have confounded evolutionist and diffusionist reconstruc- 
tions [Levi-Strauss 1963, p. 3). 
The evolutionist interpretation in anthropology derives 
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from evolutionism in biology. According to this view, West- 
ern civilisation is regarded as the most advanced expression 
of the evolution of societies while primitive groups are 
regarded as 'survivals' of earlier stages, whose logical 
classification reflects their order of appearance in time 
(Levi-Strauss 1963, p. 31. This is unsatisfactory since given 
an unlimited choice of social criteria an unlimited number 
of evolutionary sequences may be constructed [Levi-Strauss 
1963, pp. 3-51. 
The diffusionist interpretations, like the 'stages' of 
the evolutionist, are the product of an abstraction that 
always lacks the corroboration of empirical evidence and the 
history produced is conjectural and ideological [Levi- 
Strauss 1963, pp. 6-71. 
In his own structuralist solution, Levi-Strauss avoids 
the traditional opposition between evolutionist and diffu- 
sionist approaches since he holds that the two schools 
converge in a problem of reconstruction [Levi-Strauss 1963, 
p. 3]. He refers to Boas's claim that all of the history of 
primitive peoples has got to be a form of reconstruction. 
Boas is noted for imposing rigorous criteria of validity on 
reconstruction. Levi-Strauss finds Boas successful where his 
reconstructions amount to a microhistory which cannot be 
related to the past [Levi-Strauss 1963, pp. 6-9]. However, 
Malinowski reasoned that since Boas demonstrated the extent 
to which it was futile to seek knowledge about 'how things 
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have come to be' in the past, he himself could renounce an 
understanding of history in favour of a synchronic analysis 
of the relationships between the constituent elements of 
1 
cultures in the present . However, Levi-Strauss fails to see 
how the functionalism of Malinowski, which resulted from 
this move, transcends Boas's theoretical position as it is 
sometimes claimed to do [Levi-Strauss 1963, p. 11]. 
Levi-Strauss criticises Malinowski for ignoring histo- 
ry and claims that it caused him to ignore an essential 
distinction between primary function, which corresponds to a 
present need of the social body, and secondary function, 
which survives only because the group do not give up a 
habit. While it is a truism to say that a society functions, 
it is absurd to claim that everything in a society functions 
[Levi-Strauss 1963, pp. 12-13]. According to Levi-Strauss, 
where a function has a universal claim, which is far from 
established even with a rigorous study of all the customs of 
a particular type and a study of their historical develop- 
ment, it is merely some triviality. Levi-Strauss praised 
Malinowskils field work for the wealth and vividness of his 
data (Firth 1988, p. 18]. However, he thought Malinowskils 
-------------------- 
1. In Britain, Malinowski's functionalist approach was 
regarded as a competitor to the older evolutionary and 
diffusionist historical schools [Firth 1988, p. 15]. Firth 
tells us that Malinowski was so dismissive of Boas and his 
followers that he punningly described that anthropology as 
'Boasinine' [Firth 1988, p. 14]. 
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theoretical approach to be incorrect in two major ways. It 
was essentially empiricist, focussing almost exclusively on 
observed behaviour, and rather than seeking underlying 
principles, he interpreted this behaviour in terms of overt 
factors. Levi-Strauss deplored this indifference to struc- 
tural problems [Firth 1988, p. 18]. 
Despite the fact that the archaeological method is 
involved in reconstructions this approach avoids the prob- 
lems outlined by Levi-Strauss since it breaks with an analy- 
sis of man in time and is, therefore, not involved with the 
human science of history at the level of the problem of 
evolution or diffusion. This break with man in favour of an 
analysis of that which is behind consciousness, but is not 
itself a form of consciousness, marks a break with the 
figure of agency, which is the foundation of history, where 
it manifests itself as either evolutionism or diffusionism. 
Archaeology can concede an involvement with microhistories 
which are not related to the past so much as to each other. 
Further, Levi-Strauss has himself addressed this ques- 
tion of a cultural unconscious in this context and developed 
his structuralist solution in that direction. He attributes 
the principle that anthropology draws its originality from 
the unconscious nature of collective phenomena to Tylor 
[Levi-Strauss 1963, p. 18]. Tylor defines culture as a com- 
plex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired 
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by man as a member of society (Levi-Strauss 1963, p. 18]. 
Levi-Strauss also credits Boas with defining the unconscious 
nature of cultural phenomena in terms of a comparison of 
cultural phenomena with language. In the same way that Boas 
claimed that linguistic classifications never rise to con- 
sciousness, I claim that the epistemic classifications, or 
guiding codes, never rise to primitive consciousness in 
terms of moral justifications or rational explanations. 
However, the Boasian analysis remained at the level of 
individual conscious thought. This level of intention is 
exactly where agency forms the positivity of the modern 
analysis and is not a level found in my archaeological 
analysis of the primitive Trobriand episteme. 
The way in which this unconscious structure is appre- 
hended marks a significant difference between structuralism 
and archaeology. While in agreement with Levi-Strauss's con- 
clusion that anthropology is involved primarily with an 
analysis of the unconscious elements of social life, the 
archaeological method does not agree at the level of re- 
sults. Foucault is often described as a structuralist but 
he took some pains to dispel this idea. While sharing the 
structuralists' desire to displace the human subject from 
theoretical concern, he has little else in common with them. 
The archaeological analysis reveals a structuralist frame- 
work within the Classical episteme while the modern episteme 
does not. This characterises the difference between archae- 
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ology and structuralism in that structural elements belong 
to the object of archaeological analysis and not to its 
method. We can say the same of representational and agency 
models as Foucault claimed of the structuralist method. 
Structuralism was found to be the way in which a particular 
episteme was organised. It remains outside of the archaeo- 
logical method and belongs at the level of results. Because 
archaeology eliminates the fundamental role of the subject, 
in an approach to the history of thought, it can operate as 
the historical counterpart of the structuralist counter- 
sciences of psychoanalysis and linguistics in the move away 
from a conception of man as the object that constitutes the 
world of objects. This explains the close link between 
Foucault's work and structuralism and his insistence that he 
is not a structuralist [Gutting 1990, p. 228]. 
1.6 Conclusions. 
My focus thus far has been on the discursive elements 
of the archaeological method, that is, on knowledge that is 
the outcome of linguistic practices. However, there are 
relations between knowledge and nondiscursive domains 
[Foucault 1972, p. 162]. A discourse may have a pedagogical 
role, a function in the political and economic decisions of 
governments, in the social and political struggles that 
characterise a particular period, in systems for organising 
and regulating marriage, religious ceremonies and practices. 
This domain involves a concern with the causal questions 
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relating to power. Foucault's archaeology as he presented it 
to us in his earlier writings was concerned with a descrip- 
tion of the discursive formations as a condition of the 
possibility of symbolic connections. At that stage he was 
not prepared to extend archaeology to causal questions. 
However, according to Gutting, he began, in The Archaeology 
of Knowledgý, to create a space for a discussion of the 
relation between knowledge and society that would connect 
the two at a fundamental level but would not require the 
reductionist's presuppositions of social determinism [Gut- 
ting 1990-, p. 257]. Foucault eventually found this space in 
the realm of questions of power. 
Archaeology supports an understanding of power as a 
complex set of force relations that are distributed every- 
where in discourse and are exercised through major discur- 
sive strategies. We must not conceive of power as immanent 
in a state body or sovereign individual but as being mani- 
fested everywhere in discourse. 
The objective of this anthropological project is to 
analyse discourses and practices regarding sex, marriage, 
exchange and magic as they occur amongst the Trobrianders 
for their shared positivity in the figures of the episteme 
governing the emergence of these discourses within that 
group. In order to achieve this objective, the space vacated 
by the subject in knowledge is to be occupied by power and 
its effective relations so that it can be shown how these 
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Archaeology and Power. 
'The lie of the ideal has hitherto been the curse an 
reality, through it mankind has become mendacious and 
false .. ' [Nietzsche 1985, p. 341. 
2.1 Introduction. 
The field of nondiscursive practices can be brought 
into the analysis by linking a notion of power to the ar- 
chaeological concerns. This connection provides a causal 
dimension for what is principally a descriptive method. 
Firstly, in this chapter, I am concerned with outlining the 
nature of the model of power involved. The appropriate 
figure of power is not involved with ideology nor is it a 
repressive figure, that functions especially effectively 
with respect to the area of sex, but, on the contrary, it 
can have positive effects. One such positive effect is that 
of producing and circulating knowledge. Secondly, I raise 
the subject of the consequences of such a figure of power 
for anthropology in the context of a debate on replacing the 
subject-knowledge link of the tradition with the power- 
knowledge link of the method that I am promoting. This move 
can be supported by Wittgenstein and, once it is complete, 
it is then possible to outline the epistemological figures 
of the archaeology that animates the episteme of the Tro- 
brianders. 
According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, under the structural- 
ist influence of Levi-Strauss, Lacan and Chomsky, Foucault 
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sought to further a formal analysis by determining the 
conditions and limitations of a justified formalisation 
[Dreyfus Rabinow 1982, p. 17]. The aim of this formal 
project was to rediscover on what basis knowledge became 
possible. Foucault employed the transitory notion of the 
episteme towards this end [Dreyfus & Babinow 1982, p. 181. 
However, Foucault eventually expressed a disappointment with 
The Order of Things because it lacked the problem of a 
discursive regime, and sought too much systematicity which 
he described as something like a paradigm [Foucault 1979, 
p. 32]. In the context of this disappointment, he employed 
the later genealogical method to uncover the operation of 
power in discourse. The genealogical approach represents the 
application of archaeology to both discursive and nandiscur- 
sive practices and this scope of application exhibits an 
essential link between knowledge and power. By exploiting 
this connection a causal explanation of changes in discur- 
sive formations and epistemes can be achieved. Genealogy 
combines a causal analysis with a descriptive archaeology. 
According to Gutting, genealogy does not replace archaeology 
since it is still needed to uncover the discursive rules 
that constitute bodies of knowledge. However, genealogy 
explains changes in the history of discourse that are merely 
described by archaeology [Gutting 1990, p. 7]. 
In this study, I am only concerned with a description, 
in the above sense, of the discursive formations of the 
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Trobrianders and not with an explanation of changes in those 
formations. The earlier archaeology is crucial for an under- 
standing of Foucault's later development since archaeology 
is a key element in the later genealogical method. There- 
fore, I maintain the use of the term 'archaeology' but I am 
also concerned with nondiscursive practices and this in- 
volves a link with power. 
Foucault's later analysis is concerned with the posi- 
tive nature of power in producing knowledge and truth as 
part of its own effects. The archaeological analysis itself, 
as a form of discourse, belongs to a regime of power. The 
Modern episteme is characterised by the central role of 
agency. Foucault claims that the archaeological analysis has 
no origin in agency but falls outside of such an analysis 
that relies on the agent as the productive force of knowl- 
edge. Archaeology loosens its emphasis on the strictly 
theoretical, in favour of an exploration of the regimes of 
power themselves. 
2.2 Power in discourse. 
The archaeological analysis of power is distinct from 
four traditional sorts of analyses of that concept EFoucault 
1979, p. 491. Firstly, it is independent from the idea of 
power as something definite that some people possess while 
other people do not. In the orthodox notion of power, there 
is a group of people or a class that possesses power and, in 
Western society, this syndicate is the bourgeoisie, intelli- 
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gentsia or the military, etc. 
Secondly, the notion of power appropriate to archaeolo- 
gy is distinct from the idea that political power is always 
localised in a definite number of elements which are essen- 
tially the state apparatuses. The archaeological analysis is 
freed from this correspondence between the forms of power 
and political structures. 
Thirdly, the archaeological conception of power is 
unconnected with the idea that power is always subordinate 
to a mode of production and, fourthly, is also unconnected 
with the idea that power only produces ideological effects 
and not knowledge [Foucault 1979, p. 59]. Instead of these 
conceptions of power we have one where power is won or lost 
like a battle, and the heart of the power relation is in a 
war-like representation of language and not one of mere 
appropriation [Foucault 1979, p. 60]. 
For Foucault, bodies of knowledge are never autonomous 
intellectual achievements applied as instruments of power. 
Rather, their constitution as knowledge depends on mecha- 
nisms of power. While power is always dangerous it is also a 
creative source of positive values including those of truth 
and knowledge [Gutting 1990, p. 6]. This creative, if danger- 
ous, conception of power is employed in this study. When 
the time comes to analyse the Trobriand episteme in detail, 
the archaeology employed will describe both the native 
discourses, such as magical spells, and the nondiscursive 
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practices, such as witchcraft, that sustain these. 
Foucault believes that recourse should not be made to 
ideals of signs and language in the analyses of historical 
discourses but instead the notions of war and battles should 
be employed as models. He suspects that the history, which 
determines us, is war-like and not language-like [Foucault 
1979, p. 331. In this way, allusion must be made to power 
relations and not to the sense-relations of the philosopher 
since history has no sense. This does not mean that history 
is incalculable; it simply means that analyses exclusively 
in terms of linguistic meanings are incapable of making 
history intelligible. History is both understandable and 
analysable down to the slightest detail. However, such an 
analysis is only possible according to the rationale of 
disputes, strategies and tactics and not according to the 
intelligibility of the logic of contradiction or semiotics. 
Foucault says of the dialectical method that it is a way of 
avoiding the dangerous and open reality of our history, 
understood in terms of a battle, by depreciating it to the 
Hegelian skeleton [Foucault 1979, p. 33]. In a comparable 
way, semiology is an expedient for avoiding the violent 
quality of our history by reducing it to a peaceful Platonic 
form of language and dialogue. The model of violent confron- 
-------------------- 
1. Examples of ideals in language are the notion of Ila 
lanquel in structuralism and the 'proposition, in logic. 
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tation is relevant for an understanding of the stratagems 
and devices of discourses embedded in our history. 
By acknowledging the presence of power in the history 
of our discourses, we are at once addressing the question of 
whom the discourse serves. In traditional political analyses 
the proposition of power is placed on either the 'right' or 
the 'left' of our political dichotomy. On the right, power 
is questioned exclusively in terms of constitutions, govern- 
ment, sovereignty, etc. and thus only in juridical terms. On 
the left, power is posed uniquely in terms of the state 
apparatus. These analyses avoid a scrutiny of the actual 
mechanisms of power [Foucault 1979, p. 34]. 
2.3.1 Power and ideology. 
Foucault offers two main reasons why an analysis of 
power must avoid the notion of 'ideology, [Foucault 1979, 
p. 36]. Firstly, archaeology is always antagonistic towards 
something like a rationally derived truth. The method is not 
committed to the problem of how to make a division in a 
discourse between that which is scientific, and thereby 
rational and true, and that which is incoherent, for example 
magic, poetry, etc. Archaeology is involved with under- 
standing how truth effects are historically produced within 
discourses which are not in themselves either true or false. 
In this way, the analysis is not concerned with a study of 
primitive discourses in order to defend them in terms of 
scientific rationality or to denounce them as mere supersti- 
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tion; it is determined to reveal the techniques and strate- 
gies with which these discourses constitute their own truth 
producing effects. We will see examples of this later with 
regard to Trobriand sexual, economic and magical discourses. 
Secondly, ideology necessarily refers to something like 
a subject and, as I have already mentioned, archaeology 
shares the structuralist avoidance of an inquisition of 
discourse in terms of a subject. An appreciation of the 
archaeological analysis of power necessitates the avoidance 
of any procedure that implicates the constituent subject as 
an explanatory element either on the right or the left. This 
move is very important to the present study since anthro- 
pology traditionally deals with subjects. Here, an analy- 
sis in terms of the subject is replaced by a study that can 
account for the portrayal of the subject within historical 
contexts. Archaeology is a form of history which accounts 
for the distinctiveness of knowledge, discourses, domains of 
objects and theoretical choices without having to allude to 
a subject as a transcendental in relation to a field of 
knowledge [Foucault 1979, p. 341. The evasion of mere subjec- 
tivity in the analysis is achieved by the comprehensive 
rejection of the subject as an efficacious explanatory unit 
in the history of knowledge. The traditional ideological 
analyses constantly refer back to subjects and are, there- 
fore, inappropriate for archaeology. 
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2.3.2 Power and repression. 
The concept of repression is likely to be associated 
with an investigation of power and, in Foucault's opinion, 
this affiliation is detrimental to an understanding of 
the figure of power appropriate for archaeology. He con- 
tends that the conception of repression is completely inade- 
quate for an account of the productivity of power in dis- 
course. If the effects of power are specified solely in 
terms of repression we are at once committed to a naive 
juridical conception of that power, and are immediately 
secured within the traditional dichotomous analysis between 
the left and right. Such an inquiry implicates us in an 
identification of power in terms of a prohibitive law. On 
the contrary, what gives power its acceptability for so many 
is the fact that it produces things and does not just weigh 
down on us as a negative force; it causes pleasure, it forms 
knowledge, it produces discourses. It is a productive com- 
plex running through the entire social body and is not 
just a negative instance which has the particular function 
of repression [Foucault 1979, p. 36]. The archaeological 
analysis discloses the creative function of power and shows 
how it exercises itself in, for example, matrimonial, eco- 
nomic and magical discourses. Furthermore, if power were 
everywhere prohibitive and repressive it seems inconceivable 
that so many people have avoided anarchism as a solution. 
Anarchy is not rejected simply because repression is thought 
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to be better than chaos. It is because power has its own 
attractive and constructive aspects. Power has received 
wholly negative connotations in the ideological analysis. 
This is not the case in the archaeological analysis where 
power has positive possibilities. 
Repression is generally thought to have a ubiquitous 
manifestation in relation to sex. This prevailing associa- 
tion of sexuality with repression endorses an identification 
of a liberal society with a permissive one in terms of the 
absence of juridical interference; the identification of a 
liberal society as one that takes every available opportuni- 
ty in word and deed to exercise its sexuality. However, 
'repressive' discourses on sexuality facilitate positive 
systems of medical and social procedures of intervention 
and control, systems of circulation (medical and pedagogical 
texts) of the discourses, etc. which seem to be bound up 
with techniques which have the appearance of repression, or 
at least are capable of being interpreted as such [Foucault 
1979, p. 37]. Freud is held to have inaugurated the thesis 
that children have a sexuality. This was supposedly achieved 
1 
in the context of a bourgeois repression - However, all the 
-------------------- 
1. The refusal to acknowledge infantile sexuality occurs 
even amongst anthropologists as we can see in Malinowskils 
The Sexual Lives of Savages page 48 where he writes that the 
Trobriander's claims that four year old girls are fully 
sexually active can be dismissed as typical native exaggera- 
tion and an example of their Rabelaisian humour. He puts the 
age of sexual activity at between six and eight years and 
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pedagogical and medical guides for parents in the eighteenth 
century address children's sex in every possible context. 
One might argue that the purpose of these discourses was 
explicitly to prevent children having a sexuality. But the 
effect of these discourses was to focus on the problem for 
parents which the children's sex constituted in terms of 
their educational responsibilities; to persuade the children 
that their relationship with their own bodies and their own 
sex was a fundamental problem as far as they themselves were 
concerned. This had the consequence, not of repressing child 
sexuality but, on the contrary, of actually exciting sexual 
desires in both the parents and children. This repressive 
focus on the perils of child sexuality had the effect of 
sexualising the child and of sexualising the relationship 
between parent and child. In brief, it had the effect of 
sexualising the family domain [Foucault 1979, p. 37]. In this 
way, the medical and pedagogical repression of sexuality in 
the eighteenth century gave rise to new forms of desires, 
and ultimately, by making the family the focus of a sexual 
discourse, created the conditions for the possibility of the 
emergence of incest. The repressive nature of the eight- 
eenth century had the productive function of creating these 
.,. Continued 
assigns it little importance in the child's life. The selec- 
tion of this topic as an example of native exaggeration is 
itself a good example of a bourgeois repression of child 
sexuality while at the same time speaking of it. 
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new sexual desires and explaining these very desires to 
families by means of pedagogical and medical treaties. Thus, 
repression is just one strategy in discourse for the produc- 
1 
tion of effects 
In outlining the nature of the Trobriand episteme, 
it will be seen that the problem of incest does not arise so 
much from a sexual focus on the native family as from myths 
focusing on the origin of man. However, it will also be seen 
that the problematisation of kinship in terms of an incest 
taboo has the effect of creating particular sexual ethical 
and ritual practices that prevail between brothers and their 
sisters. This is an example of the productive effects of a 
supposed repressive practice. In chapter four, the incest 
taboo will be examined for this type of productive effect 
rather than any repressive form that must be supported or 
resisted. The incest taboo between brother and sister is a 
discursive strategy and an example of the operation of power 
in sexual discourse. This taboo is due neither to a sup- 
pression of sexual desire nor a particular moral restraint 
nor sexual prudence within the indigenous family, since 
1. Indeed, Malinowski acknowledges an effect of his own 
scientific study. In the special Foreword to the Third 
edition of The Sexual Life of savages, he writes of his 
disappointment that the effect of a serious and objective 
study was that only the sensational details were picked out 
to be made the objects of wonder, laughter and titillation 
and that the whole functionalist mechanism was missed. This 
effect of Malinowskils work demonstrates Foucault's point 
well. 
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these themes are absent in the native discursive context. 
On the contrary, the taboo is due to the particular 
discursive power relations of the natives where productive 
techniques differ radically from those of the Modern 
episteme and, as a result, give rise to a different set of 
objects of desire. 
Sexuality is, therefore, a far more constructive 
product of power than is commonly imagined. These positive 
mechanisms of power are investigated in the archaeological 
analysis of knowledge and not the naive examination of the 
mechanisms of openness or repression. This marks a break 
with the hasty characterisation of power in terms of a 
juridical schema or figures of repression. Power is techni- 
cal and constructive rather than juridical and injurious 
[Foucault 1979, p-381. 
2.3.3 Power and truth. 
Procuring the truth by discourses is not outside of 
power nor is the project deprived of power. We should not 
conceive of an impotent voice speaking the truth against the 
repressive forces of power. On such a model, the truth is 
conceived as virtuous and struggling for Justice against an 
inequitable power regime. A conception of power that is 
capable of both producing and circulating the truth is 
appropriate. Indeed, this conception of power simultaneously 
produces that which counts as deception and repression and 
the very systems for achieving 'openness' and 'liberty'. The 
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truth is produced by the regulative effects of power (Fou- 
cault 1979, p. 46]. 
Each society has its particular regime of truth; its 
general politics of truth which are the types of discourses 
that it harbours and causes to function as true. These are 
the mechanisms that enable the individual to distinguish 
true from false statements. These techniques are valued for 
their ability to attain the truth and to establish in their 
particular status those who have the responsibility of 
identifying what counts as true [Foucault 1979, p. 46]. 
In Modern societies, the general politics of truth is, 
according to Foucault, characterised by five historically 
important traits. Firstly, 'truth' is focused on the conven- 
tion of scientific discourse and the institutions that 
produce it. Secondly, the truth is subject to an enduring 
economic and political demand which is concerned with both 
economic production and political power. Thirdly, the truth 
circulates in both the machinery of education and informa- 
tion which have a relatively wide extent within society 
while at the same time have their own strict limitations. 
Fourthly, it is produced and transmitted under the control 
of a few political or economic apparatuses such as the 
university, army, writing, media, etc. Fifthly, it is the 
centre of an entire political debate and social confronta- 
tion that takes the form of ideological struggles [Foucault 
1979, p. 46]. 
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Truth is focused on mythical discourse and traditional 
practices In the primitive society of the Trobrianders. The 
mythical truth produced in this way is subject to both a 
constant magical demand and the basic demands of survival. 
These primitive truths cannot circulate through the written 
word since the episteme is entirely oral so it avails itself 
of the less sophisticated and limited devices of repetition 
and the precarious handing on of formulae from the old to 
1 
the young . We will see that there are very specific appara- 
tuses of control on the transmission of truth available in 
the native notions of kinship. These particular techniques 
and strategies must be dissected in order to arrive at an 
efficacious understanding of the knowledge of primitive 
societies and an understanding of the adequacy and limita- 
tions of that knowledge. 
The primitive truth of the Trobrianders is focussed an 
the conventions of magical and mythical discourses and the 
practices that produce them. This truth is subject to the 
basic demands of survival in a hostile environment and 
circulates by tradition and the static knowledge thus pro- 
duced has strict limitations. The truth that is maintained 
in this way is controlled by magicians and those elders in 
possession of the myths. Confrontations between truths take 
place on the battle field. 
-------------------- 
1. - 1 address the question of the nature of oral discourse 
in more detail in the closing chapter. 
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2.4 Summary. 
In summary, we can say that 'truth' is a set of or- 
dered procedures for the production, regulation, distribu- 
tion, circulation and function of discursive statements. It 
is linked in a circular relation to systems of power that 
produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it 
induces and which redirect it. This is what is meant by a 
regime of truth. A regime of truth different from that in 
the modern experience operates in the Trobriand society. The 
archaeological analysis in anthropology does not have the 
function of identifying what system for the production of 
truth, for example, scientific or magical discourse, is 
most valuable. Such an inquiry would relinquish an analysis 
of truth and become an apparatus solely for the production 
of truth. Archaeological anthropology attempts to analyse 
the techniques and procedures for the production, regulation 
and circulation of the primitive statements that have the 
purpose of producing truth. Such an analysis involves this 
present distinctive conception and understanding of power. 
The project is to detach the power of truth from the forms 
of hegemony with which it operates at a particular time and 
not to extract the truth from either a system of native 
power or a native discourse and modify or rectify that truth 
in terms of scientific discourse. The anthropological 
project is not one of identifying error, illusions and 
instances of 'native rationality', that is some belief that 
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can be made to conform to our own, but an analysis of primi- 
tive truth and power itself. 
2.5 The power-knowledge relation. 
Foucault claims that it was Nietzsche who first speci- 
fied the power relation as the general focus of philosophi- 
cal discourse whereas Marx specified the production rela- 
tion. He describes Nietzsche as the philosopher of power 
claiming that he managed to think power without confining 
himself within a political theory to do so. Foucault's 
analysis of the role of power in discourse remains influ- 
enced by a Nietzschean perspective. In the same way that 
archaeology thinks power without confining itself within a 
political theory, so also must it think of the subject 
without confining itself within subjectivity. 
The conditions for the possibility of power are not 
sought in the primary existence of a central point, that 
is, a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary 
forms are derived. The conditions for the possibility of 
power are sought in the particular force relations which 
perpetually give rise to states of power which are always 
local and unstable [Foucault 1978, p. 93]. Foucault alleges 
that power is omnipresent because it is produced from one 
moment to the next at every point, that is, in every rela- 
tion from one point to another, and not because it has the 
privilege of consolidating everything under its unity. Power 
is attributed to a complex strategical situation in a par- 
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ticular society and not to an institution, structure or a 
certain strength that an individual might possess [Foucault 
1978, p. 93]. Foucault advances four propositions concerning 
the notion of power and its relation to knowledge. 
Firstly, power is exercised from innumerable points and 
is not something that is acquired and distributed. Nor is it 
something that we keep possession of or forfeit [Foucault 
1978, p. 941. 
Secondly, relations of power are not external to other 
categories of relationships, such as economic and sexual 
relations, but are immanent in these relations. Power rela- 
tions are the immediate effects of the divisions and in- 
equalities which occur in discursive relations. Conversely, 
power relations are the internal conditions for these very 
discursive discriminations. In chapter five, I demonstrate 
this very feature in operation with respect to the role of 
the chief in a system of exchange for the production of 
wealth. The power of the chief is the immediate effect of an 
inequality arising out of discourses on the status of men 
and women. In turn, the role of the chief provides the 
conditions for this discrimination. Power relations are not 
in a super-structural position with regard to other rela- 
tions but merely accompany them and have a productive func- 
tion. 
Thirdly, all power is exercised with a series of aims 
and objectives but these do not emanate from the choices or 
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decisions of an individual subject. The rationality of power 
is often characterised by tactics that are quite explicit 
and in this way cynical. However, it is often the case that 
no one could have invented these particular strategies and 
very few could be said to have formulated them. In other 
words, the agency of a subject is not necessary to this 
analysis of power since the agent cannot conspire at this 
level of power. The strategies of power relations are 
anonymous and are 'invented' without hypocrisy [Foucault 
1978, p. 951. This point is extremely important since it 
necessitates the rejection of the subject as a causal unit 
in this analysis. 
Fourthly, wherever there is power there is resistance 
and this resistance is never outside of the power relations. 
Power relations depend on a multiplicity of points of re- 
sistance and take the form of adversary, target, support, 
etc., and these points of resistance are always present in 
the power network. Hence, there is no inviolable law of 
resistance posited outside of power. 
The analysis of power appropriate to archaeology es- 
chews the system of law and sovereignty which has maintained 
a political analysis for such a long time. This genre of 
analysis questions power relations for their most immediate 
and most local incidences at work in discourses appearing 
historically and in specific places. It questions power 
relations as to how they make these kinds of discourses 
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possible and, conversely, how these discourses support 
power relations. It also examines how these power relations 
are linked to one another according to the logic of a great 
strategy. These are the types of questions this type of 
analysis asks of all discourses. To answer them, Foucault 
advances several rules that he does not intend to be method- 
ological imperatives but merely regards as cautionary 
prescriptions [Foucault 1978, p. 98]. 
Firstly, since techniques of knowledge and regimes of 
power are not separable from each other, the power-knowledge 
relation must be the object of the archaeological study 
[Foucault 1978, p. 98]. This means that if a discourse is the 
object of mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the 
economic or ideological requirements of power, it becomes 
the concern of disinterested scientific enquiry. In order 
to gain access to such an analysis, local centres of power- 
knowledge must be selected. The local centres that are 
chosen eventually enter into a total strategy and conversely 
strategies achieve comprehensive effects only by gaining 
support from precise relations [Foucault 1978, p. 100]. 
Secondly, the inquisition of power does not seek the 
possessors of that power (men, parents, doctors, chiefs, 
etc. ) nor those who are deprived of it (women, children, 
slaves, etc. ). Thirdly, power and knowledge are linked 
together in discourse and for this reason, discourse must be 
conceived of as a series of discontinuous segments with 
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neither a uniform nor stable tactical function. There is a 
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into 
operation in various strategies and it is this distribution 
in particular societies that must be reconstructed. 
Finally, discourses are not subservient to power in a 
permanent way but may be hostile to it. Discourse can be 
both an instrument and an effect of power but it can also be 
a hindrance and a point of resistance and, indeed, a start- 
ing point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits, 
produces and reinforces forms of power while at the same 
time undermining them and exposing them to weakness and 
making it possible for those forms to be overthrown. 
In summary, the shift towards the archaeological 
conception of power offers an alternative to the privileged 
place of legislation, in the traditional analysis, with the 
notion of the objective of a regime. The privilege of prohi- 
bition is replaced by the notion of tactical efficacy, and 
the privilege of sovereignty is supplanted by the complex 
field of moving force relations. This means that the origi- 
nal force relations which have found their expression in war 
have gradually become immersed in the order of political 
power during peace time and in this way peace may be 
regarded as a form of war [Foucault 1978, p. 102]. This 
strategical archaeological model applied to anthropology can 
replace an ideal model based on the traditional explanatory 
categories. 
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2.6 Power or agency? 
Fardon affirms that Foucault's writings dismantle the 
classical problematisation of knowledge and power in terms 
of ideology in favour of a composite power-knowledge which 
is productive of truth [Fardon 1986, p. 5]. He takes issue 
with this approach in what he alleges to be its failure to 
address major questions in the sociology of knowledge: the 
extent to which dominant ideologies are in fact generally 
adhered to, the conditions under which they deviate, the 
degree to which they can be demonstrated to incorporate 
different classes within a society. In short, he questions 
the entire mechanics by which the dissolution of the agent 
is achieved and suggests that the logic of this position is 
difficult to maintain, and moreover creates problems in an 
explanation of transformations. 
In Fardon's assessment, Foucault endeavours to disre- 
gard the problems inherent in theories of ideology by 
compounding power with truth where truth is a product of 
power relations and not by situating power on the side 
opposed to truth or on the side of oppression. An under- 
standing of these ideas would involve anthropologists in a 
fresh appraisal of the theories of ideology and commit them 
to various approaches in that analysis [Fardon 1986, p. 16]. 
This conclusion is as much as he concedes to Foucault's 
proposals in the problem of'power. 
Fardon embraces quite specific criticisms of Fou- 
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cault's work. He rightly claims that, by virtue of its 
scope and the brilliance of its application, we may describe 
the -concept of power available in Foucault's texts as a 
'broad notion of power' [Fardon 1986, p. 128]. A 'broad 
notion of power' accommodates questions of great generality 
which are not available if power is equated with force or 
possession that is wielded to serve the interests of a 
dominant individual, class or group. He correctly characte- 
rises theoreticians of 'broad notions of power' as practis- 
ing an activity in which knowledge becomes an instance of 
the relations of the deployment of power. These different 
formulations share the characteristic of collapsing re- 
ceived distinctions into a single instrumentality with non- 
intentional destinies. This can be achieved because Fou- 
cault, amongst others, subscribes to some version of a 
replacement of individual subjects by super-individual 
forces which effectively subsumes individual agency. This 
observation is pertinent to my work here since it also 
subscribes to this 'broad notion of power' with its replace- 
ment of the agent as an explanatory element. It is necessary 
then to address and refute Fardon's particular criticisms. 
Firstly, Fardon claims that Foucault's result is para- 
doxical since this manoeuvre imposes some form of inevita- 
bility upon historical outcomes while encountering diffi- 
culties in accounting for historical processes of transition 
[Fardon 1986, p. 128]. Against this tendency of introducing 
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super-individual forces, Fardon argues that meaningful or 
goal directed behaviour should be re-introduced to the model 
to solve some of the problems encountered by broad theories 
of power. In other words, he demands the re-introduction of 
1 
intentional states 
Secondly, subjectivity becomes problematic by its very 
nature where personal experiences are considered illusory 
and when notions of personhood vary both horizontally 
across cultures and vertically through history [Fardon 1986, 
p. 129]. From an anthropological point of view, in order for 
activity to be meaningful and purposeful, Fardon claims 
that we have to know the sense in which such qualities can 
attach themselves to agency in the societies which are 
studied, and further, we have to be sure that this knowledge 
is unavailable as an object of reflection to those who are 
studied. This gives rise to the problem of the situation of 
subjectivity. This dilemma offers two possible solutions: 
the first solution is to argue that there is a standardised 
human cognitive development with minimal correspondences in 
universal human agency; the second is to work with the 
hypothesis that agents are differently constructed in dif- 
1. In this criticism Fardon ignores the role of positivities in the context of the overall archaeological technique. The 
positivity of discourses is in place precisely to replace 
the role of intentional states. 
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1 
ferent cultures . In Fardon's opinion both of these strate- 
gies are preferable to the Foucauldian consequences since a 
non-subject analysis would be against the spirit of humani- 
tarianism. 
Fardon alleges that Foucault's collapsing of the uncon- 
scious categories of the episteme into the broad concept of 
power-knowledge results in an anti-humanitarian posture more 
radical than that of the structuralists from whom Foucault 
2 
disassociates himself . The subject is dissolved both as an 
agent of meaning creation and as an agent of power. Power 
relations are at one and the same time intentional and 
anonymous, non-subjective, yet strategic. For Fardon, the 
analyst, whose analysis makes these categories visible, is 
the only subject who seems to remain undissolved. In anthro- 
pological terms, this represents a convergence of, in Far- 
don's thinking, causation and translation and the possibili- 
ty of a simultaneous solution in terms of each other [Fardon 
1986, p. 142]. The problem of translation occurs for the 
anthropologist in the analysis of alien cultures. 
1. The first of these is adhered to by Bloch in the essay 'From Cognition to Ideology' in Power and Knowledge. Anthro- 
pological and Sociological Approaches while the second is 
adhered to by Strathern in the essay 'Knowing Power and 
Being Equivocal: Three Melanesian Contexts' also in Power 
and Knowledge. 
2. These unconscious categories of the episteme are not the 
psychic categories of the unconscious. It must also be 
remembered that Foucault does not disassociate himself from 
the structuralists simply for humanitarian reasons. 
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Further, Fardon claims that Foucault's epistemes resem- 
ble the anthropologist's more mundane notion of 'cultural 
patterns'. He argues that the epistemes in The Order of 
Things, where Foucault locates the episteme in the Classical 
theories of wealth, living beings and language, are con- 
structed in accordance with the interests of the analyst. 
Different interests, he claims, would have located a dif- 
ferent episteme according to a procedure which Foucault 
likens to a game. Assuming a continuity between the earli- 
er notion of episteme and the later one of knowledge, the 
power-knowledge concept must, according to Fardon, harbour 
the same arbitrariness. However, the difference is that this 
later concept is supposed to rescind individual agency. 
Fardon fails to see how a certain imposition of arbi- 
trary form can achieve this result. He is not claiming that 
these impositions are incorrect but that they cannot negate 
agency. This constitutes the fourth point of his criticism. 
Fardon uses his own study of sociability among the 
Chamba as an attempt to reproduce the intentionality of the 
Chamba actions. He argues that these actions are based on 
intentions which, in principle, are not directly accessible 
to him just as the intention of a writer is inaccessible to 
his translator. Translations attempt to represent inten- 
tions within a system of language which itself is in the 
process of change and as such have to be periodically 
overhauled. For Fardon, the task of translation is by its 
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very nature incapable of completion. Therefore, he argues 
that his account of Chamba Political development does not 
negate Chamba agency but, rather, it offers a generalised 
translation of the intentions implied in Chamba agency by 
positing the existence of an implicit knowledge. The study 
avoids causal generalisations which are the only claims 
which could usurp the assumption of agency. Such a task is 
an effort to situate subjectivity rather than supplant it 
[Fardon 1986, p. 1431. 
in conclusion, the analyses of the theories of 'broad 
notions of power' involve circularities which Fardon claims 
can be avoided by the enterprise of translating the inten- 
tion of the agent. While acknowledging that sociability, 
agency, personhood, etc, are not concepts that are available 
to the Chamba, Fardon believes that it is still possible to 
argue that there are terms of translation which are con- 
cerned with the representation of intention. This does not 
exclude a role for the notion of power; on the contrary an 
account of intentions is not the same as an account of 
power. 
Fardon argues that broad analyses of power tend to 
tautology because they collapse procedures of causation and 
translation. He calls for a distinction to be made between 
the techniques which constitute an object of analysis and 
the means by which we analyse or explain that object thus 
constituted. Translation procedures must attempt to encom- 
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pass the agency of the situated subjectivities that are 
studied in anthropology. The techniques of explanation tend 
necessarily to displace the agency of those studied with 
their own interests but caution in this area is necessary in 
the model where the anthropologist is the custodian of both 
sets of intentions, our own and those studied, and we remain 
in the constant danger of disregarding the latter through 
failure to think through the implications of the former. 
Anthropology must define its responsibility in the handling 
of this 'middle ground'. 
2.7 Replying to Fardon's criticisms. 
Firstly, with respect to Fardon's claim about the 
paradoxical results available in the displacement of the 
analytic role of the subject, I argue that inevitability is 
imposed in archaeology only within the confines of a defina- 
ble era, that is, within the episteme. The inter-epistemic 
breaks remain unspecified in their causation even in a 
causal analysis involving power regimes. Foucault regards 
the interrogation of this area as a form of questioning 
inappropriate to his method. The archaeological analysis has 
no claims on a teleology. By breaking history into such 
specifiable eras this type of paradox is avoided in broad 
notions of power'. 
Secondly, I argue that it is not obviously the case 
that all anthropological analyses necessitate a knowledge of 
the sense in which personal experience attaches itself to 
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agency in studied societies. Both types of solution sup- 
ported by Fardon can be circumvented by removing the myth of 
the necessity of agency. It is typical of the archaeological 
analysis to avoid the explanatory terms of rationalism 
rather than attempt to dissolve them in a re-working. The 
archaeological analysis sets out the wholly new analytic 
parameters outlined in the previous chapter and this must 
always be kept in mind. 
Fardon claims that the difference between the power- 
knowledge concept of Foucault's later work and the epis- 
temes is that the power-knowledge concept rescinds individu- 
al agency. However, Foucault has already abandoned the 
utilisation of human agency in the earlier archaeological 
analysis. In essence then, Fardon is arguing that the genea- 
logical analysis arbitrarily abandons subjectivity and 
intentionality. However, this move has already taken place 
in the earlier analysis. The absence of an explicit analysis 
of the function of power distinguishes the earlier and later 
work. The later work marks the addition of an analytic tool 
rather than the subtraction of a subject. 
Fardon's error lies in his demand for a subject within 
t 
an archaeological-type analysis. This demand ignores the 
positivistic nature of the analysis which is one of the main 
reasons it can be used in anthropology since, in its non- 
subjective nature, there is no reduction to states of per- 
sonal or experiential meanings and the problem of transla- 
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tion is avoided. 
The fundamental misunderstanding of The Order of 
Things revolves around a single problem: the status and 
role of the human subject, the concept of 'man' in history 
and in the human sciences. In The Order of Things Foucault 
had precisely the ambition of displacing human agency, 
consciousness, from the centre of theoretical concern. Human 
subjects had enjoyed this position in many forms of philoso- 
phy during the time from Descartes to Sartre. This is the 
project that he shares with structuralism and not a desire 
to extend the application and methods of structural linguis- 
tics. This does constitute a basic anti-humanist position in 
Foucault's thought but he remains profoundly anti-structur- 
alist. The archaeological history does not seek to crystal- 
lise the movement of history in structures but to elucidate 
the nature of historical change. 
Indeed, it emerged from Foucault's study of general 
grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth that, 
in a sense, the whole Classical period was structuralist 
because its knowledge was based on the representation of the 
sign and on the analysis of fixed relations between specific 
elements that exclude the concept of 'man' and 'history' as 
these were understood in the nineteenth century. Foucault's 
analysis of Classical thought reveals a Istructuralist' 
framework while his analysis of Modern thought since eight- 
een hundred reveals the role of agency in the construction 
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of knowledge. The structural elements belong to the objects 
of Foucault's research, that is the Classical period, but do 
not belong to his method. The Modern episteme is characte- 
rised by the role of agency, consciousness, in the construc- 
tion of discourses. In this sense we can say that agency has 
a necessary role in all modern discourses, including anthro- 
pology. However, if we use a method like that recommended by 
Fardon, which has a role for agency, then we would be com- 
mitted to retaining traditional anthropological unities and 
traditional attempts at universalising cultural phenomena. 
In other words, we would elevate agency from the status of 
the object of a study to a transcendental role in a study. 
This would result in an undermining of the archaeological 
project by ignoring it. Agency is to the Modern episteme 
what structuralism is to the Classical: the object of the 
analysis and not the method. Foucault invokes the notion of 
positivity precisely to underscore the non-subjective ele- 
ments that are revealed in discourse by the archaeological 
method. The avoidance of the use of agency in the analysis 
is precisely the aim of archaeology. Because of this, the 
role of the subject can be outlined and delimited since the 
presence or absence of the concept of 'man' can be made 
opaque in the analysis. The use of a positive point of 
departure is the only means whereby the role of such a 
concept can be revealed horizontally across cultures in 
anthropology or vertically in the history of our knowledge. 
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otherwise, the danger remains of imposing this concept on 
cultures where it may not occur. This imposition can be 
easily achieved by the translation of the signs of selfhood, 
e. g. III, 'man', etc as denoting a selfhood constructed in 
our terms. This lesson can be learned from the archaeology 
of the Classical Age which reveals that the term 'man' did 
not signify self but represented a category of types. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault was concerned 
with clarifying certain misunderstandings in the nature of 
the archaeological enterprise. These misunderstandings 
generally appeared around the notion of self'. A second set 
of problems arose surrounding the question of historical 
periodisation. Fardon alludes to these in terms of the 
arbitrary form of the episteme which seems to serve the 
interests of the analyst. Foucault refers to this problem by 
discussing the status of certain concepts in the historical 
disciplines generally. He rejects the notion of rationality, 
the teleology of the sciences and the continuous labour of 
the thought of subjects as historically transcendental 
themes. The apparent unity an which such large groups of 
statements as medicine, economics and general grammar were 
based was illusory. The archaeological analysis revealed 
that in place of these unities were series of gaps inter- 
twined with one another, interplays of differences and 
transformations. Because of this, his analysis can be said 
to demonstrate a system of dispersion. As we have seen, 
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when such a system is at work in a group of statements it is 
termed a discursive formation. This term replaces the older 
deceptive terms of 'science', 'discipline', 'theory', etc. 
which are all attached to agents and do not appear at all 
arbitrary to Fardon. 
The selection of the episteme is not simply capricious. 
Foucault mentions how the method is fictitious, [Foucault 
1979, p. 74]. This refers to the poetic dimension of the 
method. Gilles Deleuse describes this work as 'not so much 
a discourse on his method as a poem of his previous work'. 
Foucault had reached a point at which he regarded philosophy 
to be necessarily poetry [Sheridan 1980, p. 90]. His histo- 
ries are truth producing fictions. Here he is assigning a 
new effect of power to fiction. Fiction acquires the effect 
of producing the truth with which, hitherto, it has not been 
associated. Such is the nature of a method that seeks to 
avoid the scientific 'rational' dichotomy in the history of 
our intellectual disciplines The Intellectual status of 
the method is not at stake here. Foucault is provocatively 
pointing to the fact that, since his analysis focuses on the 
techniques for establishing statements as true, it is not an 
appropriate form of questioning to interrogate the method 
for its own truth. Foucault is underlining the fact that it 
1. This type of project with its new unities is outlined in 
the Preface to The, Order of Things. There Foucault offers 
several examples of explanatory unities that he wishes to 
abandon, for example, the subject, the oeuvre, science, etc. 
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is power regimes that establish a body of knowledge as 
containing the truth and not simply logical coherence. 
Poetry, on this model, might have this status if it could be 
made to serve the interests of truth. Foucault is demon- 
strating the fact that power regimes have the possibility of 
assigning truth to any form of discourse that has not hith- 
erto been associated with it. 
The introduction of power into the analysis does not 
rescind individual agency in the subject-knowledge relation 
as Fardon suggests. He is correct to believe that a move 
like that would have such a result. The analysis of power is 
not brought in to remove agency but to occupy one side of 
the epistemological concern only after the place of the 
subject has already been vacated. This vacancy has already 
beenachieved in the positivistic analysis of the discursive 
elements. Power now occupies one half of a relationship with 
knowledge, as that which produces, grounds, modifies and 
maintains it; a role hitherto assigned to the subject. This 
only means that knowledge manifests a contingent form across 
our cultures and histories. The subject is only one such 
form that has fallen into disuse. 
2.8 Wittgenstein and power-knowledge. 
Wittgenstein's social theory with its explanatory role 
for forms of life can be used to criticise the transcenden- 
tal role of agency and its apparently non-arbitrary and 
universal unities which Fardon wants to maintain. His 
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writings can be used to support some of the conclusions of 
archaeology that attempt to show the historical contingency 
of the primary metaphorical figures in the construction of 
our knowledge. He lays down the conditions for the possi- 
bility of knowledge in that when something is claimed to be 
known it must be the case that that something is true or 
false. Something that is neither true nor false has the 
status of a fundamental proposition which has a foundational 
function in a system of knowledge without itself being a 
piece of knowledge. The guiding metaphors of the episteme 
are like this. Metaphors do not hold across all possible 
cultures since they depend on the way in which they are 
employed by a culture. This formulation represents the 
death of the unique role of the subject in knowledge. An 
affective language would not have the status of knowledge 
claims since it would not have any rules, good or bad, for 
establishing the truth or falsity of those claims and as 
such is impossible [Kenny 1973, p. 180]. The central conten- 
tion here is that the term knowledge is misused in relation 
to a language based on the subject. Therefore, we do not 
have to use such a strategy, or figure, as the foundation 
for an anthropology. 
In anthropological discourses, where knowledge is 
alleged, we must look to the way knowledge claims are actu- 
ally used in their original homes and return concepts from 
their metaphysical to their everyday use [Wittgenstein 1984, 
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para. 116]. Bloor refers to Wittgenstein's comments about 
the language games in which there is an extensive vocabu- 
lary of words for framing accounts of actions that includes 
intention [Bloor 1983, p. 72]. Wittgenstein suggests that the 
giving of reasons why one acts in a particular way does not 
involve finding the causes of one's actions by frequent 
observation of the conditions under which they arise [Witt- 
genstein 1987, p. 110]. It consists in making actions intel- 
ligible by relating them to an acceptable pattern of conduct 
and expectation. These patterns are known to all competent 
social participators and so they are readily available for 
the purposes of explanation and justification. Therefore, an 
intention is something that is embedded in human institu- 
tions and customs [Wittgenstein 1984, para. 337]. It is 
obvious that the rejection of the subject as the explanatory 
unit of epistemology involves the rejection of intentionali- 
ty as an account of human action. Earlier, we saw that 
Fardon claimed that intentionality was essential to all 
types of analyses. Wittgenstein lends credible weight to 
what may be termed the 'broad theories of history, that 
accommodate 'broad notions of power' against the position 
adopted by Fardon. 
For the anthropologist, Wittgenstein's arguments allow 
for the claim that all of the members of a primitive commu- 
nity, such as the Trobrianders, know what they mean by 
certain terms and know what the rest of the members of that 
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community mean by those terms. It is to the extent that 
the rules governing the formation of discourses are shared 
that we can identify a collection of individuals as a commu- 
nity. A community is a group of individuals immersed in a 
shared form of life (episteme) and not a group who share 
views by majority consensus, or for pragmatic reasons, or 
because of a desire to be rational, etc. By producing evi- 
dence of discursive discontinuity in terms of material 
meanings, which both Foucault and Wittgenstein have done, 
the claim for a radical diversity in thinking processes can 
be upheld. There is no one correct rational procedure but 
many forms of rationality. These many forms of rationality 
Wittgenstein calls forms of life' and Foucault calls lepi- 
stemes'. The ends served by discourses lie outside of the 
intentions of the individual agents and their discourses 
serve the discursive ends of that community in terms of 
truth and power effects. It is not necessary for the anthro- 
pologist to attempt to gain access to the primitive individ- 
ual experience but to understand the discursive regularities 
that are in operation in that community. 
In his early work, Foucault's iconoclastic style found 
its object in psychiatric and penal institutions from whence 
1 
it moved to the discourses of Life, Wealth and Grammar . The 
-------------------- 
1. See Foucault's work The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline 
and Punish and The Order-of Things. 
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study of Grammar in the Classical Age is complimented by 
Wittgenstein's critique of the philosophical maintenance of 
such a model of representation in many contemporary intel- 
lectual pursuits. Wittgenstein suggests that representation 
is inadequate for the task of producing contemporary knowl- 
edge by showing how it conflates experience and knowledge in 
1 
a (representational) model where memory is made infallible 
Foucault's analysis shows the detail and limitations of any 
knowledge which finds its conditions of possibility in any 
such figure. 
2.9 Malinowski and collective knowledge. 
Malinowski, whose ethnography I extensively employ in 
this study, was repelled by ideas of collective knowledge. 
He was an individualist, interested in the experiences, per- 
plexities and desires of individuals and he deeply distrust- 
ed anything claiming to be more than individual. It is worth 
mentioning in passing that Malinowski was influenced by that 
theoretical approach which is perhaps the most individualis- 
t ically orientated, that is, psychoanalysis. From psychoa- 
nalysis he got the clues for some of his most cherished 
theoretical ideas on the nature of family relations EFortes 
-------------------- 
1. See Wittgenstein's 'private language argument, in The 




1970, p. 171] . His most persistent criticisms are directed 
against positions like the one I am propounding that might 
be held to imply that the individual does not possess the 
capacity for free choice based in reason. Thus he would not 
be happy with the direction of my analysis here. Morgan is 
rebuked for postulating group marriage [Malinowski 1982a, 
pp. xxxii]; Durkheim is criticised for emphasising religious 
euphoria with its implications for a group mind [Malinowski 
1982b, p. 55]; Freud is criticised for postulating a collec- 
tive unconscious [Malinowski 1927b, p. 156f]; Hartland is 
criticised for suggesting that primitive man is a legal 
automaton [Malinowski 1932, pp. 10,55f]. It is fairly safe 
to suggest that, if he were alive today, I would likewise be 
abused for positing knowledge as an historical rather than 
individual achievement. It was dogma for Malinowski that all 
human beings are reasonable individuals [Leach 1970, p. 127]. 
Leach reminds us that at the beginning of Malinowskils 
career the 'savage' was commonly regarded as sub-rational 
and Levy-Bruhl's contemporary notion of 'pre-logical mental- 
ity' was repugnant to Malinowskils thinking. It is against 
this background that he tried to impose 'rationality, upon 
his savages. He contended that primitive man maintains a 
-------------------- 
1. Fortes claims that Malinowski had to reinterpret Freud to 
accommodate his ethnography. The main problem was the empir- ical status of the unconscious emotional formations and 
conflicts, overtly visible in symbolic forms. For a detailed 
study of Malinowski's adoption of Freud see Fortes's essay 'Malinowski and the study of kinship'(see bib. ). 
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fundamental category distinction between fact and fiction, 
using criteria that might have been acceptable to John 
Stuart Mill [Leach 1970, p. 1281. This argument is latent in 
all of his writings concerning the relation between science 
and magic. Since he found the conceptual difference between 
the objective-rational and the subjective-metaphysical self- 
evident, he insisted that it must also be self-evident to 
the Trobrianders [Leach 1970, p. 128]. In the late nine- 
teenth-century, non-rationality was regarded as one of the 
characteristic marks of the savage. Likewise it was regarded 
as characteristic of civilised man that he could distinguish 
between the logical and the non-logical. Frazer's descrip- 
tion of magic as 'bastard science' is typical of this view 
[Leach 1970, p. 129]. In seeking to break down this dichotomy 
between civilised and savage man, Malinowski argued that 
primitives and Europeans were equally capable of making this 
distinction [Leach 1970, p. 1291. 
Archaeology addresses this dichotomy between the modern 
European and the superstitious savage. It is misleading to 
describe the gap between these epistemes as incommensurable. 
The Order of Things is concerned with outlining the discon- 
tinuous nature of epistemes while avoiding a conclusion in 
either incommensurability or its opposite, cumulative ra- 
tionality. The archaeological analysis occupies the space 
vacated by such unities and examines what follows from their 
rejection. To embrace these simple notions of discontinuity 
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would be to ignore the spirit of the archaeological enter- 
prise and its potential in anthropology. 
1 
Foucault claims that anthropology could achieve enor- 
mous prestige and importance if it were to seek its objects 
in the area of the unconscious processes that characterise 
the system of a given culture. In this way it would define 
as a system of cultural unconsciousness the totality of 
formal structures which render mythical discourse signifi- 
cant, give coherence and necessity to the rules that regu- 
late needs and provide the norms of life with a foundation 
other than that to be found in nature or in pure biological 
function [Foucault 1970, p. 380]. It is exactly my ambition 
here to attempt to provide anthropology with this important 
status by initiating an epistemic approach to cultures that 
uncovers the formal codes that constitute kinship relations, 
1. In a footnote to an interview with Foucault in Power, 
Truth, Strategy, Fontano and Pasquino point out that 
tra io ly in French 'anthropology' was defined in oppo- 
sition to ethnography and ethnology where ethnography is the 
descriptive study of the life of human groups and ethnology 
is the comparative theoretical use of the data provided in 
ethnography and corresponds to the English discipline of 
Social Anthropology [Fontano and Pasquino 1979, p. 481. 
However, Levi-Strauss initiated a move towards using 'an- 
thropology' in the same relation to ethnology as ethnogra- 
phy. The three terms then correspond to a three stage re- 
search project which seeks a global knowledge for the whole 
of the evolution of man that embraces the subject in its 
complete historical and geographical extent. Foucault's 
interviewers suggest that it is in this sense that he makes 
use of the term 'anthropology'. In The Order of Things he 
uses the term 'ethnology' which I amý'loosely replacing with 
the term anthropology'. 
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that regulate needs and empower magical discourses with 
curative or dangerous effects. Ethnologies such as those of 
Malinowski will be rejected in place of an analysis of the 
cultural unconscious which forms an historical apriori. 
While Malinowski bases his interpretations in pure biologi- 
cal function, archaeology tries to completely avoid such an 
approach. 
2.10 Discursive and nondiscursive elements. 
The ambition of this project is to construct an episte- 
mological framework in the form of a primitive episteme that 
will account for the discursive objects and rules of forma- 
tion of the Trobriand discourses. However, we have seen 
that the discursive concerns of the last chapter cannot be 
separated from the nondiscursive practices and institutions 
which are the concerns of power. As well as discursive 
strategies and techniques, we will have to take into account 
how the primitive discourses are maintained, adhered to and 
propagated; the way in which these discourses are made true 
and false; the way in which they are made objective through 
the function of myths. Despite Fardon's objections the 
construction of such an episteme, with its power-knowledge 
relations, is an anthropological project and does not in- 
volve intentional states manifested in the explanatory role 
of 'agency', 'consciousness', etc. in the same way that the 
construction of the Renaissance episteme did not involve 
these terms. The construction of the Trobriand episteme 
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involves the positivistic concepts and objects appropriate 
to the primitive rules of its discursive formations. 
A characterisation of power exclusively in terms of 
primitive hegemonies and systems of sovereignty is to be 
avoided in an analysis of the power relations of primitive 
societies. Such a representation would mark a return to the 
traditional conception in terms of juridical forms. While 
the Trobrianders lack a formulation of the state in terms of 
sovereignty, or in terms of a policing apparatus as a puni- 
tive system, they do not lack discursive power relations 
that have productive functions in the same way that modern 
sexual discourse has these. Precisely these productive 
functions, techniques and strategies will be examined in 
this study. The discourses of this primitive society are 
examined in order to identify the particularity of these 
power functions and the means whereby the native discourses 
propagate, circulate, and sustain themselves. Tribal 
chiefs cannot occupy the whole field of the actual power 
relations. On the contrary they maintain their status only 
on the basis of already existing power relations which are 
promoted through economical, magical, and ontological dis- 
courses. 
Anthropologists tend to confine the analysis of power 
relations of primitive societies to a hegemonic system in 
the same way that modern thought has confined the operation 
of power to the forms of law and the forms of sovereignty. 
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The particular discourses that are created and the positive 
products of those discourses in terms of the function they 
have for furnishing customs, maintaining a certain order, 
and producing native truths are the power relations avail- 
able in the application of archaeology to anthropology. In 
the ethnographic detail available in Malinowski's work, it 
can be observed how power draws on the native perception of 
suitable marriage and appropriate sexual behaviour that is 
determined according to precise norms. This analysis will 
draw our attention to the discourses concerning tribal 
discipline in the areas of economic exchange, marriage, 
sexual behaviour, magical ritual and kinship. Where the 
notion of the state operates in modern culture as a 
stratagem for maintaining the productivity of power rela- 
tions, the notions of kinship, manhood and tribal 
hierarchies have a similar function in primitive societies. 
Power performs through signs of loyalty to the tribal chief, 
rituals, ceremonies, marital levys in the forms of gifts of 
crops, hunting, war, etc. in this primitive context. 
The traditional analysis of power in terms of ideolo- 
gies has as a central concern the reconciliation of the 
conflict of individual and collective interests. Political 
institutions set up as juridical systems are viewed as 
having the function of providing a balance in this conflict. 
The conflict is resolved on the right by democratic means 
with individual freedom having priority, and on the left 
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with a priority on the collective. The archaeological analy- 
sis emphasises the role of discourses and institutions in 
resolving this conflict. 
The significance of the problem of sex in a primitive 
society is that sex is located exactly at the point of 
intersection between the control of the individual and the 
control of the society in general. The problem of sex serves 
to maintain a balance between the conflict of the individual 
and the collective interests. The resolution of this con- 
flict for the Trobrianders does not take the form of a 
solution on either the right or the left. An articulation 
of the power effects employed in their type of solution is 
at stake in the archaeological analysis. 
2.11 Power and anthropology. 
The anthropological task of researching the force 
relations in primitive societies is to investigate the 
shift in those societies from the force relations of warfare 
to the strategies and tactics that are used during peace 
time. 
Foucault claims that in any society the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed according to a number of procedures whose 
roles are to avert the power and dangers of discourse and 
make it a predictable event. These procedures are obviously 
at work in the powerful discourses on magic. The most obvi- 
ous procedure for excluding discourse Is prohibition. In The 
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Order of Discourse he outlines the contemporary forms of 
prohibition and exclusion that act on our discourses. The 
three main types of prohibition are the taboo of the object, 
the ritual of the circumstance, and the privileged or exclu- 
sive right of the speaking subject. These types intersect 
and reinforce one another in a complex ever changing net- 
work. Foucault notes that the two areas where this network 
operates at its strictest in the modern world are in the 
areas of politics and sexuality. The types of prohibitions, 
taboos and rituals operating in the primitive world are 
different since tradition has privilege over the speaking 
subject and the ritual Of Custom prevails everywhere. 
In the construction of the episteme governing Trobriand 
knowledge forms and practices, both the particular surfaces 
of emergence and the social and cultural areas of that 
society will have to be examined for the way in which they 
allow a particular discursive formation to make its appear- 
ance. Further, either the authorities of delimitation, or 
the institutions deemed by the members of that society to 
possess a certain knowledge, or the system of government, 
must be described. Likewise, the way in which the members 
conceive of themselves in terms of the notion of the 'body' 
and its place within the environment, the 'spirit' and its 
place in the spirit world, the absence of the status of 
'personal experience', etc. are all themes that must be 
investigated to provide the rules of formation for the 
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particular discourses. 
An entry to this project is made at the level of native 
discourse on acceptable sexual activity. These discourses 
have a shared positivity with the discourses governing 
economic, social (marriage and kinship) and magical realms. 
These provide the kinds of knowledge available to, and ac- 
ceptable to, the natives. Further, they are made true or 
false in terms of primitive power regimes for the production 
of true native discourses. The native dominions of power 
have the positive function of producing true and false 
discourses which are involved with the primitive sexual 
discourses. The rules of formation for other primitive 
discourses with a shared positivity are disclosed by estab- 
lishing the specificity of primitive sexual mores . Further, 
the way in which these discourses are made true or false by 
the particular regimes of power will provide a means for the 
specification of the Trobriand episteme in terms of dominant 
codes for the formation of knowledge. An elucidation of the 
primitive epistemic codes, in turn, provides both an under- 
standing and an explanation of the-way in which the power 
regime works within that epistemic context and the way in 
which possibilities for the emergence of discourses are 
themselves determined by the strategies for establishing 
discourses as true or false. Also, the way in which these 
discourses share their conditions of possibility with sexual 
discourses is explained. Here there is a circular dependence 
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between the parts and the whole of the episteme. The epis- 
teme is, however, more than the sum of its parts and an 
elucidation of those parts will illuminate the role of that 
episteme in the formation of the elements of knowledge which 
in turn explains those very elements that constitute that 
actual episteme. I am not making transcendental claims for 
the results of this study but am confining myself, where 
possible, to local centres by my selection of the Trobriand 
Islanders. In this I am following Foucault's directive. The 
presence of discontinuities are kept in mind even where they 
are not affirmed. However, in the closing chapter, I will 
suggest a more generalised theory on the nature of primitive 
experience and knowledge that goes beyond the borders of the 
Trobriand Islands. 
2.12 Conclusions. 
The place vacated by the subject in archaeology has 
become occupied by the figure of power. We have seen that 
the configuration of power appropriate to the power-knowl- 
edge relation in question has nothing to do with ideology, 
nor is it necessarily a repressive form. It has an effective 
and positive relation to knowledge. An archaeology that is 
involved with the causal concerns of the nondiscursive 
practices of power will be employed in the analysis of the 
Trobrianders. Before this project, however, I turn my atten- 
tion to developing what is to count as the guiding epistemo- 
logical figures of that primitive episteme. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
The Figures of the Trobriand Episteme. 
'What resemblance more perfect than that between our two 
hands! And yet what a striking inequality there isP [Hertz 
1960, p. 89]. 
3.1 Introduction. 
As a recourse to an anthropology, the archaeological 
method provides us with a real alternative to approaches 
involving subjective explanatory unities. Having previewed 
the main features of this method, we can now turn to an 
examination of the elements that constitute the positivistic 
epistemic approach to the primitive knowledge forms of the 
Trobrianders. In this chapter, I will introduce the compo- 
nents that are to function in the divinational figures of 
the episteme which characterise that knowledge. 
Archaeology posits formal differences (discontinuities) 
in the history of man's knowledge and experience. This means 
that primitive thought is distinguishable from our own both 
in terms of its content and the forms of reasoning involved. 
I This means that archaeology promotes a transformative thesis 
that has its anthropological precedent in the earlier work 
of Levy-Bruhl. Levy-Bruhl became interested in primitive 
mentality because by comparing it with modern mentality, 
which was the furthest removed from it, he could prove his 
relativistic and pluralistic philosophy (Tambiah 1990, 
p. 84]. Like Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl believed that primitive 
peoples were involved with collective representations. These 
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representations, which guide and limit experience, we might 
call lepistemes' or 'forms of life'. This is supported by 
the fact that Levy-Bruhl described primitive forms of 
'rationality' as the 'law of participation, [Tambiah 1990, 
p. 86]. Tambiah believes that this concept of participation 
has been magnificently documented by Foucault as the doc- 
trine of signatures' in which the notion of resemblance 
played a key role [Tambiah 1990, p. 87]. This relates Levy- 
Bruhl's work to the notion of the lepistemel. Tambiah also 
refers us to Wittgenstein's provocative notion of 'form-of- 
life, as an example of a Levy-Bruhlian-type relativistic 
project. 
Levy-Bruhl was at pains to point out that primitive 
peoples do not reason in the way attributed to modern man by 
philosophers. However they do have guiding norms for the 
construction of their own knowledge. Further, in his earlier 
writings he had no thesis of continuous development from 
primitive to modern thought. Morris reminds us that when 
Levy-Bruhl writes of 'primitive mentality' he is not refer- 
ring to individual mental faculties but to the cultural 
content of thought. The mental attitude of the individual 
is derived from the collective representations of the socie- 
ty, which are obligatory (Morris 1987, p. 183). This type of 
position reinforces Levy-Bruhl's work as a precursor to the 
archaeological approach. In this context, his primary impor- 
tance lies in positing a discontinuity between modern and 
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primitive thought, and the kinds of questions that that 
discontinuity gives rise to, rather than the particular 
solutions that he offered. I am avoiding the conflicts 
between mystical and scientific, logic and prelogic, etc., 
in which Levy-Bruhl was immersed, because archaeology does 
not employ those unities and the traditional debates that 
they engage. 
Levy-Bruhl's earliest claims rested on the view that 
the thought of some primitive peoples never employed the 
ideas of verification and testing However, he later repu- 
diated parts of this thesis that the more logical habits of 
Western thought had entirely displaced 'prelogicall thought 
processes. Le Pan agrees with Levy-Bruhl's later thesis and 
holds that it would be quite wrong to claim that primitive 
cognitive processes are entirely foreign to modern Western- 
ers [Le Pan 1989, p. 201. This represents a developmental 
theory. He came to believe that the characteristic modes of 
thought of modern societies are distinguished from the modes 
of thought of primitive societies, not by the absence of 
primitive processes, but by the presence of additional modes 
of causal, temporal and logical thought. 
The epistemic analysis of archaeology does not view the 
-------------------- 
1. The epistemic characterisation of a cognitive system is 
not defined in terms of logical forms, which in archaeology have the status of the producers of true statements, but the 
characterisation is in terms of the principal organising 
metaphors. 
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difference between the modern episteme and the primitive 
episteme of the Trobrianders as a question of the cumulation 
of cognitive features but rather a question of discontinui- 
ties and this constitutes a significant difference between 
my analysis and that of the later Levy-Bruhl. Archaeology 
does not promote a developmental model because of its in- 
volvement with a cumulative theory of a single form of 
1 
rationality 
Archaeology persistently attacks the definition of 
knowledge, in terms of 'rationality', as logical discourse. 
This was seen earlier in the rejection of the 'proposition, 
which is the logical unit of language in favour of the 
'statement'. Traditionally, disciplines such as mathematics 
and physics are taken to be the best examples of rational 
activity and as such are defined as 'scientific'. The prob- 
lem then becomes the task of elevating the 'less rational, 
human sciences such as economics, history, psychology and 
anthropology to this hallowed status of 'scientific', or 
condemning them if they fall short. Archaeology replaces the 
role of science as the model for rationality with Idis- 
1. Some primitive modes of thought, such as the establish- 
ment of sides of the body that are antagonistic towards each 
other with respect to strenghts, values, etc. are familiar 
in modern thought. However, just as resemblance ceased to be 
the ground of knowledge in the Classical Age so also has 
this type of opposition ceased to be the foundation of 
knowledge outside of primitive experience. These motifs do 
indeed persist but now have the status of mere supersti- 
tions. 
so 
course' and shows exactly what it means for any discipline 
to be discursive and what it means for any discourse to be 
, scientific discourse'. 
The archaeological analysis can make distinctions 
between 'resemblance man' of the Renaissance era, represen- 
tational man' of the Classical era and the creative agent, 
of the Modern era. These are the forms-of-life that operate 
within these epistemes. The epistemological unity of modern 
man is dissolved in archaeology and replaced by these dis- 
continuous forms. The analysis can be extended to make 
distinctions between these and 'primitive man', such as the 
Trobrianders. The characterisation of man strictly in terms 
of features of modern experience is surely inadequate for an 
account of knowledge both historically and anthropological- 
ly. 
Modern man is a scientist and occupies a rational 
world. The primitive man of the Trobriand Islands is a magi- 
cian and occupies a world everywhere ordered by the necessi- 
ties of the episteme. It is non-sensical to question the 
rationality of these figures since they constitute what is 
to count as reason in the primitive experience and give rise 
to primitive truths. The universal manifestation of modern 
experience is replaced by the appearance of different peo- 
ples who occupy different worlds and may be defined in terms 
of shared conditions of experience and knowledge. 
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3.2 Three components. 
The Trobriand episteme is a form of divination and has 
three essential attributes that determine the kind of knowl- 
edge available to it. These are the operation of figures of 
bounded complementary opposition, the immediate connection 
of this model with a notion of qualitatively differentiated 
space and a primary theory of occult causation in bounded 
essences or vitalities. The Trobriand model involves the 
imposition of asymmetrical boundaries on the world and these 
impositions give rise to a series of contextually specifia- 
ble realms not totally unlike those resemblances that Fou- 
cault identifies as operating in the Renaissance. The con- 
figuration of these boundaries provide the only form of 
reason recognised in the Trobriand episteme. 
The antagonistic bounded oppositions are inextricably 
involved with the essential figures of convenience, continu- 
ity, asymmetry and enclosure because of its connection with 
topological space. These figures are the means for the allo- 
cation of boundaries and the establishment of various realms 
of things. Once the realms are available, essences can be 
attributed to each. The power of the essences will be de- 
pendent on the clarity of definition of the boundary. The 
world is divided by boundaries into opposing and rivalling 
spaces. Relations are established between the things that 
occupy these spaces on the basis of continuity, asymmetry, 
enclosure and resemblance by convenience. In this way, we 
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will see that men are convenient to wealth, light, strength 
and virtue while women are convenient to evil, darkness and 
weakness. 
one of the most important figures in this model is that 
of asymmetric opposition. Joseph Needham suggests that the 
idea of complementary division was of such simplicity that 
it might have arisen independently in several civilisations 
[Needham 1956, p. 277]. Goody suggests that such an idea 
seems intrinsic to human thought and to the use of language 
itself [Goody 1977, p. 40]. 
In the collection Right and Left, Rodney Needham de- 
scribes Hertz's work as a contribution to the analysis of 
our representation of space with an explicit emphasis on 
asymmetrical opposition [Needham 1973, p. xii]. The central 
theme of Hertz's study is that of 'polarity' or opposition 
1 
manifested in symbolic classification . Two further notable 
-------------------- 
1. The Trobriand episteme does not employ simply binary 
forms of oppositions between right and left. However, it is 
useful to look briefly at Hertz' treatment of this area. 
Hertz contends that the preponderance of the right hand is 
imposed by coercion and guaranteed by sanctions. The differ- 
ence in value and function between the two sides of the body 
possesses, therefore, the characteristics of a social insti- 
tution. He maintains that a fundamental opposition dominates 
the spiritual world of primitive men; that between the 
sacred and the profane [Hertz 1960, p. 94]. Positive and 
constructive powers lie at one pole. Contrarily, oppressing 
influences reside at the opposite pole [Hertz 1960, p. 96]. 
Hertz sought an account of this asymmetry outside of 
the human organism. I argue that such an account is found in 
the primitive necessity of epistemic figures that form the 
cultural apriori. Foucault uses the term 'historical aprio- 
ril io-describe the conditions for the possibility of state- 
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works in this area are Evans-Pritchard's paper on 'Neur 
Spear Symbolism' and Hallpike's work _The 
Foundations of 
Primitive Thought. 
Needham goes further than Hertz's belief that asymmetry 
is the essence of primitive thought and claims that the 
symbolic opposition of right and left, and the dualistic 
categorisation of phenomena of which this opposition is 
paradigmatic, are so common as to seem natural proclivities 
of the human mind [Needham 1973, p. 123]. Needham asserts 
that it is informative to elicit the symbolic classifica- 
tion and mode of conceptual relations from an ethnographic 
description since the particulars of a classification are 
not obvious. The detailing of a classification provides the 
explanatory merit of this sort of analysis. The construction 
of this sort of scheme does not depend simply on ingenuity 
in relating concepts and values which one has some reason to 
expect in any case. The form of the classification by which 
-------------------- 
... Continued ... 
ments and not the conditions for the validity of judgments. 
It is not an apriori of truths but the apriori of a history 
that is actually given [Foucault 1972, p. 127]. The systems 
of statements produced by the different positivities, in 
accordance with historical aprioris, are the archive. The 
archive is, then, the system that makes the emergence of 
statements possible. Here, the cultural apriori has the same 
role in a cultural analysis that the historical apriori has 
in the historical analysis. The cultural apriori produces an 
archive that includes asymmetrical division. It does not, 
and need not, establish the validity of this opposition. 
This notion of the archive is something like the notion of 
'collective representation' put forward by Durkheim which is 
discussed by Evans-Pritchard in Social Anthropology page 53. 
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a people order things imposes itself on the analytic con- 
struction [Needham 1973, p. 124]. Needham suggests that it 
remains to determine the range of symbolic significance in 
social systems of different types and explain the correla- 
tions of social and symbolic structure [Needham 1973, 
p. 124]. This is the task of the present archaeology. 
I will examine, in this chapter, the fairly complex and 
unwieldy system of knowledge that is involved with the 
apparently simple idea of asymmetrical or complementary 
opposition. The figure of opposition involved in this study 
is more complex than those of asymmetrical opposition out- 
lined by Hertz or Dumont when it is combined with the fig- 
ures of convenience, continuity, asymmetry and enclosure 
which are all forms of resemblance. They form the collective 
representations of the Trobrianders. 
3.2.1 Primitive causation. 
The object of Levy-Bruhl's Primitive Mentality is to 
show what the notion of causation means to primitives and 
the inferences derived from their idea of it [Levy-Bruhl 
1923, p. 111 When a phenomenon is presented to a primitive, 
he does not enquire into causal connections which are not 
self-evident, but refers to a mystic power. Causal connec- 
tions are considered to be of slight importance as it is 
the natural consequence of the well established fact that 
1. See also The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality for a more 
detailed and revised study. 
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primitive collective representations immediately evoke the 
instrumentality of mystic powers. Within this system cause 
is merely the opportunity that might have been afforded by 
something else since all that is necessary is the occult 
power to come into play without the intervention of a supe- 
rior force of the same nature [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 37]. 
The role of occult powers in primitive societies is a 
kind of apriori upon which experience has no hold [Levy- 
Bruhl 1923, p. 381. This applies in the primitive understand- 
ing of death where, generally speaking, when a man dies it 
is because he has been 'doomed' by a sorcerer [Levy-Bruhl 
1923, p. 391. Primitives, as a rule, do not perceive any 
difference between a death which is the result of old age or 
of disease, and a violent death. The difference between the 
lingering of sickness and the suddenness of death met in a 
hunt or a battle is of no interest to them, since from their 
point of view neither the illness on the one hand, nor the 
wild beast or spear on the other, is the actual cause of 
death. These are merely the agents of the occult power which 
willed the death, and which equally might have chosen any 
other instrument to bring it about. Therefore, no death is 
accidental [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 43]. There is no such thing 
as chance but primitives have a conception of the unusual. 
The unusual may occur with comparative frequency, and the 
primitive's disregard of secondary causes is compensated for 
by an alert attention to the mystic meaning of everything 
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that strikes it. Therefore, the primitive is astonished at 
nothing but very emotional about everything. The absence of 
intellectual curiosity about causation is accompanied by an 
extreme sensibility to the appearance of anything which 
takes him by surprise [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 57]. 
At the very moment when the primitive perceives what is 
presented to his senses he represents to himself the mystic 
force which is manifesting itself in this way. He does not 
'infer' from one to the other [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 60]. The 
primitive in the presence of anything new knows already all 
that he needs to know. In any unusual event he perceives the 
manifestation of an invisible force. 
The connection between cause and effect necessarily 
unites phenomena in time and they are conditioned in such a 
way so that they cannot be reversed. However, the primitive 
mind has a different view of the matter. All that happens is 
referred to the influence of mystic or occult powers. In- 
stead of both cause and effect being perceptible in time, 
and nearly always in space, the primitive acknowledges only 
one of the two conditions to be perceptible at one time 
while the other belongs to those entities which are imper- 
ceptible to sense [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 90]. 
For primitive man, cause and effect present themselves 
in two forms, not necessarily different from one another. 
Sometimes the collective representations impose a definite 
preconnection, as in the case where certain taboos are in- 
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fringed, certain misfortunes will result, or inversely, if 
such-and-such misfortunes occur it is because some taboo has 
been violated. Other times the event may be related to a 
cause in a general way, for example, an epidemic may be 
related to the wrath of ancestors or the evil work of a 
wizard. In each case, there is a direct link between cause 
and effect [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 91]. 
This direct link accounts for the primitive's indiffer- 
ence towards the search for secondary causes. The primitive 
mind is accustomed to a type of causality that observes the 
network of such causes. The mystic causes to which the 
primitive man nearly always turns, being extra-spatial, and 
even at times extra-temporal, exclude the idea of intermedi- 
ate links and chains. The influence of causes can only be 
direct. Even if an effect is produced at a distance, as is 
very often the case in witchcraft, and not perceived until 
after a lapse in time, it is nevertheless perceived with no 
intermediary [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 92]. 
This configuration of cause which relates events in the 
world to an occult force, and lacks the notion of secondary 
events, allows for a world in which a force or vitality 
animates all things since the occult power is active every- 
where. We will see this notion of occult cause, that lacks a 
theory of secondary causation, in operation in Trobriand 
magic. Levy-Bruhl's conclusions about primitive cause in 
general may be regarded as appropriate to the specific case 
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of the Trobrianders. 
Primitive man classifies objects by the contextual 
associations available in his spatial representations and 
not by, for example, the resemblances of the Renaissance, 
nor the taxonomic tables of the Classical Age, nor the 
psychologistic categories of agency in the Modern Age. Thus 
the primitive world is composed of natural realms, or areas, 
of things. Because of this context-dependency, the same 
entity assumes different natures when it occurs in different 
places. In this way, rain water may be distinguished from 
river and sea water even though the word for 'water' may be 
1 
used for all of them [Hallpike 1980, p. 443] . This system of 
contextual realms allows the world to be known. 
Primitive classification based on contextual associa- 
tion makes realms of experience possible such as 'the 
bush', the village', 'the body', etc. which come to be 
regarded as possessing a vitality of their own [Hallpike 
1980, p. 445]. In this way, the figures of the primitive 
Trobriand episteme attribute an external reality to the 
subjective experience of the Modern episteme. In this 
primitive scheme of things, there are two modes of exist- 
-------------------- 
1. Hallpike notes that this context-dependent type of 
classification will prevent the emergence of a generalised 
system of representations which focuses taxionomically on 
the physical attributes of things to the exclusion of con- 
text. This anticipates the arguments for the impossibility 
of the emergence of a written language. 
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ence: things apparent to the senses; and essences composed 
of a vital principle. Hallpike offers the example of seman- 
gat, the vital principle, from the Malays [Hallpike 1980, 
p. 447]. In its most general form, semangat, is that which is 
present in all organised things maintaining their existence 
and guiding and controlling their actions where appropriate. 
For example, houses and boats have semangat (vitality) which 
corresponds to the experience of their organised inter- 
related parts and which preserves those parts from dissolu- 
tion since what is organised has the possibility of becoming 
disorganised. 
The presence of vitality in things depends on their 
distinctiveness, both in type and number, and is a variable 
property. The clarity of definition of things, and the 
boundaries between them and their environment [Hallpike 
1980, p. 4481. In other words, the clarity of the operation 
of the figures of the episteme, is of importance in the 
power of the essences of things. 
The most powerful essences are only vaguely defined 
while the less powerful ones are clearly defined by material 
boundaries. A change in the degree of definition of a thing 
in its environment effects the power of the vitality of the 
thing. The recitation of information about the essence of a 
thing formulated in a magical spell makes that thing less 
obscure and therefore, more susceptible to constraint by 
boundaries, less powerful and subject to predictions [Hall- 
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pike 1980, p. 449]. This is the, way in which witchcraft has 
its possibility in this episteme . 
The basic realms of the Malay world, water, earth, 
jungle and the habitations of men, are further divided, 
where they concern men, into bounded classes of things, such 
as fishing grounds and fields. More specific classes of 
things are distinguished within the various realms. Vague 
free vitalities (spirits) identified with the division of 
the world roam widely. Some spirits are associated with more 
specific classes of matter. Essences are partially defined 
by the categories of matter they inhabit and in turn help to 
define these categories. In this way, well-defined bodies 
constrain well-defined essences much more than vaguely 
defined categories constrain their poorly defined inhabi- 
tants. Thus spirits are more powerful in relation to bound- 
aries than semangat, and clearly defined bodies are more 
powerful in relation to essences than bodies with vaguely 
defined boundaries. Spirits, being only slightly differenti- 
ated from the mass of the vital principle, retain much of 
the power they derive from its infinite flexibility. This 
low definition allows spirits to break through the bound- 
aries of more highly defined categories [Hallpike 1980, 
pp. 449-4501. This is what happens in magical spells where 
well defined entities act as signs in the rite. A specific 
notion of space must prevail to accommodate this occult 
notion of cause. 
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3.2.2 Primitive space. 
According to Levy-Bruhl, primitive man is much more 
conscious of time according to its qualities than according 
to its objective characteristics. Periods and salient points 
of time are characterised by the manifestations of the 
mystic powers which occur in them. Time does not have the 
divisions of past, present and future in primitive experi- 
ence. Equally, it has neither value nor object and is there- 
fore treated with indifference [Levy-Bruhl 1923, p. 94]. The 
conception of time does not play a central role in the 
primitive Trobriand episteme in the way in which the primi- 
tive conception of space does. 
Space also appears to the primitive as being laden with 
qualities. Its regions will have virtues peculiar to them- 
selves. They share in the mystic powers which are revealed 
therein. The various directions and positions of space are 
qualitatively differentiated from one another [Levy-Bruhl 
1923, p. 95]. I employ this notion of differentiated space 
extensively in the construction of the Trobriand episteme. 
Levy-Bruhl concludes that when we describe primitive 
experience as differing from the modern experience it is a 
question of the particular world formed for primitives by 
their collective representations. Of course every primitive 
can move in space and use instruments. However, every indi- 
vidual member has a representation of the reality in which 
he is living and acting which is constituted in accordance 
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with the group representation. This claim supports a collec- 
tive conception of knowledge. Levy-Bruhl's results support 
the first presumption of the application of archaeology to 
anthropology, that is, that the primitive experience of the 
Trobrianders fails to coincide with our own in the limits of 
its collective manifestation and provides us with an analy- 
sis of primitive space and causation. 
In this context, Hallpike claims that the dominant 
spatial concepts of primitive society are those of 
inner/outer; centre/periphery; left/right; high/low; 
closed/open; symmetrical/asymmetrical; and boundary [Hall- 
pike 1980, p. 2851. These orderings, he claims, are associat- 
ed with concrete physical features of the natural environ- 
ment such as the sky, earth, village, bush, etc. and with 
the images of the human body and dwelling and are closely 
integrated with moral values and social relations. These 
orderings are topologically projectional and act as the 
focus of a number of social categories. Their Inversion is a 
'common symbol of disorder where reversals are regarded as 
symbols of abnormal status. The body forms the necessary 
reference point for the most elementary spatial constructs 
and has significance in the primitive representation of 
space [Hallpike 1980, p. 286]. 
Complex systems of spatial ordering are built up by the 
repetition of these basic classificatory notions. These are 
often based on dualistic opposition. The human body, the 
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dwelling and the village are the focal points of spatial 
representation in many primitive societies. Primitive repre- 
sentation of space is largely qualitative and complex sys- 
tems can be built up on the basis of the general concepts 
of left/right, inner/outer, high/low, etc [Hallpike 1980, 
p. 290]. 
Villages are clearly bounded entities and only the 
interior of a boundary has ceremonial value. The layout of 
primitive villages is consistent with the view point of 
someone looking down from a high place. In the case of the 
Kedang village of Meuwajang, the centre of the village, 
the navel, is of great symbolic importance and is marked by 
a flat offering stone. Further, the village is supposed to 
have two snakes, male and female, which represent the spir- 
its of the village and which are closely associated with 
the centre [Hallpike 1980, p. 291]. The importance of the 
centre is emphasised by the proximity of the temple and by 
the fact that various prohibitions, such as the growing of 
maize or palms and cloth-working apply at the centre 
[Hallpike 1980, p. 292]. 
The maintenance of the proper relations between upper 
and lower is of great importance to the Kedang. Indeed, 
confusion of up and down or high and low is regarded as the 
archetypal case of incest. This principle of order is of 
particular importance in house and boat building where the 
posts that maintain the four corners of the roof preserve 
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the same relation to the trees from which they were cut as 
they had when planted in the ground; the root ends of the 
trees must form the base ends of the posts [Hallpike 1980, 
p. 292]. 
Hallpike notes that in many primitive societies the 
geometric notion of the straight line as the products of the 
intersections of planes, or a segment which is the shortest 
distance between two points, is not developed in the absence 
of problems that do not demand, for example, siting between 
two points. Primitive systems do not use Euclidian concepts 
in the construction of co-ordinated system or in the organi- 
sation of experience [Hallpike 1980, p. 339]. Hallpike at- 
tributes the absence of measurement and quantification to 
the lack of Euclidian and projective spatial representation 
together with the lack of representative drawing and map- 
ping. 
Hallpike concludes that the primitive representations 
of space are dependent on the phenomenal appearance and the 
contextual associations of the physical world which are 
experienced in everyday life such that representations tend 
to be static and heavily loaded with symbolism. Boundaries, 
centre and periphery, above and below, left and right and 
other topological relations abound. While many cultures 
recognise the cardinal points these are often conceived of 
in a static manner based on the rising and setting of the 
sun and the axes of the human body and they are not used as 
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co-ordinate systems for orientation [Hallpike 1980, p. 338). 
Southwold provides a supposedly devastating attack on 
1 
the type of position argued by Hallpike He acknowledges 
that Hallpike is trying to revive Levy-Bruhl's thesis that 
there are major formal differences between the modes of 
thought common to primitive societies and those that prevail 
in modern societies [Southwold 1981, p. 491]. He characte- 
rises Hallpike's findings as being based on a scientific 
theory of mind which is explicitly rooted in the developmen- 
tal psychology, and genetic epistemology, of Piaget [South- 
wold 1981, p. 491]. While acknowledging Hallpike's signifi- 
cant achievement in demonstrating the fact that the collec- 
tive representations are necessarily shaped by the kinds of 
cognitive processes that prevail among individuals in that 
society, he is nevertheless dismissive overall. Southwold 
classifies Hallpike's treatment of causality and space as 
belonging to Piaget's 'preoperatory' stage of human develop- 
ment. 
I join with Southwold where he criticises Hallpike for 
rejecting the Durkheimean assumption that collective repre- 
sentations are to be understood in isolation from individual 
psychology. Given the non-subjectivist claims of the opening 
chapters of this study, it readily follows that the archaeo- 
-------------------- 
1. He makes this challenge in a review of Hallpike's The 
Foundations of Primitive Thought that appeared in Man (see 
bib. ). 
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logical approach to collective representations does not 
reduce to categories pertaining to individual consciousness, 
However, Southwold's main criticism of Hallpike focuses on 
the tone of his arguments rather than their substance. He 
claims that it is derogatory both to apply the term 'primi- 
tive' to societies and to correlate the cognitive processes 
of 'primitives' with those which are normally superseded in 
our childhood. Further, Hallpike describes modern thought as 
'higher', more effective' and more 'powerful' than primi- 
tive thought [Southwold 1981, p. 493]. It is not part of my 
thesis, or the archaeological project in general, to make 
value judgments between the merits pertaining to different 
epistemes. Indeed, how could such a task be accomplished in 
a method that energetically eschews any such 'objective' 
point of judgment. All values, merits and efficiencies 
belong within the particular episteme: there is no trans- 
epistemic overview. We have alr_eady seen that while archae- 
ology is concerned with an analysis of truth it is not an 
apparatus for its production. If it made such judgments it 
would be producing truths and would, therefore, cease to 
fulfil its original function. I have tried hard to reject 
the models that could provide these types of judgment, that 
is, models that posit a cumulative rational theory with only 
one form of rationality. The developmental psychology of 
Hallpike is an example of such a rational theory. These 
theories hold that primitives are only imperfect participa- 
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tors in reason. I make no such claims. 
However, I maintain the use of the term 'primitive' as 
an historical classification to signify difference and hope, 
perhaps naively, that it will be read without any of its 
usual ethnocentric derogatory connotations. 
Using Hallpike's general findings I conclude that the 
figures of the Trobriand episteme are based on a strictly 
topological conception of space. The notion of space to 
which the figures of the episteme are linked cause it, 
unlike that of the Renaissance model, to be everywhere tied 
to those figures. 
3.2.3 Bounded complementary oppositions. 
Dumont, in Homo Hierarchicus, problematizes the notion 
of opposition by distinguishing between complementary and 
hierarchical opposites. He provides us with an example of 
asymmetrical opposition in the form of the caste system 
which he treats as a central ideology of inequality. 
Barnes and de Coppet claim that central to Dumont's 
understanding of caste is the principle of hierarchical 
polarity attached to every criterion of distinction and the 
opposition of status and power [Barnes and de Coppet 1985, 
p. 1]. Dumont's conception of hierarchy can be seen as pro- 
viding a method of anthropological analysis relying on the 
conception of hierarchical opposition as extending through- 
out the totality of the ideology of all societies. The key 
terms in his approach are difference, ideology, value, 
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totality, opposition and hierarchy. Dumont distinguishes 
hierarchy from social stratification and inequality [Barnes 
and de Coppet 1985, p. 1]. In his analysis, the notion of 
equal opposites in structural taxonomies and classifications 
is of less use than hierarchical opposition. 
It is useful to examine Dumont's notion of hierarchical 
opposition rather than his analysis of caste systems. When 
discussing the nature of power in archaeology, we have seen 
that any system that is involved with an ideological dimen- 
sion is inappropriate for grasping the elements to be re- 
vealed at the archaeological level. If an analysis of the 
caste system were to be carried out in archaeology it would 
not be in terms of its ideological import but in terms of 
caste as a condition for organising the world in terms of 
its discursive potential. Since the notion of caste as 
political and economic hierarchy is so imbued with ideologi- 
cal content, and is given in terms of a repressive power, it 
is not an appropriate unity for the construction of the 
Trobriand episteme. We have seen that archaeology analyses 
power for its positive effects and not as a negative concep- 
tion of prohibition. Dumont concedes that the caste system 
has positive attributes as a power regime but these are 
still construed within a left/right ideological opposition. 
Barnes holds that Dumont defines asymmetry as the 
principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in 
relation to that whole. This asymmetry is a relation between 
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the encompassing and the contrary where the idea of encom- 
passment brings in the issue of distinctions within the 
whole and the oppositions of the resulting parts. Dumont's 
principle of encompassment holds that the superior includes 
the inferior which in turn excludes the first. This means 
that Dumont regards hierarchical opposition, which makes 
reference to the whole, as the appropriate asymmetrical 
figure. He concedes that at first sight some oppositions do 
not exhibit this relationship, for example, the left is not 
normally included in the right. All that seems essential to 
this model is the division of the whole into unequal pairs 
(complementary opposites). If this is the case, according to 
Barnes, the nature of opposition is a matter of empirical 
demonstration in each culture [Barnes 1985, p. 11]. However, 
the debate is more complex than Barnes' recommendations 
would suggest since there are rivalling forms of hierarchi- 
cal models. 
For Dumont, complementary opposition provides a divi- 
sion of the universe of discourse into two complementary or 
contradictory classes. Despite both classes being subsumed 
within the greater whole, Dumont does not describe this 
relationship as hierarchical. However, hierarchical asymme- 
try is represented where there is unity at the superior 
level, distinction at the inferior level and the two classes 
are related by complementarity and contradiction. The supe- 
rior class stands both in opposition to the other and for 
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the higher order unity. Therefore, opposites exemplify 
hierarchical opposition only where one stands for the whole 
as well as for part of the internal division [Barnes 1985, 
P. 111. 
According to Allen, hierarchical opposition may appear 
at first sight as a binary relation like contradiction. But 
there is a third relevant entity, namely the whole universe 
of discourse. It is possible to describe the classes as 
differentiated while the whole world of discourse transcends 
such classification. This means that hierarchical opposition 
takes a tertiary rather than a binary form. Leaving the 
question of transcendence aside, Allen asks whether struc- 
turalism needs to put as much emphasis as it has on binary 
formulations [Allen 1985, p. 27]. 
Mauss goes beyond Allen's recommendations for a ter- 
tiary formulation to one involving many more dimensions. He 
emphasises the need to go beyond the simplistic sacred/pro- 
fane opposition of Hertz's pioneering work [Mauss 1968-69, 
pp. 143-1481. The lateral opposition of right and left, 
according to Mauss, is to be treated with reference to spa- 
tial dimensions. The right/left relation needs to be analy- 
sed together with the up/down relation and front/back rela- 
tion. One should take account of a centre associated with 
the cosmic navel or the inhabited space of the village, etc. 
Mauss envisaged the whole set of relations as a sort of 
sphere with six poles radiating from the centre with its 
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special quality [Mauss 1968-69, p. 145]. But he was not 
thinking solely of conceptions of space but had in mind a 
complex combining positions, powers, and purities and in 
extreme cases embracing all the beings and events in rela- 
tion to other things. The objective should be the ensemble 
of things and relations. Mauss does not conceive of the 
centre as transcendent nor of the whole as constituting a 
level distinct from that of its components but it is clear 
for him that the route to such an holistic approach was not 
solely through binary opposition. 
I am guided by Mauss's recommendations and go beyond 
the simple binary oppositional forms of Hertz's asymmetrical 
conception to take the whole world of things into account. 
However, what is sought in a guiding metaphorical code is 
not an infinitude of relations but a few relations that can 
be imposed on the infinite world of discourse. 
The important element in Dumont's model of hierarchical 
opposition is not so much the presence of unequal division 
but the relation of the unequal classes to the whole. This 
means that there must be a clear and distinct formulation of 
a closed world of things available to the hierarchical 
model. I will look at how orality has its possibility be- 
cause of the absence of this type of closure in the primi- 
tive model. Closure is a condition for the possibility of 
the emergence of writing and is not available in the Trobri- 
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1 
and episteme. A distinction can be made between enclosure 
or encompassment, which is indeed present in the primitive 
episteme, and closure represented by the notion of a closed 
whole. Dumont does not make such a distinction. Because 
of this absence of closure, the fundamental figure of asym- 
metry appropriate to the Trobriand episteme is that of 
2 
complementary opposition 
But there are also other oppositional relations that 
pertain to this spatial model. Proximity is the most elemen- 
tary spatial relation together with its complement separa- 
tion [Hallpike 1980, p. 2831. This proximity and separation I 
call the recognition of convenience. Separation of objects 
1. Closure is discussed in more detail in the context of 
orality in the final chapter. 
2. Needham refers to Bernardi's study of the Mugwe of the 
Meru society, where the left hand possesses and symbolises 
ritual power, as an example which might invert complementary 
relations. In the light of this, Bernardi should have looked 
for an explanation of this case but he did not [Needham 
1973, p. 1101. Needham's only assumption is that the Meru 
classification is consistent, and on the strength of this, 
he suggests that the sacred hand must enter the series with 
what is superior and the profane hand must enter the series 
in the company of the complex of opposite and complementary 
terms [Needham 1973, pp. 120-1211. The selection of one hand 
or the other as sacred is not necessarily determined by 
matters of physical fact and the categorisation of a term is 
not in principle deducible from any one of its properties. 
The point is very pertinent to the present study. What is 
being examined here is not necessarily the determination of 
value in terms of the right but the consistency and coher- 
ence of the operation of systems of complementary opposition 
as an element in the complex of the episteme. There are many 
examples of this type of consistency available in Needham's 
essay 'Right and Left in Nyoro Symbolic Classification' in 
the collection Right and Left (see bib. ). 
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results in their ordering or succession of which a particu- 
larly important case is asymmetry. We have seen that the 
asymmetry in question is complementary opposition. Ordered 
sequences also possess the property of enclosure or sur- 
rounding. The centre of a circle is enclosed by the periph- 
ery. Lines and surfaces also possess the property of conti- 
nuity in which only the end-points are distinguished: the 
mid-points are not. Continuity is, therefore, a synthesis of 
the relations of proximity and separation and is the last of 
the topological relations to be fully grasped at the concep- 
tual level of spatial representation [Hallpike 1980, p. 284]. 
The figures of the episteme are everywhere involved with 
topological space and are those of asymmetry, convenience, 
enclosure and continuity. These figures characterise the 
epistemological configuration that orders the Trobrianders' 
world and allow for the contextual associations of their 
representations. 
Convenience, as a means of identifying a boundary, 
forms adjacencies and is connected with space by a graduated 
scale of proximity. Convenience pertains to the world as a 
whole. Things are convenient when they are sufficiently 
close to be adjacent. The contact gives rise to a resem- 
blance of areas by exchange on the basis of their adjacency. 
Convenience sets up a linear chain of resemblances. In this 
way a child is connected to its mother in that while in the 
mother's womb, it occupied the same place as the mother. 
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Convenience co-exists with separation. Separation 
results from the convenient ordering of objects in succes- 
sion which are asymmetrically opposed. Asymmetry provides 
for the division of the world into rivalling parts. It is a 
form of emulation, and thus a form of resemblance that 
establishes spaces that reflect and rival each other. By 
the division of the body in space into two parts essences 
are assigned asymmetrically to the two parts because they 
occupy different realms. One side is similar to strength, 
light and honour. Space is also divided in such a way that 
the top reflects and rivals the bottom, where again the top 
is positive, being the home of the gods. 
Ordered sequences possess the property of enclosure. 
There are enclosed circles of conveniences and separations 
in the Trobriand episteme. Lines and surfaces possess the 
property of continuity in which only the end points are 
distinguished. In this way continuity is a synthesis of the 
relations of convenience and separation. Enclosure differs 
from Dumont's notion of the whole since it posits a sur- 
rounded space rather than completeness. The elements of this 
primitive episteme multiply to infinity so that any notion 
of the whole is missing. However, there is a restraint on 
the analysis in the function of the microcosm and macrocosm. 
Primitive thought can find all of its necessary terms in the 
body of man which is the centre of reflection. This body 
acts as a limiting function in the analysis. 
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The figures set up relations between things in the same 
way as the figures of the Renaissance episteme set up resem- 
blances between things. This is how boundaries are estab- 
lished and, as a result, how the essences of things are 
knowable in this primitive episteme. However, the Trobriand 
episteme has four figurative moves that are different from 
the four of the Renaissance and different types of bound- 
aries and relations are established. The four figures of 
the Trobriand episteme are strictly related to space. This 
allows different constraints on each model and, further, it 
allows for more complex relations in the Resemblance model. 
The linking of forms of representation with space has its 
most important consequence for the Trobriand model in the 
nature of language available to it and its absence of the 
conditions for the possibility of writing because of the 
primitive conception of the sign. 
In the Renaissance episteme the figures of emulation 
and sympathy/antipathy are not connected with space. Sympa- 
thy, antipathy and analogy operate in a free state; they 
can cross the largest space instantaneously. Sympathy has 
the power of making things identical with each other and 
causes individuality to disappear. It is counter-balanced by 
antipathy which maintains things in isolation and prevents 
assimilation to a single point. These two give rise to all 
the figures of the Renaissance. Sympathy/antipathy have no 
counterpart in the Trobriand episteme except continuity 
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which gives rise to the other figures. However, this does 
not have the power of sympathy or antipathy. Continuity is 
a synthesis of convenience and separation. Convenient ob- 
jects form ordered successions which may be asymmetrical and 
form enclosures. We can see all of these figures in opera- 
tion in an archaeological analysis of the Trobrianders. 
The signs in the world rival the things of the world 
which are related together in space by convenience and 
asymmetric emulation. This primitive model lacks the three 
dimensionality of the Renaissance model and only allows for 
simpler forms of similitude. Therefore, the positivity of 
the primitive discourses can be defined in terms of this 
circular enclosed place with its conveniences, asymmetries, 
and continuities. 
The Trobriand figures have several consequences for the 
character of their knowledge. The resulting knowledge takes 
the form of divination and, because of its universal appli- 
cation in space, it is limitless since the whole world must 
be investigated in order to obtain correct knowledge. Each 
pole of the asymmetry refers back to another and proceeds by 
an infinite accumulation of confirmations which are depend- 
ent on each other. In this way, Trobriand knowledge accumu- 
lates by simple addition. 
Knowledge of the world is gained by divination where 
the place of the sign is sought. The world is changed in 
witchcraft where the signs are operated upon and altered by 
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an operation on the vital boundaries. The infinite possi- 
bility of this knowledge and the possibility of witchcraft 
accumulates by addition and is maintained by tradition and 
restrained by the microcosm. 
3.3 Microcosm and macrocosm. 
The limitless universe of things in the primitive world 
is constrained by the use of a fundamental resemblance in 
1 
the body of man . The divinational model is applied to the 
human organism which forms the microcosm for the otherwise 
infinite investigation. The human organism as a microcosm 
guarantees that every investigation will have a microcosmic 
justification on the larger scale. The organism provides the 
conditions for the validity of primitive knowledge and order 
of the universe while the realms of the model in general 
2 
provide the conditions for the possibility of that order 
Inversely, it confirms that the visible order of the world 
will be reflected in the microcosm. The figures of the 
-------------------- 
1. Littlejohn argues that the ground of the fundamental 
distinction between right and left must be sought in the 
human body. The distinction must make possible the separa- 
tion between left and right in the body and it must confer a 
primary meaning on the two halves. The ground of the dis- 
tinction must be a directed straight line and represent a 
sort of vector otherwise right and left could change sides 
at any time depending on which end of the line was taken as 
a starting point. Evidently the vector is a movement from 
high to low [Littlejohn 1973, p. 289]. Some primitives may 
have a representation of a vector in the form of a tree, 
spear, house-pole, etc. 
2. See the role of the microcosm in The Order of Things, 
page 30. 
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Trobriand episteme occur between the limits of this analogy, 
between the world and the human organism which provides the 
conditions for the limitation of the accumulation of primi- 
tive analyses, and the primitive justification of knowledge. 
The beings and things residing between microcosm and macro- 
cosm are finite and potentially countable. The macrocosm 
provides the guarantee of knowledge and the limit to its 
expansion. Thus, the body of man forms a limiting analogy 
for this otherwise infinite world and provides the possibil- 
ity of primitive truths. 
The human organism forms the microcosm for the Trobri- 
and configuration and the figures occur within this space 
between the body and its reflection onto the world. However, 
the individual bodies are subjected to the operation of this 
model. There is an organic asymmetry between the body of a 
man and the body of a woman. The male body is assigned a 
place at the pole of strength, light, courage and skill. 
But if the woman is powerless and passive she has her re- 
venge within the realm of magic where she is particularly 
suited for the workings of sorcery. The model is not one of 
power present on one side but wholly absent on the other. On 
the contrary, power is spread across both sides functioning 
in a state of tension. The relation of knowledge to power is 
possible by the very deployment of this axis in the space of 
the primitive world. Evils, misery and death can come from 
the female element [Hertz 1960, p. 97]. In this way, the 
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opposition between the two sexes correspond to oppositions 
between the sacred and the profane, to life and to death, to 
light and darkness. Women possess the powers of one side of 
the power deployment. 
Hertz notes that the human body, the microcosm, could 
not escape the law of polarity which governs everything 
[Hertz 1960, p. 98]. Society and the whole universe have a 
side that is sacred, light and precious and another which is 
profane, dark and common; a male side strong and active and 
a female side that is weak and passive. This means that it 
is impossible for the human organism to remain symmetrical. 
Such an exception would ruin the entire economy of the 
primitive world. In this way, Hertz argues that if organic 
asymmetry had not existed it would have been invented. There 
is no need to invent this asymmetry since it is a necessity 
imposed by the order of things in the primitive world avail- 
able through the figures of the antagonistic bounded realms. 
In the primitive thought of the Trobrianders, the world 
forms a closed circle at the centre of which is the body of 
man. An axis divides this circular space of the universe 
cutting the world into two opposing and rivalling halves 
with the organic body of man at the centre divided by this 
axis. This figure is reflected in the physical structure of 
the Trobriander village where the inside represents 
strength, security, goodness and life, and is the place of 
the chief, while the outside is near to the hostility and 
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menace of evil in the form of hunger, disease and war from 
the world outside of the village. 
The organic body is divided between the two sexual 
natures of male and female. One the one side is the male, 
represented by the brother, while on the other side is the 
female, represented by the sister. Each body itself finds 
its appropriate place in the world. The male body is on the 
side of strength and power while the female is an the side 
of weakness and evil. However, the female is not completely 
cast out into the world of darkness and evil. If such were 
the case, relations between the two sides would be impossi- 
ble. The female body itself has its right side, or is con- 
venient to the male body at the macroscopic level. However, 
at the microscopic level it represents darkness. The female 
body acts both as the sign for negative attributes and as a 
thing that can occupy various spaces in the world itself. 
This is the way in which the female body functions in Tro- 
briander thought. The primitive sexual act has its possibil- 
ity in this convenience. 
In the primitive experience of the Trobrianders, the 
epistemological figures are imposed on the world so that 
specifiable realms are available that are convenient, asym- 
metrical, enclosed and continuous. All of these realms are 
spatial. Essences or vitalities are assigned to each in 
relation to a corresponding division of the mass of the 
vital principle which is everywhere operating in the world. 
ill 
Thus, the primitive world is divided by the application of 
specifiable figures so that animated spaces can emerge which 
are at one and the same time the natural order of the world 
and the signs of that order. Because knowledge is always 
concerned with formulating truths about the order of things, 
its nature will depend on the episteme's construal of the 
nature of the signs used to formulate truths. 
3.4 Primitive signs. 
Wagner holds that it is reasonably self-evident that 
the meaningful elements of a culture all bear some sort of 
1 
relationship to one another [Wagner 1972, p. 168] This 
implies that meaning is constituted through a determinate 
relation between signifier and signified. Wagner describes a 
signifier, that bears such a determinate relation to the 
signified, as a metaphor. A metaphor presupposes a contrast 
as well as at least one point of similarity with the thing 
it represents. A metaphor signifies a relation [Wagner 1972, 
p. 169]. 
The relations outlined above indicate the presence of 
such a metaphorical system of signification at work in the 
episteme. Metaphorical signification has an innovative 
interaction with the elements it metaphorizes such that, 
eventually, the relation between signifier and signified 
1. This has already been asserted in archaeology but the 
meaningful element there is the 'statement' and not the 
'proposition' as in Wagner's conception. 
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becomes one of ordinary lexical signification, which can be 
incorporated into a new metaphor. The interchange between 
signification and metaphorisation implies that meaning is a 
function of change that takes the form of metaphoric innova- 
tion [Wagner 1972, p. 169]. 
In this model of meaning production, one relation is 
used to produce another which results in a dialectic rela- 
tionship in which the relation signified by one metaphor 
becomes the context of another and, therefore, the meaning 
evoked by each is achieved at the expense of the other. 
These metaphors may either exist in a complementary or a 
dialectically innovative relationship to one another, with 
the respective meanings being either consistent or contra- 
dictory [Wagner 1972, p. 169]. 
Elsewhere, Wagner argues that since metaphoric usage 
sets one symbol into a relation to another such symbol, it 
is obvious that a notion of simple, or literal, reference 
cannot apply [Wagner 1978, p. 25]. This relation introduces a 
new symbolisation simultaneously with a 'new' referent such 
that the symbolisation and its referent are identical. The 
metaphor assimilates both symbol and referent into one 
expression. In other words, a symbol stands for itself 
[Wagner 1978, p. 25]. Thus, the symbolic effect of metaphoric 
usage collapses a distinction between symbol and symbolised 
and differentiates that expression from others [Wagner 1978, 
p. 25]. 
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Wagner's work is relevant for articulating the nature 
of signs in the Trobriand episteme. In this episteme, signs 
are themselves things in the world and act as references for 
the assignation of new signs. There is an inter-connecting 
circle of things in the world that occupy a certain place. 
Each possible place is opposed through the operation of the 
metaphorical figures of the episteme. These places allow 
something to be assigned a sign to determine its essence. 
once an essence is assigned to a sign, which itself is a 
thing in the world, a different essence may be assigned to 
the sign in a different place. 
This means that the inter-connecting circular world of 
things has super-imposed on it an equally complex inter- 
connecting circular world of signs. In order that these 
signs are not transparent to the world of things their 
imposition is referred to a different application of the 
metaphorical figures. 
Because each thing is the sign of itself, this means 
that signs are indistinguishable from the things they repre- 
sent and their function as signs cannot be detected. Howev- 
er, by referring things to their place on a model of funda- 
mental opposition, imposed on the human organism, an opaque 
sign can be determined. We have seen that the imposition of 
an asymmetrical axis on the world is available at the micro- 
scopic level in the asymmetry of the human organism. The 
signs that arise from this are the left and right hand 
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sides. Further, the application of this opposition onto the 
world as a whole allows each thing in the world to occupy a 
place relative to it , and allows new oppositions to emerge. 
These are oppositions such as up and down. 
Amongst the Trobrianders, the signs of things have to 
be located in their appropriate spaces. Hertz offers us 
examples of these from Maori thought [Hertz 1960, p. 101]. If 
a convulsive tremor is felt while sleeping it is a sign that 
a spirit has entered the sleeper, and according as to wheth- 
er the sign was on the right or the left, good or ill for- 
tune can be expected. The same rule holds in general for 
omens which consist in animals thought to be bearers of 
fate. These messages are susceptible to two contradictory 
interpretations according to whether the situation is seen 
from the point of view of the observer or the observed. If 
it appears on the left it presents its right side and, 
therefore, it can be considered favourable. 
Holy, in his essay 'Symbolic and Non Symbolic aspects 
of Berti Space', raises the point that criticisms of analy- 
ses of symbolic collective representations of the form 
outlined above typically have been concerned with the psy- 
chological validity and with the difficulty of establishing 
the criteria in terms of which they might be falsified [Holy 
1983, p. 269]. This puts pressure on Barnes's claim that the 
nature of opposition is merely a matter of straightforward 
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empirical demonstration. In response to this criticism Hall- 
pike suggests that the collective representations may have a 
dualistic structure which is beyond the capacity of the 
individual members of the culture to employ explicitly in 
their reasoning. Therefore, the collective representations 
exist at the level of the unconscious and this effectively 
dismisses the question about their existence at the level of 
individual consciousness. 
The employment of models of opposition in the episteme 
does not amount to the claim that archaeology is adopting a 
structuralist method at this level. Foucault claims that the 
collective representations, or guiding codes, exist at the 
level of the unconscious which is not a psychic unconscious 
(since archaeology does not employ psychologistic models). 
These representations exist at the level of a collective 
unconscious; they form the cultural archive. In this way, 
archaeology avoids the first criticism. This answer, howev- 
er, does not address the second criticism [Holy 1983, 
p. 270]. 
The second criticism remains and appears to be as 
pertinent to archaeology as it is to structuralism. How are 
the archaeological collective representations supposed to be 
falsified? The answer to this problem is straightforward but 
might strike some as unsatisfactory. Popper's definition of 
scientific knowledge in terms of theories that are open to 
falsification suffices as the definition of science for 
116 
those who raise this criticism. We have already seen that a 
concern of archaeology is to question scientific discourses 
for what it means for those discourses to be scientific. The 
archaeological definition of science is not given simply in 
terms of the possibility of falsification of a body of 
knowledge. Despite problems with the definition of science 
1 
in terms of falsification , the demand for falsification 
belongs to a rationalistic conception of science that I have 
taken some space in this study to circumvent. 
Further, in The Order of Things Foucault treats con- 
tradiction (falsification) not as some part of knowledge 
that is wholly to be avoided but as having the positive 
effect of producing further discourses. Falsification may be 
regarded as a technique for the classification of theories 
in discourses as true or false. This is a technique employed 
in a power regime for the establishment of a body of knowl- 
edge as true and as such, since the truth is valued, facili- 
tates the propagation of that knowledge. Archaeology is not 
as directly involved with this technique as some might 
desire but, nevertheless, I will employ empirical examples 
of its application to the Trobrianders to show the operation 
of the symbolic representations at work. 
-------------------- 
1. See Kuhn's History of Scientific Revolutions, Feyera- 
bend's Against Method and Chalmer's What is This Thing 
Called Science? for a criticism of Popper. 
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3.5 Malinowski's ethnography. 
In the next chapter I will turn to an archaeological 
mediation of the empirical data amassed by Malinowski in his 
prolonged study of the Trobrianders' culture to demonstrate 
the operation of the epistemological figures. Paluch tells 
us that Malinowski's work has only recently been rediscov- 
ered in his native Poland, where it had been viewed as 
serving the ends of British imperialism [Paluch 1981, 
p. 276]. Malinowskils Influence on the development of Polish 
social science was not especially important [Paluch 1981, 
p. 277]. However, Paluch claims that Malinowski's earliest 
works in Polish are crucial for an explanation of the ori- 
gins of his functionalism as well as for the interpretation 
of some of his ideas. Malinowski's doctoral thesis in 1908 
was in positivistic philosophy. There he argued that the 
function and genesis of science must be explained within a 
relationship defined by human biological needs [Paluch 1981, 
p. 279]. Both his emphasis on functional explanations and his 
notion of culture as an instrumental whole can be traced to 
this period [Paluch 1981, p. 279]. 
However, Malinowski diverged from his positivistic 
programme when he was influenced by the neo-Kantianism of 
the Marburg school. This school of thought promoted the 
employment of apriori forms of cognition in the study of 
reality. The apriori concept that was to determine his 
anthropological results was one of biological imperatives 
lie 
[Paluch 1981, pp. 280-282]. Culture, then, is an apparatus 
that makes the satisfaction of human needs possible [Paluch 
1981, p. 283]. Paluch concludes that Malinowskils positivis- 
tic bias produced not specially deep and sensitive common- 
sense knowledge [Paluch 1981, p. 2831. 
With respect to the theory of biological needs, Goddard 
claims that Malinowski owed much to Durkheim as he was not 
an empiricist in the traditional British sense and, as such, 
his more radical formulation of functionalism was rejected 
by British anthropology [Goddard 1979, p. 67]. The assimila- 
tion of Durkheim in Britain was highly selective and incom- 
plete. Durkheim's mode of analysis was interpreted uneasily 
as a form of 'sociological positivism' and made to conform 
to the methodological conditions of traditional empiricism 
[Goddard 1979, p. 74]. Durkheim's disdain for empirical facts 
was berated. His view that one experimental situation could 
serve to establish the validity of a sociological law was 
received with incredulity. In this way, the real strength of 
the Durkheimean method was never accepted in British anthro- 
pology (Goddard 1979, p. 75]. 
Leach supports this view since he claims that any 
attempt to elucidate the epistemological context of Malinow- 
ski's functionalism runs into the difficulty that Malinowski 
borrowed the notion of social function from Durkheim but 
transmuted it in the process. He understands Durkheim to 
have been concerned simply with investigating the relation- 
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ship between social facts and their social consequences. But 
for Malinowski, social phenomena exist to satisfy biological 
1 
needs Functions are thus purposeful and positive and to 
detect them requires intuitive judgment. In light of this, 
Leach- concludes that Malinowskils functionalism is presented 
as practical rather than plausible [Leach 1970, p. 124]. 
While Radcliffe-Brown was initially willing to accept a 
'functionalist, label with Malinowski, he later preferred to 
elaborate his conception of anthropology in terms of a 
comparative study of structural systems. Formal structural 
concepts were employed to provide a framework and differen- 
tiating element in the idea of a functional social system 
put forward by Malinowski [Firth 1988, p. 17]. 
Jarvie criticises Malinowskils functionalism with 
-------------------- 
1. In A Scientific Theory of Culture, Malinowski constructed 
a table 
_of 




















[Malinowski 1944, P. 911. When I come to treating the economy 
of a Primitive culture I do not seek the possibility of an 
economics in organic need but in the figures of the episteme 
and in this way mY analysis is significantly different from Malinowski'5. For a detailed analysis and assessment of Malinowski's theory of needs see Piddington's 1970 essay in Firth's collection Man and Culture. (see bibliography). 
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respect to its ability to explain change. He claims that 
social change cannot be handled by functionalism and this 
amounts to a significant weakness in the theory [jarvie 
1964, p. 19]. 
Malinowskils general interpretations may be briefly 
summarised in the following way: first, he initiates his 
theorising by making all modes of behaviour intelligible in 
terms of the motivations of individuals; second, he includes 
within this theory both rational 'scientific' behaviour and 
irrational 'magical' behaviour; and third, he recognises the 
interconnectedness of the different items which constitute 
the Trobriand culture as a system [Parsons 1970, p. 55]. 
With respect to the first aspect of his theory, Mali- 
nowski was repelled by the historicist implications of his 
teacher Wundt's notion of 'group-mind' and sought a theory 
which could combine the 'materialist' basis of nineteenth- 
century Evolutionism with the attribution of free will to 
the individual. According to Leach's belief, Malinowski 
found this body of theory in the Pragmatism of William James 
1 
[Leach 1970, p. 121-123] . He claims that Malinowski rebelled 
against the mechanistic implications of the late nineteenth- 
-------------------- 
1. Leach claims that Malinowskils Pragmatism is that of 
James rather than Pierce. He cites Gallie's commentary where 
a summary of James' thesis is that the main function of 
thought is to satisfy certain interests of the organism, and 
that truth consists in whatever thinking satisfies these 
interests. Leach suggests that if we substitute behaviour 
for thought we have the essence of Malinowskils functional- 
ism. 
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century and his 'functionalism', like James's 'pragmatism', 
is an aspect of this revolt. However, Malinowski never fully 
succeeded in escaping the influence of these traditions 
[Leach 1970, p. 127]. 
Parsons identifies the main characteristic in Malinow- 
ski's thought as an effort to remain close to an interpreta- 
tion of the motives of the individual which is a psychologi- 
cal emphasis [Parsons 1970, p. 54]. Foucault rejects this 
analysis of motives in this type of analysis and with it the 
role of individuated experience. This marks what is probably 
the most significant difference between the two analyses. 
Malinowskils psychologism was tempered by an awareness of 
the cultural context in which the individuals lived [Parsons 
1970, p. 541. My analysis views individuals as immersed in 
the context of the episteme. The subject is necessarily 
situated and dependent in archaeological analysis and cannot 
function as a transcendental figure or as empirical con- 
sciousness [Foucault 1972, p. 183]. Instead of exploring 
Malinowskils consciousness\knowledge\science axis which can- 
not escape subjectivity, there is the objective exploration 
of the practice\knowledge\discourse axis. 
With respect to the second- aspect of Malinowskils 
theory which relates to rational behaviour, Malinowski 
rejected both the rationalism of Tylor and the irrationalism 
of Levy-Bruhl in interpreting the mind of primitive man. 
Malinowskils savage combined empirical knowledge, that was 
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rationally directed, with a belief in ritual and magical 
rites within certain contexts. He tried to make both aspects 
intelligible through a theory of function [Parsons 1970, 
p. 54]. Archaeology does not interpret the mind of man but 
the knowledge of primitive man, which does not have its 
origin in the mind, but in the creative figures, or codes, 
of the episteme. Further, archaeology does not divide the 
debate in the emergence of knowledge between the rational 
and the irrational where rationalism is defined in terms of 
its empirical content and 'sensible' application. Archaeolo- 
gy examines that which counts as sensible for any context. 
The limits of reason are given within archaeology and not 
outside of it in a way which supposedly governs its applica- 
tion. 
The third aspect of Malinowskils theory refers to 
culture. Malinowskils definition of culture states that 
, culture, comprises inherited artifacts, goods, technical 
processes,, ideas, habits, values and social organisation 
since these cannot be understood except as part of culture. 
In this way, it only differs slightly from Tylor's nine- 
teenth century definition of culture as including knowledge, 
belief, art, law, morals, customs, and all the other capa- 
bilities and habits acquired by man (Richards 1970, p. 16] 
Subsumed under Malinowskils use of the term culture' 
is, first of all, the notion of the tribal microcosm, the 
functioning whole. Secondly, there is a stress on the need 
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to study the 'use' or 'function' of the custom's institu- 
tions and beliefs which form part of a culture. Thirdly, 
because Malinowski was interested in the difference. between 
man's biological and sociological heritage, he identified 
the latter with the term culture [Richards 1970, p. 16]. 
In Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski at- 
tempted to analyse culture into a number of well balanced 
distinct parts. Leach contends that Malinowskils dis- 
courses on culture and his theoretical position in general 
are merely platitudinous [Leach 1970, p. 119]. Further, he 
regards functionalism in the Malinowskian form to have 
become repugnant and his abstract writings to be dead [Leach 
1970, p. 120]. However, he believes that the only distin- 
guishing special characteristic of his theoretical assump- 
tion is that the total field of data must fit together and 
make sense [Leach 1970, p. 1201. 
Archaeology shares Malinowskils belief that all the 
elements of a culture have an interconnectedness. However, 
Malinowski defines 'culture' in terms of three disparate 
categories: firstly, material culture consisting of physical 
objects which are the products of human activities; second- 
ly, concrete categories of human activity under the term 
, custom'; thirdly, constitutional charters for the various 
social groupings and beliefs [Parsons 1970, p. 58]. In terms 
of the archaeological analysis 'culture' may be understood 
in terms of power regimes, discursive formations, positivi- 
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ties, institutions, objects and statements which are inter- 
connected in terms of the possibility of cultural effects. 
We have seen that these effects, in the primitive Trobriand 
episteme, are unweildly and multiply to infinity and, as 
such, are static in nature and do not involve any techniques 
for bringing about significant internal dynamism. 
Goddard claims that Malinowskils type of functionalism 
arises in the context of his inability or reluctance to 
subject the whole of society to questioning with notions of 
totality and the use of structures. Malinowski follows 
British philosophers in their inability to provide a criti- 
cism of the totality of the social order [Goddard 1979, 
p. 62]. Goddard concedes that there has been a notion of 
structure in British social anthropology but that this 
notion is simple since it merely relates, without mediation, 
to the empirical reality of native social life [Goddard 
1979, p. 63]. 
Further, Goddard claims that Malinowski sought a solu- 
tion to the problem of how social life presents a stable 
order in the institutional arrangements regulating relation- 
ships between individuals and not in culture as a given 
totality [Goddard 1979, p. 64]. Therefore, within Malinow- 
ski's anthropology there is nothing more than the idea of an 
aggregate of social relations (the social structure) main- 
tained by the ongoing processes of social life. In effect, 
he claims, the normative series remains unreduced; it is 
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1 
simply described and its order noted 
Archaeology provides a means of placing the whole of 
society in question in a totalising fashion that does not 
reduce social phenomena to mere empirical observations. In 
fact, we have seen that archaeology provides a significant 
criticism of empiricism in general. Archaeology furnishes a 
form of reductionism where the notion of the larchivel is 
equivalent to the idea of 'culture' as the given totality 
invoked by Goddard. Archaeology is not a form of analysis of 
the possibility of the regulation of individuals where 
individual desires are repressed. It is an investigation of 
the order of things where power is creative rather than 
solely repressive. In Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 
Malinowski is concerned with this question of the origin of 
the conformity of the individual to the collective order. By 
positing the individual against the collective will we are 
involved in an ideological analysis of power which I have 
argued is inappropriate for archaeology. It is essential to 
realise that archaeology does not utilise a conflict between 
the individual and the collective but seeks a solution which 
is an aggregate of social relations. 
Archaeology embodies a Durkheimean disdain for empiri- 
-------------------- 
1. See Firth's essay 'Malinowski in the History of Social 
anthropology' in Ellen's edition of Malinowski, Between Two 
Worlds (see bib. ) for a comprehensive review of the way in 
which Malinowskils work has been received in anthropology. 
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cal facts but here I attempt to mediate them rather than 
dispense with them altogether. It must be noted that archae- 
ology is not at all involved with an inductivist method. 
Empiricism regards induction as a condition for the possi- 
bility of validity. Archaeology puts those very conditions 
into question. What is offered as a 'proof' is similar to a 
Durkheimean type conclusion from a single experimental 
situation. However, the totality is constrained by the 
notion of lepisteme, and the omnipresence of difference in 
the analysis. Further, archaeology offers a positivistic 
analysis where the shared positivity of discourses is 
sought. 
Malinowskils phenomenological view, that no data out- 
side of the subjective-objective present need be considered, 
is disastrous for abstract generalisations. Because of this 
Malinowskils merit lies in the quality of his observations 
rather than in his interpretations. His interpretations are 
merely the private intuition that humans must satisfy bio- 
logical needs [Leach 1970, p. 120]. 
3.6 Conclusions. 
It is my view, then, that once the task of applying 
archaeology to the field of anthropology is completed I will 
have succeeded in placing the whole of our approach to our 
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own culture and that of others into question so that there 
is a viable alternative to the traditional interpretative 
unities that have sustained anthropology and have also 
sustained debates about the status of primitive knowledge 
in terms of a Western rational. 
We have seen that, in the Trobriand episteme, there 
are three attributes that characterise primitive knowledge. 
These are the operation of forms of complementary opposition 
(asymmetry), convenience and enclosure. These figures are 
inextricably linked with space and the involvement of these 
bounded spaces with an occult causation gives rise to a 
world of vitalities. These are the main features of the 
epistemological figures which guide the knowledge of the 
Trobrianders. 
The antagonistic realms of the episteme provide the 
conditions for the possibility of Trobriand knowledge and 
institutions in the same way that agency makes modern knowl- 
edge possible. It shapes the sexual, magical and economic 
discourses of the Trobrianders. I have selected the natives 
of the Trobriand Islands for the central examination because 
of the wealth of ethnography available on them in the work 
of Malinowski. They are not deliberately selected to suit my 
thesis since there is no precedent for a study of the world 
1. Goddard criticises British anthropology for its inability 
to place the whole of culture into question. For details of 
this criticism see his essay 'Anthropology: the Limits of 
Functionalism' in Ideology in Social Science, page 62. 
128 
of these natives in terms of the oppositions outlined above. 
The main objective in looking at the configurations in 
this primitive episteme is to show what kinds of knowledge 
can be included or excluded. This epistemological figure 
outlines the regularity of the discourses and shows their 
positivities in that we can see how sexual discourse, magi- 
cal discourses and discourses on marriage and economics 
occur at the same level. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
The Realm of Sex. 
'The manifold sexualities - those which appear with the 
different ages (sexualities of the infant or the child), 
those which haunt spaces (the sexuality of the home... ) 
all form the correlate to exact procedures of power. ' [Fou- 
cault 1978, p. 47]. 
4.1 Introduction. 
The figures of the primitive episteme, outlined In the 
previous chapter, will be used here to provide an account of 
the nature of the discourses of the Trobrianders. Far from 
being the free and unfettered creature of Rousseau's imagi- 
nation, the savage is hemmed in on every side by the custom 
of his people, he is bound in the chains of tradition in his 
religion, medicine, industry, art and social relations 
[Hartland 1924, p. 138]. 
over the next three chapters, I will look at the ob- 
jects of discourses available in the discursive formations 
governing primitive sexual relations,, industry in the gar- 
dens and magic. I have selected the primitive discourses on 
sexual experience as a means of gaining access to a group of 
discourses since sexual experience is involved with many 
other primitive discourses and is part of a technique for 
reconciling the individual desires with the collective and, 
therefore, is an effect of power. I will examine the dis- 
courses on sex, kinship and marriage in the context of 
economics and magic and demonstrate the shared positivity of 
all these discourses in the primitive epistemic figures. 
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The experience of the Trobrianders is itself subject to 
the operation of the episteme in the way in which they come 
to regard themselves as a selves. The notion of self which 
is appropriate to the experiences of the Trobriand episteme 
is not the undifferentiated modern individual. Morris refers 
to Taylor's conception of the primitive self as one where 
the self spills out into the world beyond the confines of 
the experiencing body [Morris 1987, p. 185]. The nature of 
the individual is derived from the place of his origin in 
the world and the nature of that boundary. In this way, it 
will be demonstrated how it is that a brother shares his 
nature with his sister, whom we might regard as a differen- 
tiated extension of his self. 
Dumont separates the notion of the individual into the 
two concepts of the empirical subject of speech, thought and 
will and the essentially nonsocial moral being who carries 
our value and is found in the modern ideology of man and 
society. He defines the approach where the individual is of 
paramount value as individualism' and where society is the 
paramount value he uses the label of 'holism, [Dumont 1986, 
p. 25]. Dumont reminds us that Hellenistic thought believed 
the path to wisdom lay in the renunciation of the world in 
favour of individual concerns. He identifies this thought as 
the genesis of individualism in Western intellectual life 
(Dumont 1986, pp. 27-28]. Universal reason is regarded to be 
at work through the particular person that exercises it. The 
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Hellenists established this ideal of the wise man detached 
from social life [Dumont 1986, p. 29]. Individualism de- 
veloped from its Greek beginnings through Christianity where 
Augustine inaugurated an existential struggle between reason 
and experience which modifies the relation between the ideal 
and the actual, and of which, Dumont claims, we are in some 
sense the products in the modern episteme [Dumont 1986, 
p. 41]. 
Dumont identifies Liebnizls system of monads as the 
only serious attempt to reconcile individualism and holism. 
However, Liebnizls successors seem to have forgotten the 
incompatibility between these two EDumont 1986, p. 211). 
Durkheim initiates his analysis from the social whole by 
stressing collective representations while Weber starts with 
the individual. Dumont seeks his own solution in a complex 
hierarchical combination of both principles [Dumont 1986, 
pp. 213-2141. Here, Dumont's solution is involved with an 
ideological conception of power which is inappropriate for 
archaeology. The archaeological solution does not reject the 
value of individuals over society as a whole, which is an 
ideological concern, but does reject the role of the indi- 
vidual in reason, which is an epistemological concern. 
Nevertheless, in this way, the method might be described as 
holistic. 
The archaeological method constantly refers to the 
conditions for the emergence of discourses in the context 
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of an epistemological pattern. The study of the Trobriand 
episteme provides a context for the analysis of primitive 
knowledge different from current anthropological approaches. 
This project encompasses an introduction to a range of 
fundamental concepts and issues which I have already ex- 
plored. It also involves an examination of the primitive 
archive; the shared positivity of diverse discourses and 
practices. 
4.2 Discourses on sex. 
In the Modern episteme, sex is located in the family 
where it is transformed into a function of reproduction. Sex 
is not located in the family in the Trobriand episteme. One 
of the most interesting things about the Trobriand experi- 
ence of sex is that it has no association with reproduction. 
The dominant place of reproductive sex in the bedroom of 
modern man can be contrasted with the many locations of sex 
in the vi. llages of the Trobrianders; there is the central 
dwelling of the polygamous chief; the house of the married 
couple; the bukumatula (bachelor's hut) of the unmarried 
young men; and the shaded groves of the children. These 
locations are not related to the utility of reproduction. 
In the Victorian Age a general silence was maintained 
with respect to sexual activity amongst children and all 
evidence to support such practice was assiduously ignored. 
The Trobrianders tolerate sexual activity amongst children 
and it is not at all regarded as an illegitimate activity. 
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However, the most conspicuous form of taboo operates at the 
level of a strict prohibition on sexual relations between 
brother and sister which is not a repressive figure. Fur- 
ther, this taboo is not related to a Capitalist economics 
based in reproduction and production as we find with sexual 
activity in the Modern Age but is related to a primitive 
economics of exchange. A necessary space was provided, in 
the Modern Age, for illegitimate sexualities in the area of 
an economics. Perversions were denied a place in production 
and reproduction and the brothel became the place of sexual 
tolerance where money could be exchanged. Perversions could 
be tolerated where they could be made to contribute to an 
economy. In the Trobriand episteme, the taboo on Incest 
between brother and sister arises from the fundamental order 
and its tolerance would invert that order along with the 
economic system that it gives rise to. This threat is posed 
in such a way that this incest has no chance of becoming 
involved in the primitive economy of exchange. The mainte- 
nance of the taboo is necessitated by the primitive economic 
order. 
In the primitive society of the Trobrianders, we find 
no locations for the tolerance of perversion at a price. 
This is because the nature of primitive sexuality is not to 
be understood in terms of repression, reproduction or an 
economics based in production. Repression has come to be 
regarded as the fundamental link between power, knowledge 
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and sexuality since the Classical Age [Foucault 1978, p. 5]. 
The placement of the age of repression in the seventeenth 
century causes it to coincide with the development of Capi- 
talism, and as such repression becomes an integral part of 
the bourgeois order of things. Sexuality becomes associated 
with the modes of production and is linked to a particular 
economics. However, the primitive taboo on sexual activity 
between brother and sister has its origin in the figures of 
the episteme and not in a repression. The incest taboo is 
examined for its productive nature and not as a possible 
repression. 
The experience of sex in the Trobriand society is 
characterised by the inter-relations of the two axes that 
constitute it: the formation of discourses that refer to it; 
and the systems of power that regulate its practice. The 
analysis of the discourses that refer to sex avoids the 
dilemma of science versus ideology. The analysis of primi- 
tive power relations and their technologies makes it possi- 
ble to view them as open strategies while escaping the 
conception of power as domination. 
In the first of these constitutive axes, there are the 
discourses which are governed by the figures of the epis- 
teme. In the second are the power regimes that propagate and 
maintain that formation. My analysis explores these two 
axes which constitute the power-knowledge relation in this 
primitive episteme. 
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There is a topological example on the knowledge of sex 
from the natives of Lambok which shows us that when they 
marry, the couple sleep with their heads to the north or the 
east, or between north and east. The man lies on the side 
that is closer to north and east, directions which are 
superior to south and west [Duff-Cooper 1985, p. 413]. In the 
Lambok, male and female have different roles with different 
values attached to them. This is especially true of their 
sexual relations. A male retains his superior position in 
sexual intercourse; penetration always takes place with the 
male above the female EDuff-Cooper 1985, p. 415]. This exam- 
ple shows us that even the concerns of desire are not out- 
side of the imposition of qualities and values on the bodies 
of men and the parts of the body concerned with those de- 
sires. 
The native Trobriand physiological conception of the 
male sex organs is that they are strictly for sexual pleas- 
ure and excretion and not for reproduction. The eyes are 
regarded as the seat of desire and lust. They are the cause 
of sexual passion. Desire is carried from the eyes to the 
brain by means of the wotuna (fibre) and hence spreads all 
over the body to the belly, arms and legs until it finally 
concentrates in the kidneys. The eyes are regarded as the 
ulula (basis) of sexual passion. The kidneys are considered 
the main part or tapwana (trunk) of the system. other 
wotuna lead from them to the penis. This is the highest 
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point of the whole system, the matala (eye). This division 
between basis, trunk and tip is repeated later in the struc- 
ture of the magical spell. This indication of the three 
cardinal points is characteristic of the native canons of 
classification in general and represents vital boundaries in 
the body. Thus when the eyes see an object of desire they 
communicate the impulse to the kidneys which transmits it to 
the sex organs. The eyes are the primary motive for all 
sexual excitement; they are that which makes the native 
desire to copulate. Consistent with this conception, the 
natives hold that a man with his eyes closed will have no 
desire [Malinowski 1982a, p. 142]. 
The process of sexual excitement in the female is 
analogous [Malinowski 1926, p. 20]. The eyes, the kidneys and 
the sex organs are united by the same system of wotuna. Both 
the male and female discharge have the same name: mamona. 
The natives ascribe both discharges an origin in the kidneys 
and a similar function which has nothing to do with genera- 
tion but is strictly concerned with lubricating the membrane 
and, thereby, increasing pleasure [Malinowski 1982a, p. 142]. 
Men and women are not distinguished on biological 
grounds and this means that there is a strict symmetry 
between male and female sexuality. There are three bounded 
areas functioning in this account; the eyes, the kidneys and 
the sexual organs. There is a distinction between elements: 
the ulula, the tapwana and the matala. The image is derived 
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from a tree, a pillar or a spear. The ulula is the foot of 
the tree and has come to mean the source of strength. This 
represents the eyes. The tapwana is the middle part of the 
trunk and represents the kidneys. The matala which is the 
eye, or point as in a spear, stands for the highest part and 
represents the penis [Malinowski 1982a, p. 143]. 
Love, as opposed to passionate desire, has its seat in 
the intestines, in the skin of the belly, in the arms, and, 
only to a lesser extent, in the eyes. Hence, when the na- 
tives look at their friends, those they are fond of and 
their children they desire to hug them with their arms 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 144]. The native conception of the body 
reveals a series of bounded realms separated by their rela- 
tive place within the body rather than by biological func- 
tion. Each participating organ has a role determined by its 
place in the asymmetric order. As well as sex having its 
distinctive places in the body it also occupies a place in 
the world outside of the body in the village. 
The village takes the form of two rows of houses built 
in concentric rings around a large open space. Between the 
outer ring and the inner there is a circular street running 
around the whole of the village. The outer ring consists of 
dwelling houses and the inner ring consists of store houses 
in which yams, which are the staple food, are kept. The yam 
houses, being the place of food have an important central 
location and are distinguished from the dwellings by their 
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better and more elaborate finishes. Both the dwellings and 
the store houses always face the centre. The inner circle is 
the scene of public and festive life. A part of it consists 
of a burial ground and another part of it consists of a 
dancing ground which is the locus of all festive and ceremo- 
nial activities [Malinowski 1982a, p. 8]. All the houses of 
the inner row, which are mainly store houses, are subject to 
certain taboos, especially to the taboo of cooking. The 
outer ring consisting of dwellings, is where cooking is 
allowed [Malinowski 1982a, p. 60]. All the houses of married 
people have to be in the outer ring, whereas a bachelor's 
house may be allowed among the storehouses in the middle. 
Thus, the inner row consists of yam-houses, personal huts of 
a chief and his kinsmen, and the bachelor houses. The outer 
ring is made up of closed yam-houses, matrimonial homes and 
widow's and widower's houses. The main division between the 
two rings is the taboo on cooking [Malinowski 1982a, p. 61]. 
However, before exploring the discourses on sex, marriage 
and food we can say that the outer part of the village, the 
street, may be regarded as the female portion of the vil- 
lage. The street is occupied by women busy with their house- 
hold tasks. The central place may be regarded as the male 
part of the village where men predominate, discussing in 
communal gatherings the prospects of the garden, a fishing 
trip or ceremony [Malinowski 1982a, p. 9]. In this way, we 
can say that the physical design of the village itself 
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reflects the primitive ordering of the world. The most 
important people of the village occupy the most central 
positions. The 
'male 
children eventually move towards the 
centre where they take up residence in the bachelor huts, 
while the females, in the form of witches, move in the shape 
of spirits towards the most extreme darkness of the jungle 
outside [Malinowski 1982a, p. 39]. The architectural layout 
of the village finds its possibilities and limitations in 
the circular positivities of the episteme. There is an 
enclosing boundary outside of which is the place of darkness 
and disorder. This is the realm of witches. The central 
place of the village represents the most stable place and 
holds the food stores which represent survival. The central 
place is enclosed by a continuous circle of dwellings. The 
boundary between these and the central place interact since 
food is taken from the central stores and cooked in the 
outer ring. Cooking represents a manipulation of this bound- 
ary, which guarantees future survival, and, therefore, takes 
the form of an implicit threat. This is seen in the prohibi- 
tion on cooking in the central place. The spatial layout of 
the village reflects the operation of the primitive bound- 
aries of the episteme with its enclosures, continuities and 
asymmetries. For the young and the chief the place of sex is 
In the inner enclosed circle while sex in marriage belongs 
to the outer enclosure. For the very young the place of sex 
is anywhere privacy is possible which is usually some quiet 
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grove outside of the village. 
Native children become acquainted with sex at a very 
early age. They enjoy considerable freedom and independence 
from the adults. This freedom extends to sexual matters. 
Since there is little or no privacy within the household, 
children have ample opportunity for acquiring practical 
information concerning the sexual act, and no precautions 
are taken to prevent them doing so. Children initiate each 
other into the practicalities of sexual life. A premature 
amorous existence begins among children before they are 
really able to carry out the sex act. Games and pastimes 
satisfy sexual curiosity about the appearance and function 
of the sexual organs, where genital manipulation and oral 
stimulation are typical forms of these amusements EMalinow- 
ski 1982a, pp. 44-47]. Adults regard such infantile indul- 
gence with indifference or complacency. They find it natural 
and do not interfere, and at times, even indulge it. This 
is because there are no discourses available that would 
problematize children as valid sexual objects. 
The age at which a girl joins in kayta (sexual inter- 
course) coincides with her putting on the small fibre skirt; 
1 
between the ages of four and five When a boy reaches the 
-------------------- 
1. It is interesting to note here that Malinowski rejects 
all claims that these girls engage in real intercourse as an 
example of the Trobriands grotesque Rabelaisian humour and, 
based on no apparent evidence, comes up with his own esti- 
mate of the ages for a girl's start to full sexual life at 
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age of from twelve to fourteen years he ceases to be regard- 
ed as a gwadi (child) and receives a different status in- 
volving some duties and many privileges, a stricter observ- 
ance of taboos, and more participation in tribal affairs A 
girl emerges from childhood into sexual maturity with the 
development of breasts and the start of menstruation [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p. 53]. 
A partial breakup of the family takes place at this 
stage. Brothers and sisters are separated since the demands 
of the taboo on brother and sister sexual relations forces 
-------------------- 
Continued 
between six and eight and a boy's at between ten and twelve. 
Here Malinowski is, himself, involved in a debate about 
whether or not children are sexual beings and comes up with 
his own peculiar compromise [Malinowski 1982a, p. 48]. 
1. Malinowski provides a table of age designations in The 
Sexual Life of Savages that roughly indicate the stages of 
the lives of the Trobrianders. 
Waywaya (fetus; infant till the age of crawling, both male 
and female). 
Pwapwawa (infant till the stage of walking, male and fe- 
male). 
Gwadi (child till mature sexual development, male and fe- 
male). This is also the generic designation for all these 
stages meaning child, male or female, at any time between 
birth and maturity. 
Tolulatile (youth from sexual maturity till marriage). 
Nakapugula or Nakubukwabuya (girl from sexual maturity till 
marriage). 
Tobubowalu (mature male). 
Nabubowalu (mature woman). 
Tovavaygile (married man). 
Navavaygile (married woman). 
Generic designations - Talu (man), Vivila (woman). 
Tomwaya (old man). Toboma (old honoured man). 
Numwaya (old woman). 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 51]. 
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the brother out of the parents hut. The boy moves to a house 
occupied by bachelors or by elderly widowed male relatives 
or friends. This house is called the bakumatula. Sometimes 
the girl goes to the house of an elderly widowed maternal 
aunt or other relative [Malinowski 1982a, p. 53]. 
Coinciding with this move to the central bukumatula, is 
the development of a more serious attitude towards sexual 
activity with definite attachments and personal preferences 
coming into play. There are no serious duties to be per- 
formed and young people enjoy more independence and a wider 
scope of action than they had as children. Many of the 
taboos are not yet quite binding on them and they know 
little of the operation of magic [Malinowski 1982a , P. 553. 
Young people of this age, as well as conducting their 
love affairs more seriously and intensely within the village 
community to which they belong, also'form sexual connections 
outside of the village. These new associations are formed on 
the occasion of a ceremony where custom permits. During this 
intermediate period, between the playful sex of the infant 
and the serious commitments of the married man, sexual 
relations are involved with sentiment since these pre-mari- 
tal intrigues are based upon and maintained by personal 
elements only. There is no obligation on either party and 
both may enter into them and dissolve them at will [Malinow- 
ski 1982a, pp. 56-59]. These relationships do not have an 
important role in marital choice. 
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The most important institution in the village for the 
maintenance of the separation of the brother and sister is 
the bukumatula. This form of accommodation for the young 
unmarried men meets the demands of seclusion, comfort and 
of the approval of custom by preventing incestuous liaisons. 
This bachelor's hut can accommodate several couples who live 
there for various lengths of time in this temporary communi- 
ty. It also offers occasional privacy for younger couples 
for a few hours of passion [Malinowski 1982a, p. 60]. This 
place, set aside for the sexual enjoyment of the young, was 
established because of the demands of the incest taboo. 
Apart from the taboo on incest there are specific limits on 
the choice of a sexual partner for the native which have 
their origin in the primitive conception of kinship and not 
in a dominating figure of repression. I will now examine the 
discourses limiting these choices. 
4.3 Sex and the clan divisions. 
In the native organisation, humanity is divided into 
four clans (kumila) [Malinowski 1982a, p. 416]. Each of the 
four clans comprises smaller sub-clans called dala [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p. 417]. The sub-clans are, if anything, more 
important than the clans since the members of the same sub- 
clan regard themselves as kinsmen, have the same rank, and 
form the local unit in Trobriand society. All the members of 
the same sub-clan belong to the same place. It is in this 
way, as we have seen, that the same name can be applied to 
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them. It is through a shared location that they get their 
identity. Each local community is composed of people belong- 
ing to one sub-clan only. Larger villages are compounded of 
several minor units but each unit has its own compact site 
within the village. In this identification of clan, the 
ability to delimit the locus of the group allows for a 
stricter identification. People of the same sub-clan are 
real kinsmen and call one another veyogu [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 417]. This identification is made in terms of location and 
not genealogy and provides the basis for a weak taboo on sex 
between the members of the same clan. 
The taboo on sex at the level of the clan means that 
two people of the opposite sex and members of the same clan 
must neither marry nor co-habit nor even show any sexual 
interest in each other. The term tabu in its most extensive 
application stands for 'woman with whom intercourse is 
possible' and she must be someone from another clan for this 
term to apply [Young 1979, p. 811. Malinowski tells us that 
the native word for clan incest, or breach of exogamy, is 
suvasova [Malinowski 1982a, p. 4231. Breach of exogamy is 
reinforced at the level of classificatory kinship but only 
by weak forms of censure. Clan incest is an example of a 
native vague boundary in the Trobriand experience. These 
weak prohibitions demonstrate the native belief that opera- 
tions on vague boundaries are less effective than manipula- 
tions on specific ones and, therefore, less in need of 
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maintenance by strict prohibition. 
There is a magical discourse designed to maintain clan 
exogamy. An undiscovered incestuous relationship between 
members of the same clan entails an unpleasant disease. This 
disease involves the swelling of the belly, a whitening of 
the skin with sores and a small insect is generated in the 
body and maggots can be found in the corpse if death results 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 424]. This is an example of the associ- 
ation of, diseases with certain types of sexual activity. 
Certain sexual activities are made dangerous in magical 
discourse. However, we might imagine that, from the possi- 
bility of catching this dread disease, few cases of breaches 
of clan incest would occur. On the contrary, clan incest 
provides the possibility of a tolerable sexual digression 
amongst the natives. There is a difference of stringency 
according to the clans in which it happens and in general 
amounts to a desirable and interesting form of erotic expe- 
rience. Magic to counter the associated disease is available 
so the threat is virtually eliminated in practice. There- 
fore, clan incest provides the possibility of an erotic 
perverse diversion which is frowned upon and not openly 
practised as is the nature of perversions. 
Each of the four clans has its own name: Malasi, Luku- 
ba, Lukwasisiga, and Lukulabuta [Malinowski 1982a, p. 417]. 
Each of these names can be used to give a definition of the 
natives place within the fourfold division of mankind. There 
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is an hierarchical differentiation within this division. 
Each clan, because of Its relative place, has its own char- 
acteristics associated with it: magical knowledge, moral and 
intellectual propensity, relations with certain animals and 
plants and an indication of rank. There are myths to support 
the hierarchical division of the whole of humanity into four 
clans. Each sub-clan in the Trobriands can indicate its 
original locality, where their group Initially emerged. 
Coral outcrops, water-holes, small caves and grottoes are 
Pointed to as the original 'holes' [Nalinowski 1966, p-631. 
Hear the village of Labali is a place called Obukula which 
is a 'hole' and is the place from which the first ancestors 
emerged [Malinowski 1982a, p. 4181. 
There is a significant myth which accounts for the origi- 
nal clan divisions and maintains those separations. This 
myth represents a powerful technique that propagates the 
social order and its prohibited sexual combinations. Accord- 
ing to the myth of origin, before they appeared on the earth 
people led a subterranean existence similar In all respects 
to life on the surface. They were divided into clans and 
sub-clans and were grouped into districts [Malinowski 1982a, 
P. 4181. A sister as the head of the family and the brother 
as her guardian emerged and gave the totemic. economic and 
magical character to the communities begun in this way 
[Malinowski 1926, p. 471. In the emergence myth the Iguana, 
the animal of the Lukulabuta clan, scratched its way through 
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the earth and climbed a tree and remained there as a mere 
onlooker on the subsequent events. Then the Dog, totem of 
the Lukuba clan, who originally had the highest rank, came 
up. The Dog was followed by the Pig, representative of the 
Malasi clan. Last came the sign of the Lukwasisiga clan, 
represented variably as a crocodile, snake, possum or some- 
times completely ignored. The Dog ate the fruit of the noku 
plant. The Pig regarded the Dog to be of low rank since it 
accused it of eating dirt in the form of noku (there is a 
convenience here between eaten fruit and excrement) and 
assumed the highest rank [Malinowski 1926, pp. 47-48]. Food 
is the main indication of man's nature and there are taboos 
imposed according to rank and clan and in this way the 
Lukuba clan lost its highest ranking. In the Trobriands, the 
higher the rank of the totemic sub-clan, the greater its 
power of expansion (Malinowski 1926, pp. 59-601. 
It can be said at this stage that the clan distinctions 
came about because of the groupings into distinct areas and 
not vice-versa. The identification of spatial difference in 
the episteme made these differentiations possible. The 
autochthonous clan emergence strengthens the fact of the 
local unity and the kinship unity and this unity is provided 
in the figures of the episteme. 
The rule in Trobriand emergence mythology is that one 
pair of brother and sister emerged, formed one sub-clan, 
occupied one village, worked one portion of garden land, had 
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one system of gardening and fishing magic. The exception to 
this rule is the hole at Obukula from which the four main 
clans emerged. This emergence established the relative 
positions of the four clans in the scale of rank EMalinowski 
1982a, p. 4191. 
The subdivision of people into four main clans provides 
a justification of differentiation by location at a macro- 
scopic level. This can be seen in the weakness of the taboo 
on sexual relationships between members of the same clan. 
However, it is at the level of the sub-clan distinction, 
which impinges concretely on the natives lives since the 
sub-clan has its locus in the village, the most tangible 
unit, that the exogamic rules come into full effect. While 
the clan is a function at the macroscopic level for the 
limitation of the primitive notion of the human species An 
general, the sub-clan is a function for the organisation of 
the sexual lives of the natives at a practical level. It has 
its own mythological rules for emergence in the 
one-hole-one-line-one-sub-clan regime [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 419]. It is a rule which gives rise to specific discourses 
and practices relating to choice of sexual partners. A 
stronger taboo on sub-clan sexual relations pertains than 
the taboo at the level of clan relations. However, this 
taboo is not nearly as significant as the taboo on sexual 
relations between the brother and sister. 
The categories of clan, sub-clan and the brother/sister 
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relation as the identification of limits on sexual partners 
are each defined to various degrees. The notion of clan is 
vague in its operation and has, therefore, a more powerful 
vitality than the others. But, by possessing this power, it 
remains beyond practicable manipulation by the natives. In 
this way, inversions in the sexual order at this boundary 
have no practical effect on the clan order. The designation 
of the sub-clan by the same name, more so than the clan, 
designates a more localised place in the world, and, there- 
fore, a more specifiable shared nature. The sub-clan is 
modelled on the brother and sister emerging together from 
the ground but has a vaguer boundary. The notion of the 
brother/sister relation is the most well defined and as such 
is the most easily manipulated by magic and social interven- 
tion. Manipulations are available in the form of love magic 
and the separation of brothers from their sisters at an 
early age. This well defined boundary becomes the focus of 
the strictest discourses on sexual taboos and an area with 
the possibility of the greatest danger of an inversion of 
order through the bringing together of bodies in sex by 
magic. The notion of the sub-clan lies between these two 
extremes and is the category for the focus of discourses on 
sex where sexual inversions have a less dangerous potential. 
Both dala and kumila identity is transmitted to indi- 
viduals at conception. The rule of exogamy between kumila is 
broken without any drastic repercussions; however, dala 
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exogamy is strictly maintained [Weiner 1976, p. 51]. Malinow- 
ski translated kumila as 'clan' assuming that a dala was a 
smaller replica of a kumila. Weiner claims that the Trobri- 
anders only take an interest in personal genealogy where it 
serves land disputes and holds that the kumila are not 
descent lines [Weiner 1976, p. 52]. I have abandoned genea- 
logical conceptions in the analysis so Weiner's insights are 
of no significance to me here. Further, kumila boundaries 
are not manipulated. Further, Weiner seems to believe that 
definite versions of the emergence stories would be avail- 
able in an oral culture. However, this is not likely to be 
the case. Neither dala nor kumila are crystallised in a 
culture where writing has no possibility. The same applies 
to unities of descent. 
4.4 The incest taboo. 
The archaeological analysis does not question primitive 
sexual experience for its repressive nature. Instead, it 
questions this experience for its origins in the figures of 
the episteme and its positive possibilities. After looking 
at the sexual experience of Trobriand children it would seem 
that there are no sexual censures in place. There are no 
native discourses condemning such practices as bestiality, 
fetishism, exhibitionism and masturbation nor are there 
believed to be any dangers associated with these practices. 
A native would never use the term bomala (taboo) with regard 
to them [Malinowski 1982a, p. 395]. Bomala has its possibili- 
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ty only in incest and all of these other practices form no 
part of native concern. They have no possibility for emerg- 
ing as real problems amongst the Trobrianders. All forms of 
sexual decorum are problematised in terms of a taboo on 
incest. 
Sexual activity at the level of the brother/sister 
relationship is strongly prohibited in native activities and 
discourses. The removal of a child from his family and his 
placement in a bachelor hut is due to the supreme taboo: the 
prohibition of any erotic dealings between brother and 
sister. This taboo is the first rule seriously impressed in 
the child's life [Malinowski 1982a, p. 437]. The relation 
between brother and sister is denoted by the term luguta 
which designates a person of the opposite sex and of the 
forbidden class. As a metaphor, the word luguta for 'sister' 
is used in magical formulae when blights and diseases are to 
be exorcised [Malinowski 1982a, p. 437]. This term, luguta, 
is used only with regard to the tabooed relationship since 
children of the same parents and of the same sex use differ- 
ent kinship designations to describe each other [Malinowski 
1982a, p. 4381. 
Brother and sister are forbidden to take part together 
in any childish sexual games, and this convention is rigor- 
ously observed by the children themselves. No festive compa- 
ny is allowed to include a brother and sister. When a boy 
grows up he goes to the bukumatula to sleep and to carry on 
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his love affairs. In this way, brother and sister grow up 
without any personal or intimate communication between them. 
The sister is the centre of all that is sexually forbidden 
and unnatural for her brother. This application of a strict 
taboo arises out of the native desire to maintain this 
vulnerable boundary in the face of magical manipulation. 
This boundary forms the microcosm for the political and 
economic ordering of the society where the brother is the 
powerful possessor of wealth, the head of the family and the 
provider for his sister's children. An inversion at this 
level would threaten the entire social order. 
The incest taboo is involved with the formation of 
clans and the origin myths accounting for the clans main- 
tains that order. The most central location for the identity 
of a shared nature lies in the mother. A child comes from 
the same place as the mother and as such has a shared nature 
with the mother. There is no knowledge of physiological 
paternity amongst the Trobrianders. Therefore, the father 
occupies a different place to the child and does not share 
in its nature in the way in which the mother does. The 
father stands in a different relationship to the child. 
Sexual relations between father and daughter or between 
mother and son are not involved with mythological proscrip- 
tion nor are they the locus of the involvement of sex with 
real dangers as are brother/sister relations. This is the 
epistemological significance of the matrilineal system which 
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makes the brother/sister boundary central rather than a 
father/son boundary. In this way, the matrilineal system 
makes the particular discourses on incest possible. 
Brother/sister incestuous relations is the subject of 
one of the natives' sacred stories and the basis of love 
magic. The myth outlines the origin of the association of 
death with incestuous activity and maintains and promotes 
this taboo. The myth represents a powerful strategy for the 
maintenance of the separation between brother and sister and 
is an example of the relation of power to knowledge. 
The myth on the origin of love magic runs briefly as 
follows. In the village of Kumilabwaga there was a woman of 
the Malasi clan living with her son and daughter. One day 
the son made some magic over herbs to gain the love of a 
certain woman and placed the finished oil concoction in a 
container in the thatch of the roof. He then went to the sea 
to bathe. As the sister passed under the container on the 
way to a water hole, some of the oil mixture dropped onto 
her hair. She brushed it off with her fingers and sniffed at 
it. She was overpowered by the potion and immediately began 
to inquire after her brother, which she should not have 
done, and this caused her mother to realise what had hap- 
pened. 
The sister ran after her brother whom she found bathing 
naked on the beach. She threw off her fibre skirt and tried 
to approach him. The brother was horrified by this act and 
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ran away along the beach three times until he fell down 
exhausted and was seduced by his sister. Then, ashamed and 
remorseful, but still effected by the love magic, they re- 
treated to the grotto of Bokaraywata where they stayed 
without food, drink and sleep until they died and the sulum- 
woya plant grew out of their entwined bodies. 
Meanwhile, a man on the island of Iwa dreamt the magi- 
cal dream of this event. When he woke he told the people of 
his village how the two were dead and how the sulumwoya 
plant was growing out of their bodies. He journeyed to the 
grotto where he picked some of the plant and then travelled 
to the mother's house. She gave him the magical formula 
which he learned by heart. He took part of the spell to Iwa 
and left part of it in Kumilabwaga. The root of the plant 
(magic) remained in Kumilabwaga while the tip was taken to 
1 
Iwa This man from Iwa then imposed the taboos of the 
magic, he prescribed the ritual and stipulated that a sub- 
stantial payment should be made to the people of Iwa and 
Kumilabwaga when they allowed others to use their magic 
(Malinowski 1927b, pp. 127-129]. 
The power of love magic reaches its climax in this 
incest case. Love magic focuses on the fundamental opposi- 
tion between brother and sister and the threat to the order 
-------------------- 
1. We have already seen the division of sexual parts of the 
body into the yulula (root), tapuala (flank) and dogina 
(tip). 
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of things, through the possibility of incest, provides it 
with its power. Because magic can act accidentally on broth- 
ers and sisters it is important for them to avoid each other 
since all sexual attraction has its origin in magic and not 
in the will. For this reason the brother must leave the 
house where his sister lives so that he avoids becoming the 
victim of a magical spell. Here we have a concrete case of 
the absence of individual will amongst the Trobrianders. 
Sexual desire, which is at the heart of Modern analyses of 
the individual in Freud, has no place here. 
This myth is an example of the system of power that 
regulates the primitive discourse on incest and forms the 
second axis of the present analysis. This is a mythical 
discourse in the native experience that makes a particular 
sexual activity dangerous by relating it to death. The myth 
associated with brother/sister incest and the origin of love 
magic addresses the fundamental paradox concerning sexual 
activity available in the figures of the episteme. on the 
one hand, the male is attracted to the female because of a 
shared nature. Here the brother is doubly attracted to his 
sister in that they share the same nature by emerging from 
1 
the same place; the mother This makes them extremely 
vulnerable to the operation of magic. On the other hand, the 
-------------------- 
1. The mother in the story has a passive role but is none 
the less inadvertently responsible in bringing her children 
together in a sexual relation by not assisting her daughter. 
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opposition is most acute in the organic asymmetry presented 
by two persons of the same sex with the same natures. one is 
assigned virtues while the other, the luguta, is blighted. 
However, magical desire threatens to bring these two togeth- 
er since desire belongs to love magic which cannot be re- 
sisted by the will. Magic has the power to break down this 
opposition with a resulting inversion of the primitive order 
of things. Love magic focused on the boundary of the asymme- 
try of the sexes threatens to destroy the order of the world 
and a great amount of native energy and attention must be 
given to this ever present threat so that it might be over- 
come. That energy takes the form of a prohibition which is 
not so much a repression of freedom as a device to maintain 
and propagate the order of things. 
We have seen the exogamic and incestuous restrictions 
operating to limit the choice of sexual partners. There are 
also endogamous restrictions which are again relatable to 
spatial concerns. Endogamy functions to prevent the native 
sexual world becoming intolerably large and dispersed. 
Endogamy for the Trobrianders allows for sexual partners 
within some ten to twelve villages of the same district. 
Endogamy and exogamy emerge at the same level and relations 
occur within the space established by the operation of the 
two. Their function for the production of relations is 
similar to the function of sympathy and antipathy for the 
production of a space for the figures of the Renaissance 
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episteme. Endogamy represents the operation of a form of 
enclosure while exogamy represents a form of separation 
within the conveniences of clan and sub-clan. 
The brother/sister emerge asymmetrically from the 
mother to form the continuous sub-clans which are convenient 
but separated by exogamy. These sub-clans are enclosed by 
more specific boundaries than those of clan. Exogamy func- 
tions nearer to the original place of emergence and is more 
suited to operation on native boundaries and, thus, the 
focus of more native discourses than endogamy which encloses 
a viable world of people. These boundaries form the epis- 
temic configuration of the divisions of society. 
The four main clans are convenient to each other and 
are all enclosed by endogamy. The brother and sister are 
related asymmetrically and form a microcosm of the sub-clan. 
Exogamy provides the separation that makes convenience 
possible. The positivity of clan relations is given in these 
relations and they are wholly absent in Malinowski's treat- 
ment. 
The incestuous restrictions have a microcosmic func- 
tion in that they move towards an idealised unit of society 
available in the mother/brother/sister conception of the 
family. This microcosm of the native society provides a 
fundamental model of sexual opposition and relations from 
which spring the discourses on incest, disease, death and 
exogamy. Further, it provides the possibility of erotic 
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experiences available in sexual relations amongst people 
prohibited from marriage by the one-hole-one-line-one-sub- 
clan exogamic rule. 
Brother and sister are assigned the same nature, at 
the level of this rule, because they are said to have 
emerged from the same place in the ground. This is acted out 
at birth where the brother and sister come from the same 
womb. This shared nature allows for the possibility that all 
sexual relations focus on this initial convenience and a man 
need look no further than his sister for sexual satisfac- 
tion. This identification of brother and sister makes 
incest such a real possibility and problematizes it in its 
particularity for the natives. This problem is worked out 
through mythical and magical discourses. Incest operates at 
the level of the central metaphorical model of primitive 
society in the sub-clan composed of brother and sister. 
Exogamy functions at this point to prevent the world closing 
upon the single place of the mother's womb. Exogamy, in its 
strongest instance keeps brother and sister apart. The need 
for this separation arises out of the epistemic demand for a 
world divided into unequal parts rather than one indivisible 
space. A brother shares his nature with his sister as a 
differentiated extension of himself. If these two were to 
join together in desire it would be something like masturba- 
tion since it would be wholly unproductive. However, the 
productivity of sexual relations does not lie in the chil- 
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dren it produces, since primitive intercourse has not repro- 
ductive function, but in the economic system that marriage 
maintains. 
4.5 Non-reproductive sex. 
One of the most important elements in the Trobrianders' 
experience of sex is the absence of a link between copula- 
tion and the birth of new life. In their understanding, new 
life begins with death. The baloma (spirit) moves to Tuma, 
the island of the dead, after the body dies where it leads a 
pleasant existence analogous to life on earth [Malinowski 
1926, p. 26]. Whenever the baloma grows wrinkled and its 
hair turns grey it simply sheds its outer skin [Malinowski 
1982a, p. 1461. This power of regaining youth was once en- 
joyed by the whole of humanity when it lived underground 
[Malinowski 1926, p. 27]. The native conception of this stage 
in human existence reflects the static nature of the world 
in primitive experience. This inertia was disrupted by the 
introduction of death as a dynamic of spiritual exchange. 
When the baloma becomes tired of constant rejuvenation on 
the island of Tuma it may return to earth again by leaping 
back in age and becoming a small pre-born infant. Black 
magic may reach a spirit on Tuma and make it tired of life 
there. Then it will change into a spirit child [Malinowski 
1926, p. 28]. 
These rejuvenated spirits are the only source from 
which humanity draws its new supplies of life. A pre-born 
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infant finds its way back to the womb of some woman who 
always belongs to the same clan or sub-clan as the spirit 
child itself. Clan identity is maintained since it is car- 
ried over into the next life and brought back again in 
reincarnation [Malinowski 1982a, p. 416]. Therefore, the only 
real cause of every birth is the activity of spirits and not 
sexual intercourse [Malinowski 1982a, p. 146]. 
The rejuvenation process is associated in a general way 
with sea water. The spirits go to the beach and wash their 
skin in salt water and become young again. This is the 
process of rejuvenation on Tuma. Likewise, in the final 
rejuvenation which makes them return to the infant stage, 
the spirits have to bath in salt water and when they become 
babies again they go into the sea and drift. These spirits 
floating in the sea around Tuma are invisible to ordinary 
people. 
. The spirit infants never float far away from the is- 
land. They are transported to the Trobriands with the help 
of another spirit. This baloma (carrier spirit) puts the 
infant spirit in the hair of the woman who is to become 
pregnant who then suffers head aches, stomach aches and 
vomiting. Then the child comes down from the head and into 
the belly and at that point the expectant mother says that 
1 
the spirits have brought her the child [Nalinowski 1982a, 
-------------------- 
1. The mother might describe this event as the child having 
found her [Malinowski 1982a, p. 148]. 
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p. 148]. 
When the natives say that the children are given by a 
baloma, it is the baloma that is the real cause of child- 
birth. This is an example of the operation of occult cause 
in the primitive experience. The natives always refer to 
the controlling spirit and not to the infant spirit itself 
as the direct cause of pregnancy. This controlling spirit 
usually appears in a dream to the woman about to become 
pregnant. The woman dreams of a face and it is the person 
dreamed of who is thought to have given the child to the 
mother. The tradition maintains the notions of a spiritual 
godmother and godfather in this way. Usually it is some 
maternal relative of the mother who bestows the gift but 
sometimes it may be her father's relatives (Malinowski 
1982a, p. 148-1491. 
The spirit child is laid by the baloma on the woman's 
head. Blood from the body rushes there and on this tide of 
blood the baby gradually descends until it settles in the 
womb. The blood helps to build the body of the child and 
that is the reason why, when a woman becomes pregnant, her 
menstruous flow stops. Consistent with the topologically 
differentiated world a physical means, or pathway, must be 
provided for moving an element from one part of the order to 
another. Here the water of the sea and the blood of the 
mother provide a flexible connection between Tuma and the 
mother's womb. The movement between these two is aided of 
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course by occult intervention. 
An alternative version of the story of reincarnation 
ascribes more initiative to the reincarnated infant. In this 
version, it is supposed to be able to float of its own will 
towards the Trobriands where it remains drifting about the 
shores waiting to enter the body of a woman while she 
bathes. The spirit infants are thought to be attached to 
driftwood, or else to small stones at the bottom of the sea. 
Whenever much debris accumulates on the share due to winds 
and tides the girls will not enter the water for fear that 
they might conceive. Again, in the villages on the northern 
coast, a wooden baler is filled with sea water which is left 
overnight in the hut of a woman who wishes to conceive on 
the chance that the spirit might have been caught in it and 
will transfer itself to the woman during the night. But even 
in this case the woman is said to be visited in her dreams 
by the spirit of some deceased relative so that a control- 
ling spirit is still essential to conception. The water must 
always be fetched by her brother or by her mother's brother; 
that is, by a maternal kinsman [Malinowski 1982a, p. 150]. 
Therefore, in every version, the real cause of childbirth is 
the spirit initiative from Tuma. 
The native discourses on childbirth take the form of a 
topological account where the different bounded areas employ 
vitalities in the form of spirits to transact the movements 
from one area to another; to bring about the proximity of 
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convenience. This is achieved by the intervention of baloma 
or by the mechanical aid of magic in the case of the trans- 
portation of sea water Into the house. The sea is a large 
and, therefore, vague boundary and as such has powerful 
vitalities operating in it. These vitalities are the cause 
of birth. Here the account of procreation is not given in 
the form of an explanation involving the functions of the 
organs in generation. The problematisation is strictly 
spatial and is a good example of the operation of the epis- 
temic figures. 
A virgin cannot conceive because of the physiological 
I 
obstacle of kalapatu [Malinowski 1982a, p. 154]. Once this 
has been removed by sexual intercourse, or by the mechanical 
insertion of an appropriate object into the vagina, there is 
no further need for male and female to come together in 
order to produce a child. It is thought that a bulabola 
(large orifice) facilitates conception and that a nakapatu 
(closed entrance) does not [Malinowski 1982a, p. 154]. There- 
fore, a virgin cannot give birth. However, there are no 
virgins in the villages since, as we have seen, every female 
child begins her sexual life very early. Even extremely ugly 
women and albinos, who would not be objects of native de- 
-------------------- 
1. Malinowski translates ]ial.! * ýpatu as 'tightness' but I 
think it is more useful to render this term as 'closedness' 
which we will shortly see allows us to understand what is 
involved here. 
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sire, give birth without sexual relations by mechanical 
dilation. The native idea on virginity relies on the notion 
of mechanical dilation and not physiological fertilisation. 
As we have already seen, according to native discourse 
mankind originated from underground with a brother and 
sister emerging at specified places. According to certain 
legends only women appeared at first. The primeval woman is 
always thought to have borne children without the interven- 
tion of a husband or any male partner but not without the 
vagina being opened by some means. In some of the mythologi- 
cal discourses this is mentioned explicitly. Thus on the 
island of Wakuta there is a myth which describes how an 
ancestress of one of the sub-clans exposed her body to 
falling rain and in this way mechanically lost her virgini- 
ty. In the most important Trobriand myth a woman lives quite 
alone in a grotto on the sea shore. One day she falls asleep 
in a rocky cavern reclining under a dripping stalactite. The 
drops of water pierce her vagina and take away her virgini- 
ty. In other myths of origin, the means of piercing the 
hymen are not mentioned but it is explicitly stated that the 
ancestress was without a man [Malinowski 1982a, p. 156]. We 
must understand the native notion of virginity as meaning 
the presence of a hymen. This means that native discourses 
rule out the possibility of virgin birth even with the 
visitation of spirits. The native belief demands the need 
for an open passage from the womb to the vagina. 
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The role of the vagina is analogous to the role of the 
original hole in the ground from whence the clans emerged. 
Each clan has its own hole and in this native account it can 
be seen that each clan or sub-clan has its own vagina. The 
identity of sub-clan is preserved throughout the rejuvena- 
tion cycle. However, consciousness of personal identity is 
not preserved. The only rule guiding these metamorphoses is 
the one-hole-one-line-one-sub-clan rule that guided the 
initial emergence of humanity where the unalterable essence 
of the clan is maintained throughout. 
The vagina must be made to be open by mechanical means 
so that it can function in the way a hole in the ground 
functions to allow humanity to emerge. This mechanical 
opening is an example of the operation of enclosure and 
convenience. The mother is connected with the earth from 
which the human race comes. Women belong on the earth as 
opposed to the sky. However, women may escape from this 
boundary through the operation of magic when they have the 
power to fly through the night sky and even appear as a 
falling star [Malinowski 1982a, p. 39]. Outside of the 
operation of magic, women belong on the earth. A hole in the 
ground is an example of an enclosed area which rivals the 
enclosed spaces of the village and dwellings. The mechanical 
removal of the hymen provides the vagina with this enclosed 
nature: the penetration of the vagina is an operation on a 
bounded space for the establishment of another. 
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This conception of the nature of childbirth gives rise 
to its own particular social formations. Children born in 
wedlock during a long absence of the husband will be recog- 
nised by him as his own since women cannot give birth to 
illegitimate children. This is because the father has no 
legitimate, or otherwise, role in procreation. A parallel to 
this is provided by the case of children born out of wedlock 
but during a long exclusive liaison. In such a case the male 
sex partner would not recognise the child as his. The 
husband is always the father of children born to a married 
woman. Children born to unmarried women have no fathers at 
all. The father is defined socially and in order that there 
be fatherhood there must be marriage. Thus, the notion of 
the father has its possibility only within a social conven- 
tion and not within a physiological theory [Malinowski 1926, 
p. 71-731. 
It is not the custom of an unmarried girl to become 
pregnant although it is the custom for her to have as much 
sexual intercourse as she pleases within the permissible 
relations. This possibility is not brought about by the 
availability of contraceptive techniques since these only 
have a possibility within a biological theory of procrea- 
tion. There are no primitive statements focusing on the area 
of biology nor any possibility for their emergence. No 
preventative means are used since seminal fluid is consid- 
ered a beneficent ingredient in love making and there is no 
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reason to interfere with its lubricating properties [Mali- 
nowski 1926, p. 731. Unmarried girls are not exhorted to 
abstain from sexual activity to avoid becoming pregnant. 
There are no native discourses focusing on this area. 
Amongst the Trobrianders, fatherless children are rare 
since spirits are not inclined to visit unmarried girls. 
When a girl becomes married she usually conceives and often 
breeds prolifically. Those rare children that are barn 
outside of marriage are often adopted by a relative. A man 
may regard his wife's sister's child born outside of mar- 
riage as his own child [Malinowski 1982a, p. 167]. Some magic 
exists to bring about abortions and abortion by mechanical 
means is the only technique available to counter the unwel- 
come visitation of a spirit. Fertility in married women is 
considered to be a good thing since it effects their mater- 
nal kinsmen. The kinsmen rejoice when their sisters and 
nieces have many children since they believe that this makes 
their own bodies stronger. This relates to the conception of 
the clan as a single realm where the bounded members form a 
single body. However, public opinion holds that a woman must 
not become a mother before she marries though she may enjoy 
sexual freedom within the legitimate bounds. This means that 
she should practice precautions when bathing in the sea, 
etc. Physiological theories have no chance of emerging in 
this context and this means that discourses on the preven- 
tion of pregnancy focus on strategies for avoiding the 
168 
appropriate spirits. 
A mother needs a defender and provider of economic 
necessities. She has one natural protector in her brother 
but he is not in a position to look after her when she is 
pregnant. This is because the natives believe that during 
pregnancy she must abstain from sexual intercourse for a 
period. At this time she needs someone who will take over 
the role of sexual protector. The brother cannot fulfil 
this role because of the strict brother/sister taboo in all 
matters sexual (Malinowski 1926, p. 81]. He must avoid the 
thought of anything concerning his sisters sex. A man ful- 
fils this function in the role of the husband. In this way, 
the father has his possibility in his strength to protect 
the children and as a provider. This is why the theme of 
food constantly emerges in the discourses an married life. 
The sexual taboo governing the brother/sister boundary 
makes a space for the emergence of the husband and father. A 
woman with a child and no husband is an incomplete grouping. 
The disapproval of a fatherless child is an instance of a 
general disapproval of anything which does not conform to 
the general order of things in tribal organisation; this 
order is given in the figures of the Primitive episteme. 
4.6 The matrilineal system. 
The non-reproductive role of sex and the function 
of spirits In an explanation of pregnancy provides an ac- 
count of the possibility of matriliny. The process of 
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introducing new life into a community involves only the 
spirit world and the female organs. There is no possibility 
in such an account for a role for the male except as a 
mechanical means for the opening of the vagina from which 
the child must emerge. This theory of non-sexual reproduc- 
tion closes a circle of relations since it also provides an 
account of the origin of the incest taboo. These three 
discursive formations with their own particular statements 
support and reinforce each other. 
The incest taboo does not have its origin in repression 
but in the native belief that the mother contributes every- 
thing to her child because of the absence of a link between 
sex and reproduction in a theory of physiological paternity. 
The mother makes the child out of her own flesh [Malinowski 
1926, p. 10]. Brothers and sisters are of the same flesh 
since they come from the same mother and, therefore, from 
the same place. These beliefs describe the native attitude 
towards their fundamental principle of kinship [Malinowski 
1926, p. 10]. A mother is able to give her child her own 
attributes since the child is convenient to the mother at 
birth. Social position is handed an in the mother line from 
a man to his sister's children, since brother and sister 
have the same nature, the same vital principle, and this 
matrilineal conception of kinship is of paramount importance 
in the restrictions and regulations on sexual activity. The 
mother functions to distribute wealth and office, because 
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she is the one who bears children, while being unable to 
hold either in her person herself. She is a mechanism for 
the deployment of wealth and influence in the primitive 
world and this involvement in a regime of power will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter. 
The native ideas of kinship dramatically come to light 
at the death of an individual since burial, lamentation, 
mourning and the ceremonies of food distribution are based 
on the belief that people united by the bond of maternal 
kinship form a unity of interest, feeling and flesh [Mali- 
nowski 1926, p. 11]. Here the notion of maternal kinship 
operates in the place of the modern unit of the individual. 
The Trobriander term tama (father) signifies the man mar- 
ried to the mother, who lives in the same house with her. He 
is described as Tomakava (outsider) [Malinowski 1926, p. 11]. 
Marriage is patrilocal since the woman is displaced to her 
husband's village community and lives in his house. A child 
quickly learns that he is not of the same clan as his tama 
and that his totemic appellation is identical with that of 
his mother. He learns that the place where his kada (moth- 
er's brother) lives is also his own village, and not the 
place where he presently lives with his father. In his 
kada's village is his property and other rights of citizen- 
ship, his natural allies and associates. While his father's 
authority over him diminishes as he grows up, the influence 
of the kada increases over the child and gradually replaces 
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that of the father [Malinowski 1982a, p. 3]. 
Even Malinowski recognised the presence of asymmetrical 
pressures when he described the life of a Trobriander as 
running under the influence of a duality that produces 
complications in the continuity of tribal life: this is the 
dual influence of the maternal and the paternal which is at 
the bottom of all native experience [Malinowski 1926, p. 16]. 
Children inherit the attributes of their mother's 
family through her as they come from the same place in the 
world as her. In this way, the father cannot impose his 
place in the world on his children. They inherit their 
citizenship, companionship and real identity through their 
mother who is herself displaced. Full citizenship is not 
gained through achieving a certain age but by returning to 
one's rightful place in the world. That place is the place 
from whence the mother came. This displacement is fundamen- 
tal to the Trobriander's experience and characterises the 
nature of childhood. Thus, the life of the Trobriander child 
is dominated by a fundamental displacement. Children are 
initially displaced at birth and it is in the space of this 
displacement that they are defined as children, dependent on 
an alien place in the world without their real attributes 
1 
available in their kada's village They achieve their real 
-------------------- 
1. It is with Freud that the contemporary debate about the 
sexual nature of children begins. Freud claimed that chil- 
dren were sexual in nature and related that nature to par- 
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place in the world by regaining their right ful place which 
comes to them through their mother. 
The displacement of women in marriage should not be 
regarded simply as a form of suppression, or sexual domina- 
tion, to be overcome but as a means of deploying the discur- 
sive statements that are involved with the discourses on 
clan identity, incest taboos, marriage and economic prac- 
tices. Further, the matrilineal practice should not be 
regarded as signifying a particular tolerance towards women. 
Such a conception does not belong to the Trobriand episteme. 
The epistemic significance of the matrilineal practice is 
available at the level of the economic, magical and sexual 
realities that it makes possible for the Trobrianders. The 
existence of a matrilineal system should not be reduced 
simply to an analysis in terms of the ideological role of 
men and women. It has its significance as a technique for 
the re-deployment of men and women in space and, therefore, 
makes a dynamic primitive knowledge of human affairs possi- 
ble. 
Malinowski translated the word dala as 'sub-clan'. 
-------------------- 
Continued 
ticular ages. Here, however, children are not defined in 
terms of age related to sexual development (puberty). Chil- 
dren are small adults dependent on their parents. The 
displacement brought about by the mother's move at marriage 
provides the conditions for the limitations and nature of 
child sex in terms of clan relations, sub-clan relations and 
the relation of the child to these. There are no discourses 
concerning child sex except in relation to the specific 
taboo on incest between brother and sister. 
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Weiner holds that this is because he is trying to equate 
birth, descent, women, the place of emergence and village 
community with matrilineality as a total gestalt [Weiner 
1976, p. 381. Weiner demands that this gestalt be broken up. 
The waiwaia (spirit child) required for conception is not 
conceptually identical to an ancestral founder of hamlet 
land. The former spirit is reincarnated from an ancestral 
being called baloma while the latter is tabu. Only baloma 
transmits dala substance in the form of a new child through 
its mother. In this sense, a person's dala remains the same 
[Weiner 1976, p. 39]. However, Weiner argues that when magic 
spells, body decorations, taboos and land become associated 
with the name of a dala, then dala identity is transformed 
into external holdings. Dala property does not remain as 
pure as dala blood since property circulates and increases. 
To understand the significance of dala as it relates to 
property it is necessary to introduce a male frame of refer- 
ence [Weiner 1976, p. 391. In the next chapter, we will see 
that this male frame of reference outside of matriliny is 
involved with the discourses and practices governing ex- 
change. 
While women have the right of inheritance they do not 
have the power of possession; only their sons can possess 
this inheritance during their lives. This means that women 
are the means to power as wealth, but have no end in this 
figure of power themselves. The female body represents the 
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boundary through which possessions pass so that they become 
inheritable. The power and functions which belong to a 
family are vested in the men of each generation, though they 
have to be transmitted through the women. However, women 
play an influential role in the community because of the 
woman's exclusive role in procreation. The role and nature 
of women is characterised everywhere by the demands of the 
episteme, at one and the same time, to exclude them from 
power while acknowledging their necessary inclusion in the 
order of things as the exclusive place of regeneration. This 
allows for the claim that women are at the nexus of tensions 
in the primitive power deployments. Soon we will see how 
women have an integral role in the deployment of a power 
regime based in the creation and exchange of the signs of 
wealth. 
In comparing the parts played by the sexes, the brother 
and sister have to be set side by side as the representa- 
tives of male and female. Within the matrilineal order, the 
brother and sister are the naturally linked representatives 
of the male and female principle in all customary matters 
and are a more appropriate focus of sexual discourses than 
the husband and wife relation. In the myths covering the 
origin of the clans, the brother and sister emerge together 
from underground through the original hole in the earth. 
They come from the same place. In family matters, the broth- 
er is the guardian and head of his sister's household. But 
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in their personal relations the strictest taboo divides them 
and prevents any intimacy between them [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 30]. This recurring theme of the shared origin of the 
brother and sister gives rise to the particular problemati- 
zation of sexual and domestic relations among the Trobriand- 
ers where a boundary must be established between them. 
It would seem that the most natural and spontaneous 
sexual relationship that the primitive episteme would allow 
for is that between brother and sister and, indeed, this 
relationship constantly occupies the discourses of the 
Trobrianders. The brother and sister come from the same 
place and the brother is the head of his sister's family. 
However, if this relationship were allowed, conflicts in the 
model would be overcome at the cost of resolving all human 
relations into one single static point. To avoid this the 
episteme allows for the production of mythical discourses 
focussing on this very theme of brother and sister relations 
and resolves it by prohibitions threatening death and dis- 
ease. These relations also have a more complex economic 
nature and are linked to systems of food exchange which are 
necessary for the survival of the Trobrianders. 
4.7 The function of kinship systems. 
The Trobriander kinship system is defined by the opera- 
tion of matriliny. However, there are different systems of 
kinship in the primitive world which are based on patriliny. 
Rabelais explains that the Ennase (noseless people) con- 
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ceived of kinship and affinity on the model of such func- 
tional relationships as those of oyster and shell, hole and 
plug, axe and handle. Levi-Strauss raises the question as 
to why such different patterns of kinship perform the same 
function with respect to the members of social groups. He 
examines three possible solutions. The first solution is 
that the taxonomic principles adopted by a given kinship 
system are the indirect result of psychological and socio- 
logical factors operating on an independent level. However, 
he holds that the psychological affects cannot account for 
the rigid properties of a conceptual system [Levi-Strauss 
1965, p. 14]. This is the type of solution adopted by Mali- 
nowski in the body of his work and is rejected here as an 
account of kinship. 
The second solution is best exemplified by Radcliffe- 
Brown who claims that there is a close correspondence be- 
tween the structure of a kinship system and the network of 
rights and obligations, so that each society recognises as 
many types of kinsmen and women as there are distinct and 
prescribed modes of behaviour between them. Levi-Strauss 
rejects this solution because both terminological and beha- 
vioural differences are the outcome of more basic structural 
features which alone can account for their similarities and 
differences [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 14]. I agree with Levi- 
Strauss that what is sought is an explanation at a more 
basic level. This, however, need not involve us in a struc- 
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turalist analysis since this more basic level is available 
in archaeology. 
The third solution is that favoured by Levi-Strauss 
himself, namely, that the function of a kinship system is to 
generate marriage possibilities or impossibilities. Accord- 
ing to Levi-Strauss, a kinship system acts as an operating 
agent to a system of matrimonial exchange within the commu- 
nity. He believes that a people who make use of a kinship 
system need not be aware of the type of solidarity it gener- 
ates between them [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 14]. 
Marriage must be envisaged as a kind of exchange be- 
tween social units (Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 15]. This implies 
that there should be two distinct kinds of relatives in- 
volved. one kind is found in the form of the wife's brother 
or the husband's sister who are 'cross' in-laws. Their 
presence is required for exagomous marriage. The other kind 
is that of the wife's sister or a husband's brother who only 
feature as possible seducers of their sibling's spouse and 
are 'parallel' in-laws [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 16]. This 
distinction in relatives is not present in the asymmetrical 
system of the Trobrianders. Nevertheless, the kinship system 
operating there functions to generate marriage possibilities 
which have a productive role in the patterns of economic 
exchange. This constitutes a form of exchange between dis- 
tinct social units. 
Levi-Strauss contends that in order to understand an 
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asymmetrical system, whether patrilateral or matrilateral, 
the philosophical relevance of the difference between advo- 
cating 'prescriptive' and 'preferential, systems must be 
investigated at the level of the model. A preferential 
system is prescriptive at the level of the model, while even 
a prescriptive system cannot be preferential at the level of 
reality [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 17]. The Choice in systems is 
between formulating strict rules that cannot be closely 
adhered to in practice, or framing observances so broadly as 
to be empty of content. The difference between 'preferen- 
tial' and 'prescriptive' does not pertain to the systems 
themselves, but to the way in which these systems are con- 
ceptualised [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 18]. 
The conception of the kinship system offered in archae- 
ological analysis may be described in these terms as 'pre- 
scriptive' where detailed observations are sacrificed to 
content. We have a simple model in the figures of the broth- 
er-sister asymmetry. However, as Levi-Strauss reminds us, 
the notions of a 'complex structure' and a 'simple struc- 
ture, are merely heuristic devices and cannot be used alone 
to define a system. All systems of kinship and marriage 
contain an 'elementary' core which manifests itself in the 
incest prohibition. Similarly, all systems have a 'complex, 
aspect deriving from the fact that more than one individual 
can usually meet the requirements of even the most prescrip- 
tive systems, thereby allowing for a certain amount of 
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freedom of choice. Levi-Strauss sees the future of anthro- 
pology in the progression from elementary to complex struc- 
tures [Levi-Strauss 1965, p. 18]. 
one means of making the simple taboo centred systems of 
marriage more complex is to show how the system has a shared 
positivity in an economic system. Indeed, it is not possible 
to grasp fully the significance of the pattern of the kin- 
ship system without taking this realm into account. This is 
not the vertical trans-epistemic movement towards more 
complex societies envisaged by Levi-Strauss as a possible 
solution. It is a horizontal movement within the same epis- 
teme that includes more forms of discourse such as the 
discourses on wealth and magic whose regularities share the 
patterns and possibilities of the discourses on kinship and 
marriage. This horizontal move avoids the universal concep- 
tion of rationality that is available in structuralism. 
4.8 Conclusions. 
The primitive experience of sex focuses on its own 
discursive objects: a taboo on sexual intercourse between 
brother and sister; non-reproductive sexual intercourse; and 
virginity which has no necessary connection with sex. These 
objects belong to a discursive formation on kinship which is 
designed to allow for particular sexual relations which are 
compatible with marriages that have an economic productivi- 
ty. The primitive discourses on sex are maintained and 
regulated by the presence of discourses focusing on origin 
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myths and love magic. In the case of the Trobrianders the 
origin myths posit an enclosed world of convenient clans 
that have their own characteristics or essences. Because of 
the topological conception of the world the mother has the 
function of being the place from whence the child emerges. A 
child shares this place with the mother because of a link 
with the original birth of the clan since clan identity is 
maintained through the process of reincarnation. This iden- 
tity is redoubled since the child gains its clan identity 
through coming from the mother's womb. A child does not 
inherit its nature through biological concerns but from the 
qualities assigned to the location of its birth, that is, 
the mother. This central role of the mother as the provider 
of location provides the principal for the matrilineal sys- 
tem. 
The opposition between gender influences among the 
Trobrianders, represented by the mother's brother and the 
father respectively, creates two natural spheres of influ- 
ence to be exercised over a woman by a man. The one domain 
is that of sex, from which the brother is absolutely de- 
barred and where the husband's influence is paramount. The 
other is that of kinship where the interests of the blood 
relationship can only be safeguarded by someone of the same 
blood. This is the realm of the brother. However, in the 
area of marriage these two spheres are brought together in a 
different way where the brother is materially obliged to his 
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sister and her husband's sexual interest is subsumed by 
economic factors. Systems of kinship provide the pattern of 
possible marriages and thus contribute to the particular 
economic profile of the community. I will now turn to a 
consideration of marriage and its involvement in wealth. 
This represents a concern primarily with the axis that 
propagates and maintains the particular discursive forma- 
tions outlined above. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
The Realm of Wealth. 
'In the ethics of married life, the 'fidelity' that is 
recommended to the husband ... has to do with maintaining the wife's status ... it does imply a certain reciprocity of behaviour between the man and the woman ... A reciprocity, then, but a fundamental dissymmetry since the two interde- 
pendent behaviours ... do not obey the same principles. ' [Foucault 1985b, p. 165]. 
5.1 Introduction. 
The incest taboo is the strongest and most persistent 
motif in the field of the sexual discourses of the Trobri- 
anders. This taboo, which opposes the brother to the sister 
in a fundamental asymmetry, arises out of the particularity 
of the Trobriand conception of the origin of human nature in 
the mother and is at the centre of the kinship system. The 
discursive themes on the origin of individual nature and the 
species in general have their possibility in the widespread 
division of the world according to the circular figures of 
the primitive episteme. The threat of an inversion at the 
level of the epistemic order by an act of incestuous sex is 
greatly lessened in the marriage of both brother and sister 
to different acceptable spouses. When a woman marries, her 
relationship with her brother becomes problematised in terms 
of a significant economic obligation rather than in terms of 
a sexual danger. 
Malinowski described the obligation between a brother 
and his married sister as a form of 'gift' exchange since 
there is reciprocation from the husband's family. He regard- 
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ed the goods exchanged to be gifts because his psycho-bio- 
logical theory was unable to reveal the obligation on the 
concerned parties that is exercised at the level of the 
native collective experience. While he noted the absence of 
divergence from this practice, he sought an explanation for 
it in free will. This account in individual agency fails to 
identify the function of the kinship system in bringing 
about the particular patterns of marriage. Permissible 
marriages allow for a specific movement of goods within the 
system and, as I demonstrate in this chapter, that movement 
constitutes a primitive economics. While I retain the use of 
the term 'gift' it is not used as a concept free of obliga- 
tion. Clans, age groups and sexes, in view of the many 
relationships ensuing from contracts between them, are in a 
state of perpetual economic activity which is not really 
materialistic [Mauss 1954, p. 70]. For example, the mapula 
form a sequence of payments by a husband to his wife as a 
kind of salary for sexual services. Likewise, the payments 
to chiefs are tribute and the distributions of sagali (food) 
are payments for labour or ritual accomplished, such as work 
done on the eve of a funeral. Therefore, these gifts are 
neither spontaneous nor disinterested. They are basically 
counter-prestations made both to pay for goods or services 
and to maintain profitable alliances [Mauss 1954, p. 71]. The 
notion of a primitive gift emerges as a discursive object 
which is involved in a system of strict obligation at the 
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level of primitive discursive formations governing wealth. 
Here my archaeological analysis seeks to show how the na- 
tives came to regard themselves as gift-givers. 
Furthermore, I will demonstrate the operation of the 
power of the polygamous chief in the exchange of goods in 
marriage. The practice of exchange in marriage is asymmetri- 
cal since the majority of goods pass from the brother, 
through the sister, to the husband. The gifts pass through 
the sister because, as we have seen, women form a particular 
boundary for the deployment of plutocratic power. When a 
chief has several wives he has an economic command over many 
brothers-in-law. The obligation of gift exchange, and not an 
initiation of sexual acts, constitutes marriage and this is 
an example of a primitive institution for the maintenance of 
the economic and social order. This institution has its 
origin in the particular form of the opposition between 
brother and sister which emerges from the epistemic order of 
things. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how the chief func- 
tions as a mechanism for the conversion of food into signs 
of wealth because of his peculiar location in that order. 
In summary, archaeology reveals that the exchange of 
goods constitutes the act of marriage and gives meaning to 
it as an institution. Marriage is the primary locus of 
economics and makes a closed system for the circulation of 
wealth possible in the episteme. In the realm of wealth, I 
will try to show that the circular figures of the Trobriand 
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episteme, with the opposition between brother and sister at 
the domestic level, characterise the nature of a primitive 
economics as exchange. This will allow us to say that the 
discourses concerning sex and those concerning wealth have a 
shared positivity and this unity governs the nature of both 
the experience and knowledge of self and the world of things 
in that episteme. 
5.2 Marriage. 
Leach makes a distinction between two types of mar- 
riage. The first results from the whims of two persons 
acting as private individuals; the second is a systematical- 
ly organised affair which forms part of a series of contrac- 
tual obligations between'two social groups (Leach 1951, 
p. 24]. This is a distinction that Malinowski does not 
clearly make and there is an ambiguity in his work as to 
which type of marriage is the object of his analysis. It is 
the second type of marriage referred to by Leach that I am 
alluding to in this study and I will go so far as to claim 
that the first type has no possibility amongst the Trobri- 
anders. 
We have already seen that the Trobrianders enjoy sexual 
freedom as they grow up in the villages and, in such a 
society, marriage adds nothing to this freedom but, indeed, 
takes a great deal away from it. Marriage does not mark a 
form of sexual licence where, for example, virginity is 
valued and removed. Virginity is of no particular value to 
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the Trobrianders. The basis of marriage does not lie in sex 
since it can be noted that a married couple maintain a 
strict decorum regarding any sexual relations between them 
which is in striking contrast to their pre-nuptial life- 
style. The primary basis of marriage is for status and 
economy. Marriage is constituted by economic obligation. In 
my view, Malinowski does not stress this dimension enough in 
his account of the motives for marrying since he seems to 
have a notion of marriage based for the most part in senti- 
mental companionship. This type would fall into Leach's 
first category. Not surprisingly, Malinowskils banal account 
of marriage fails to account for why the brother continues 
year after year to fulfil his not insignificant obligations 
to the husband of his sister. 
Further, we must resist the sentimental type of expla- 
nation of the role of marriage provided by Malinowski in his 
claim that women marry simply for personal affection and a 
desire to have children [Malinowski 1982a, p. 70]. For Mali- 
nowski, these two motives seem somehow equivalent. Affection 
can be separated from procreation. It is possible to have 
children in marriage once the means for providing for them 
has been secured. The organising figures of the episteme 
allow for the appearance of children at this level since a 
visitation from the baloma lies outside of the realm of free 
choice. However, the spirits usually only visit married 
couples so marriage does help to clear the way for reproduc- 
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tion. Therefore, Malinowski seems justified in claiming that 
primitive marriage is also involved in the production of 
children. However, we have seen that birth is itself a form 
of exchange, where the spirit substitutes one body for 
another. This theme of exchange constitutes the regularity 
of the primitive discursive formations centred on marriage. 
The motives for marriage lie outside of the individual's 
conscious choice and at the archaeological levels of the 
episteme. The system simply allows affection as a contin- 
gency in marriage but not as the moving force behind it. 
Marriage represents the placement of the man in the 
economic and social order of the society. A bachelor would 
have no household of his own and would be debarred from many 
privileges. However, a proof of the significance of the 
economic aspect of marriage lies in the fact that there are 
no unmarried men of mature age except idiots, invalids, old 
widowers and albinos. Widowers and deserted men remarry as 
soon as possible [Malinowski 1982a, p. 68]. If the whims of 
private individuals had a place here, it would seem likely 
that some men would remain unmarried out of choice. However, 
this is not the case as marriage is involved with daily 
survival by securing adequate sustenance, since marriage 
brings with it a considerable yearly supply of staple food, 
and is not necessarily involved with securing genial compan- 
ionship. 
The economic obligation on the brother, and other mem- 
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bers of a married woman's family, is a mechanism which is 
central to the Trobriander society. The authority of the 
chief lies in the practice of exchange of goods in marriage 
and his privilege of polygamy provides his ability to fi- 
nance ceremonies and festivities. The chief has this privi- 
lege in his role as a creator of the signs of wealth. There- 
fore, any man, and especially the chief, must marry to gain 
economic security and social status by entering the group 
of tovavaygile (marrie4 men) [Malinowski 1982a, p. 51]. 
When a man becomes part of this group of tovavaygile 
he receives a dowry with his wife [Malinowski 1982a, p. 66]. 
This fact characterises marriage amongst the Trobrianders 
as a means for the distribution of goods. Power and econom- 
ics come into contact with the field of sex in marriage. 
The economic objects, statements and discursive formations 
associated with marriage, -as well as the techniques for the 
deployment of these formations, give marriage its most 
important features at the archaeological level. The Trobri- 
and marriage is associated with a custom of infant betrothal 
which also has important implications and is a further proof 
that this form of marriage is not necessarily linked to 
individual will but to a series of contractual obligations. 
Leach describes the Trobriand-type marriage as asymmet- 
rical cross cousin marriage (patrilateral) which precludes 
the reciprocal marriage of a man with the sister of his own 
sister's husband, but amounts to a systematic exchange of 
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women between two local descent groups [Leach 1951, p. 26]. 
Amongst the Trobrianders, the local descent group has its 
possibility in matrilineal descent and avunculocal residence 
where succession of male authority is from mother's brother 
to sister's son [Leach 1951, p. 24]. The exchange of women is 
completed only after a time interval of one generation. In 
the ideal type, a man marries the father's sister's daugh- 
ter; he is forbidden to marry the mother's brother's daugh- 
ter. This kind of marriage regulation also occurs in patri- 
lineal societies [Leach 1951, p. 26]. 
The person who has the most influence in the marriage 
of a girl is her father. The strict taboo that rules that 
the brother must have nothing to do with the love affairs of 
his sister debars him from any control over his sister's 
matrimonial plans. Because of the operation of this taboo 
the responsibility falls to her father who is not her kins- 
man [Malinowski 1982a, p-72]. The father acts as the 
spokesman of the mother who is the appropriate person to 
deliberate on her daughter's sexual intrigues and marriage. 
Further, the father is closely concerned in the work of his 
sons from an economic stand-point and, after the marriage of 
the daughter, these sons will have to divide the fruits of 
their labour between her and their mother [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 731. 
If a family is well disposed towards a prospective 
husband they will take the initiative by asking him for 
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small gifts which is an unambiguous indication that he is 
acceptable. When a family are opposed to the match, and give 
no sign of good will, the prospective husband may take the 
initiative and plead an his own behalf. He may be refused 
because he is notoriously lazy and would be a burden on the 
future relatives or else because the girl is intended for 
someone else. If there is a refusal, the couple may try to 
bring about their marriage regardless. If they decide to do 
this, the bride stays in the house of her lover's parents as 
if she were really married. Sometimes the couple elope to 
another village in the hope of impressing the opponents to 
their marriage. While the couple have eloped they stay 
indoors and do not eat anything. This abstention from the 
common meal constitutes a definite declaration of intent and 
shows that they are waiting for the family's consent. In the 
meantime, the boy's father or maternal uncle may go to the 
girl's family as an ambassador and offer them a valuable 
gift. Under such pressure the latter may give in and send 
the customary present to the couple. If, however, they do 
not agree, they go to the house of the couple and bring the 
1 
girl back with them . The boy's relatives may oppose this 
and a scuffle will ensue. But the girl's relations cannot be 
forced to supply the pair with food and without these provi- 
-------------------- 
1. The customary and technical expression for this event is 
'pulling the girl back', which indicates what actually hap- 
pens [Malinowski 1982a, p. 74]. 
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sions, the household will soon dissolve since food is the 
most important symbolic and economic sign in the area of 
marriage. This action by a couple might, on the surface, be 
taken as an example of the exercise of individual preference 
in marriage. I am not claiming that there are no individual 
actions. This would be as absurd as claiming that action and 
movement were impossible without a Euclidian understanding 
of space. I am merely claiming that the economic dimension 
is what gives marriage its discursive significance. 
When the parents of the girl are in favour of the 
marriage, the couple must wait for a short interval in order 
to allow time for the necessary preparations. One day the 
girl will remain with her husband, take her meal with his 
parents and accompany him throughout the day instead of 
returning in the morning to her parents house. The word goes 
around that the couple are married. These proceedings con- 
stitute the act of marriage. There is no other rite, no 
other ceremony to mark the beginnings of wedlock. From the 
morning on which the girl has remained with the man, she is 
considered to be married to him provided of course that the 
consent of the parents has been given. Without this consent, 
the act constitutes only an attempt at marriage. The act of 
marriage is recognised by the open sharing of a meal with 
the husband and by staying under his roof. This conventional 
public declaration of marriage has serious consequences in 
that it imposes considerable obligations on the girl's 
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family; obligations associated with counter-obligations on 
the part of the bridegroom (Malinowski 1982a, p. 75]. 
This simple act of marriage is followed by the complex 
exchange of gifts between's the boy's family and that of the 
girl. Each gift has a definite nature and quantity, each has 
its own place in a definite sequence, and each is recipro- 
1 
cated by a corresponding contribution - This system of gifts 
and counter-gifts brings together the realms of sex and 
primitive economics in marriage. 
The family of the girl make the first offering to 
signify their consent to the marriage. This small gift must 
be given on the day on which the two remain together, or on 
the morning of the next day. A series of gifts and recipro- 
-------------------- 
1. Malinowski provides a list of this gift and counter-gift 
sequence [Malinowski 1982a, p. 76]. 
Gifts from the girl's family. 
1. katuvila - cooked yams, brought in baskets by the girl's 
parents to the boy's family. 
2. Pepeli - several baskets of uncooked yams, one given by 
each of the girl's relatives to the boy's parents. 
3. Kaykaboma - cooked vegetables, each member of the girl's 
family brings one plateful to the boy's house. 
4. Mapula Kaykaboma - repayment of gift (3), given in exact- 
ly the same form and material by the boy's relatives to the 
girl's family. 
5. Takwalela Pepeli - valuables given by the boy's father in 
repayment of gift (2) to the girl's father. 
Gifts from the girl's family. 
6. Vilakuria -a large quantity of yam-food offered at the 
first harvest after the marriage to the boy by the girl's 
family. 
Counter-gifts. 
7. Saykwala - gift of fish brought by the boy to his wife's 
father in repayment of (6). 
8. Takwalela Vilakuria - gift of valuables handed by the 
boy's father to the girl's father in payment of (6). 
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cations follow, culminating in the girl's family giving a 
present of considerable size at the next harvest, and from 
then on at every harvest they will have to help the new 
household with a substantial contribution of fresh yams. 
This gift must also be repaid. Fish is considered to be an 
appropriate counter-offering. The husband in a coastal 
village will embark on a fishing expedition while those 
living inland will buy the fish with yams. Sometimes a gift 
of valuables will also be given at this point and this 
closes the series of initial marriage gifts [Malinowski 
1982a, p. 781. This complicated series of gifts represents a 
continuous principle in the economic relation which will 
obtain for the entire duration of the marriage. Marriage- 
confers substantial material benefits on the man. He repays 
these at intervals with a gift of valuables such as polished 
axe-blades of green stone, necklaces and shell armlets. 
5.3 Infant betrothal. 
However, there is a second way of arranging marriages 
that is in sharp contrast to the process outlined above. In 
vaypokala (marriage by infant betrothal), a binding agree- 
ment is made by the parents in the children's infancy. The 
boy and girl grow up into the relationship and find them- 
selves bound to each other before they have an opportunity 
to choose for themselves. Vaypokala is always associated 
with cross cousin marriage. The practice of infant betrothal 
lends weight to the argument that marriages are arranged to 
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serve the ends of power and not affection. In this case, 
arranged marriage is particularly important in relation to 
the chief who has a specific role in the creation of 
wealth. 
In the ceremony of vaypokala, the initiative is always 
taken by the brother who, on behalf of his son, asks his 
sister for the hand of her daughter in marriage. If the 
sister of a new-born boy has a daughter, or perhaps a grand- 
daughter who will not be too old to become the infant's wife 
later on, a request for betrothal may be made immediately on 
this infant's birth. The disparity of age should not exceed 
two or three years [Malinowski 1982a, p. 89]. Soon after the 
preliminary agreement, the man has to give a vaygula (a 
polished axe-blade or shell ornament) to the father of the 
infant bride. She must sleep in her mother's house only. 
Shortly after this three gifts of food are offered by the 
girl's family to the boy's father which are similar to the 
three initial gifts in ordinary marriage. Because of the 
presence of exchange, vaypokala is thought to be an actual 
marriage. The betrothed are regarded as husband and wife. As 
in an adult wedding, the three gifts are considered to 
conclude the marriage and the infant bridegroom's family 
have to repay the last present by a return gift of food 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 89]. At the next harvest, the girl's 
father brings yam food to the boy's parents. This is a 
reversal of what happens in normal marriage. In vaypokala 
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the boy's father receives a gift from his sister's husband 
on behalf of his son. The sister's husband acts as the 
representative of his own sons, the brothers of the future 
bride. As yet, the yearly harvest gifts do not follow the 
first offering of crops. An interval lasts until the new 
household is actually established [Malinowski 1982a, p. 90]. 
When the two grow up, they have to marry again. The bride 
has to go officially to the bridegroom's house, share his 
bed there, take her meals with him and be publicly announced 
to have married him. The initial gifts are omitted and only 
the large harvest gift and its repayment are exchanged 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 903. 
During the interval between betrothal and adult mar- 
riage, the appearance of chastity has to be maintained. Both 
parties must be discreet in their affairs. Also, it is not 
customary to return the initial presents in the event of the 
dissolution of the marriage arrangement. 
According to native ideas, the two people most suited 
for marriage with each other are a man's son and the daugh- 
ter of his sister. If the sister's daughter is too old to be 
betrothed to her male infant cousin, her daughter may re- 
place her since the two are regarded as equivalent for the 
purposes of this marriage. Vaypokala is an important device 
for a chief in establishing his son permanently in the 
village with rights of full citizenship for himself and his 
progeny. This device is necessary to the chief in the matri- 
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1 
lineal society of the Trobrianders 
The chief's son can enjoy practically the same position 
that he enjoyed during his father's life time by marrying 
his cousin. He is ousted from his position of influence by 
his male cousin, the rightful heir, at his father's death. 
The husband of the chief's niece will have a definite claim 
on his wife's brother (the new chief) and other male rela- 
tives. He also has the right to live in the village if he 
chooses. He holds this right through his grandmother who is 
also the grandmother (or great-grandmother) of his wife. The 
mother has the function of establishing the place to which 
he has claim of belonging despite the fact that marriage is 
patrilocal. Malinowski does not trace this right of the 
chief's son to his grandmother but merely attributes it to 
his influence and vested interests [Malinowski 1982a, p. 83]. 
Through cross-cousin marriage, the chief and his son 
-------------------- 
1. 
Chief ----------------- Chief's sister 
Chief's daughter ----- Chief's son 
orthodox 
1 cross-cousin -!: _Chief's sister's ---- 
Chief's sister's 
I marriage I daughter I son 
(the chief's heir) 
Chief's sister's Chief's sister's 
daughter's daughter daughter's son 
II 
marriage is not allowed between these two 
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get what they want; the chief's niece marries the most 
influential man in the village; an alliance is established 
between the son of the chief and the chief's lawful heirs 
eliminating the rivalry between them. 
It should become clearer why there is an exogamic 
restriction operating to prohibit the chief's heir, his 
nephew, from marrying the chief's daughter. Such a marriage 
would result in a closed system of exchange where the 
chief's son would lose all benefit from his betrothal by 
being obliged to furnish gifts to the new chief (his sis- 
ter's husband). The exogamic restrictions operate to prevent 
such a closed movement of goods and to provide an open 
primitive system of exchange based on the figures governing 
the ordering of the clans and sub-clans. 
Whenever the possibility arises a cross-cousin marriage 
will always be arranged for the son of a chief, a village 
headman or any man of rank, wealth and power. This demon- 
strates that marriage is involved in the primitive deploy- 
ment of power: marriage is part of a regime of power. Mar- 
riage as an institution primarily serves the interests of 
power rather than sentiment in the primitive society. It is 
an institution for the deployment and maintenance of the 
figures of a primitive economics. One of the main effects of 
the institution of marriage is the manipulation of a fairly 
complex system of exchange. Sexual tolerance exists only 
where it does not interfere with the economic ambitions of 
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those involved. Therefore, it is becoming clearer that the 
primitives order their world and their relationships along 
the lines of the formative figures of the episteme rather 
than along sentimental lines. The figures governing the 
operation of the primitive system of economics share the 
same positivity as those governing the notions of clan and 
sub-clan identity which provides the primitive technique for 
the construction of the individuals as selves. 
Malinowski regards the existence of cross-cousin mar- 
riage as a compromise between the two principles of mother- 
right and father love [Malinowski 1982a, p. 86]. The cross- 
cousin marriage between the son and the niece (or grand- 
niece) of a man is the only exception to the exogamic prohi- 
bition since other combinations are prohibited. I hold that 
it is more intelligible to regard the presence of cross- 
cousin marriage of this nature as an attempt to resolve the 
conflicts arising out of a system which allows women to be 
the means through which power is deployed but not held and 
allows men to be the objects of that power. For the man, the 
problem then lies in passing that power, through an appro- 
priate pattern of women, to his own sons without it being 
deflected to someone else. The possibility of the loss of 
power comes about because of the primitive conception of the 
family based in the brother/sister model available in the 
myths on the origins of the tribe rather than a father/son 
model. 
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5.4 The economics of exchange. 
Mauss claimed that an archaic form of exchange, involv- 
ing gifts and return gifts, could be seen in operation in 
primitive societies such as the Trobrianders [Mauss 1954, 
p. 45]. In these societies he noted the circulation of ob- 
jects along side the circulation of persons and rights. He 
speculated from this that gift exchange was characteristic 
of societies that were not involved with pure individual 
contracts, the money market, fixed price and weighed and 
1 
coined money 
Mauss translated kula which describes the whole system 
of inter-tribal and intra-tribal commerce as 'ring' [Mauss 
1954, p. 20]. Mauss introduced the concept of exchange as a 
, total social phenomenon' containing elements at once so- 
cial, legal, moral, aesthetic, etc. He analysed exchange by 
separating the acts of giving, receiving and repaying so 
that the structure of exchange as a total concept could 
become fragmented. Mauss's reciprocity was a step towards a 
general theory of exchange. However, Weiner claims, in 
agreement with Levi-Strauss in The Savage Mind, that the 
separation of the acts of giving, receiving and repaying was 
a major conceptual error. Weiner holds that an analysis of 
-------------------- 
1. However, Mauss is only concerned here with societies that 
have passed the phase of 'total prestation' between clan and 
clan, and family and family. He obviously has a form of 
economic evolution in mind. 
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Trobriand exchange in terms of a single dimension tends to 
make the processes of social interaction appear to be deter- 
mined by principles of cause and effect. This mistake, 
Weiner claims, arises out of the error of looking at ex- 
change as an act within the limitations of the present 
rather than the analysis comprising a system of regeneration 
in which the temporal context of generational continuity 
carries as much weight as economic and political factors. In 
conformity with Weiner's advice, the archaeological analysis 
of the economics of exchange, which I attempt here, is not 
broken down into these elements of giving, receiving and 
repaying. 
Furthermore, Weiner holds that Malinowskils dilemma of 
, giving for the sake of giving' has tended to obscure the 
nature of power underlying exchange events. I am in agree- 
ment with Weiner that this view of exchange as primarily 
social rather than economic, because of the generalised 
character of reciprocity and kinship, is unsatisfactory. 
Anthropologists have tended to ignore exchange as part of a 
power system. Exchange must be seen as the means of gaining 
power over people and control over resources. Levi-Strauss 
was a proponent of a social rather than an economic view of 
exchange and this marks a significant difference between 
structuralism and archaeology. Structuralism is not con- 
cerned with the relationship between regimes of power and 
knowledge. 
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Weiner is correct to analyse exchange as part of a 
power system. However, there is a difference between Wein- 
er's analysis of exchange as a deployment of power and that 
of archaeology. In archaeology the analysis of exchange does 
not emerge from the space of a competition between a social 
and an economic theory. It is difficult to see exactly what 
is meant by 'economic' in Weiner's view. She accepts that 
the meaning of this concept has a relationship with power as 
wealth but her analysis remains vague as to what is meant by 
power here and I can only assume that she is employing the 
traditional conception that was rejected in chapter two. 
Archaeology does not oppose the social to the economic but 
places both discursive fields within the framework of an 
analysis in terms of the productive figures of power. During 
the course of the investigation, the particularity of this 
approach will become apparent. 
Marriage is constituted by exchange since it places the 
brothers of the woman under a permanent tributary obligation 
to the husband. They have to pay yearly contributions to the 
households for as long as it exists. This contribution takes 
the form of yams produced by their kinswoman's family. These 
yams make up about half the annual consumption of the aver- 
age household. 
When a couple get married they have to set up a yam- 
store as well as a dwelling house. The yam-store stands in 
the inner circle facing the dwelling. It contains a ceremo- 
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nial compartment which stores the contribution of the wife's 
family at harvest. At the same time the new husband delivers 
a large quantity of yams to his own sister or female rela- 
tives. He keeps only the inferior tubers in the sokwaypa 
(the inferior yam-house). He also produces seed yams and 
other vegetables [Malinowski 1982a, p. 104]. 
Weiner informs us that the production of yams is firmly 
grounded in the male domain. The taytu forms the principal 
object of exchange and opens the way to all other areas of 
resource control [Weiner 1976, p. 1371. Two types of gardens 
are worked: subsistence and exchange gardens. Two types of 
exchange occur: cooked and raw yams are exchanged and this 
difference has contextual implications. Raw yams can be 
stored for up to six months and thus can enter further 
exchanges unlike cooked yams which cannot be stored nor can 
they be replanted for another harvest. Therefore, uncooked 
yams are the basic commodity in exchanges [Weiner 1976, 
P. 1381. 
Weiner believes that the cooked yams must be taken out 
of an exchange system so that an estimation of yams for 
subsistence can be made. This, she claims, is the main 
reason why boys in the bukumatula are not allowed to cook so 
that this estimate might be made more accurately. I disagree 
with this interpretation and argue that the taboo on cooking 
has more specifically to do with the dual function of the 
yam as the sign of wealth and the means of subsistence. The 
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taboo focuses on a vulnerable boundary in the yam in the 
same way that the sexual taboo focussed on the vulnerable 
boundary between the brother and sister. 
The family dig up the taytu (small yams) from their own 
garden plot within the communal garden and carry them to a 
kalimomyo (shade) where they are carefully cleaned and 
selected. The best yams are placed in a conical pile in the 
middle and this is the urigubu (the yield for the husband's 
women folk). The rest are irregularly stored in the corners. 
This marriage gift is the main and most ostentatious product 
of the garden work [Malinowski 1982a, p. 105]. 
Because quantities of yams can be amassed and stored, a 
single harvest can be subdivided and redistributed. Thus, a 
man can establish relationships with several people. This is 
why, according to Weiner, the yam is culturally elaborated 
into the system of display and exchange [Weiner 1976, 
p. 1391. 
After about a week, the taytu are brought into the 
villages and the urigubu are carried to the husband's sis- 
ter's husband. This is a time of gaiety and rejoicing. 
Sometimes several village communities organise a kayasa 
(competitive harvest) and everyone tries to produce the best 
crop. often wars, or at least fights, are associated with 
the intense rivalry of the kayasa. The gift yams are placed 
in a conical heap outside of the recipient's house and after 
about a week there is a ceremony for placing them inside the 
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yam-house [Malinowski 1982a, p. 107]. 
Malinowski notes the profound effects of this annual 
endowment on the institution of marriage and on the economy 
and constitution of the tribe as a whole. He believes that 
it would be wise for a man to guide his choice of a bride 
according to the number of her sisters and brothers. An only 
daughter with several brothers would prove to be a profita- 
ble choice. Here Malinowski is clearly contradicting his 
earlier observations that love and sentiment were the only 
guiding factors in a man's choice of a wife, outside of the 
incest taboo bars. He is, at this stage, allowing an econom- 
ic dimension in the choice as an important factor. It will 
become clearer that this element has a very important func- 
tion in the institution of marriage; it governs the choice 
of partners. The sexual element that dominates the relation- 
ship between a couple before marriage is gradually replaced 
after marriage by an economic concern with survival. 
once a couple become married, there is a distinct in- 
crease in sexual propriety between them. In public, they 
never demonstrate any affection towards each other in the 
manner of lovers from the bukumatula. All allusions to sex 
between them is rigorously excluded [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 96]. In this way, we can see the emergence of institutions 
and discourses which replace the role of sex focussing on 
the boundary between the sexes. The yam-houses occupy the 
central place of the village and married life tends to focus 
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on this place. There is a shift from a concern with sexual 
activity as that which characterises a relationship to a 
concern with food as the primary theme of experience. 
A man acquires new relatives-in-law in the form of his 
wife's sons since, in a matrilineal society, children are 
regarded as the kinsmen of the woman. A man's relatives-in- 
law are obliged to assist him when he builds a house or 
canoe, arranges a fishing expedition, or takes part in a 
public festival. They must keep watch over him against 
sorcerers when he is ill or carry him to some location which 
might bring about a cure. Finally, after his death the bulk 
of the mortuary duties fall upon them. Only occasionally 
does he have to repay these services with youlo (valuables) 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 108]. 
Malinowski claims that it is merely custom and personal 
pride that impel a man to give yams freely and liberally 
each year since there are no definite punishments to enforce 
this duty. Neglect is rewarded with public contempt [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p. 108]. The force must therefore be pride and 
ambition. However, archaeology questions practices for their 
possibility in epistemic figures and we must investigate the 
practice of annual contributions from a brother to his 
sister's household for its possibility in the figures al- 
ready outlined. The forces behind this practice have the 
same conditions as those governing the deployment of magic 
and clan relations. Pride does not provide an account of 
206 
primitive economics just as genealogy could not provide the 
solution to the deployment of the clan. Genealogy and vanity 
are examples of two traditional explanatory unities that are 
rejected in archaeology. 
This native system of the giving of urigubu involves 
the extra work of the building of the kalimomye, the clean- 
ing, stacking and carrying of the taytu. However, this extra 
burden, according to Malinowski, enhances industrial effi- 
ciency. If he worked just for himself, the native would have 
no means of capitalising his surplus and would have no 
incentive to produce it [Malinowski 1982a, p. 109]. However, 
the native system of annual contributions to the household 
of the sister has produced a system that allows for the 
capitalisation of surplus and provides a means of producing 
that surplus. In this system we see the workings of matrili- 
ny. 
The wife's brother, who is the guardian of the wife and 
her children, bears the largest part of the economic burden 
of the household. A brother retains an authority over his 
sister after she is married regardless of the rank of her 
new husband. At the same time, there exists an important and 
elaborate ceremonial of respect towards persons of rank 
which highlights the function of the boundaries of the model 
among the Trobrianders. This manifests itself in the idea 
that a man of noble lineage must always remain on a physi- 
cally higher level than his inferiors. People of lower rank, 
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in the presence of a noble, have to bow the head or bend the 
body or squat on the ground according to the degree of their 
inferiority. Tall platforms are always built on the chief's 
house and he will sit on one of these at tribal gatherings 
so that the people may freely move below without any head 
reaching higher than his [Malinowski 1982a, p. 28]. If the 
chief stands up, the commoners must bend towards the ground 
[Young 1979, p. 441. 
The sanctity of the chief's person is particularly 
localised in his head, which is associated with strict 
taboos. Most especially sacred are the forehead and the 
occiput with the neck and only equals in rank, wives and a 
few privileged persons are allowed to touch these parts, or 
in other words, to be convenient with them. This sanctity of 
the head extends to the female members of the noble sub- 
clans, and if a noble woman marries a commoner, her brow, 
her occiput, neck and shoulders should not be touched by the 
husband even during sexual intercourse [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 291. In the area of nobility we have an example of a weak 
boundary between the sexes. 
Women enjoy the same privileges of rank as men in the 
observances of taboos. However, no woman is ever the head of 
any sub-clan and, therefore, no woman can be a chieftainess. 
Furthermore, the privilege of polygamy, which is the basis 
of the chief's power, is denied to women since they have no 
similar privilege of polyandry [Malinowski 1982a, p. 29]. The 
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chief derives his authority from the fact that he is the 
headman of the village and from the division of the communi- 
ty into different rankings of clans [Malinowski 1978, p. 62]. 
In every community, there is one man who wields the greatest 
authority, though in reality, this may not amount to much. 
All decisions are taken on the basis of traditional and 
conventional lines and the authority has no capacity for 
innovation. These lesser authorities are in effect the 
masters of ceremonies. However, in the case of a headman of 
high rank, such as the head of the Tabalu sub-clan of the 
Malasi clan who holds the highest rank of all, the authority 
is more than ceremonial. The authority of a chief lies in 
his ability to produce value and wealth from food which is 
not just involved with basic survival. 
Weiner cites three features which support the concep- 
1 
tion of the Trobriand guyalu as chief. Firstly, the Trobri- 
and 'chiefs' adhere to hereditary claims. Secondly, the 
paraphernalia of decorations and social and physical taboos 
serve as a means of rank separation. Thirdly, only the few 
quyalu are polygamous. The right to be polygamous comes from 
the founders (tabu) [Weiner 1976, p. 45-46]. However, an 
account of the privilege of the polygamy of the chief is 
given here in terms of the function of the chief as the 
-------------------- 
1. Malinowski glosses this term as 'aristocratic' on page 
26, chief (premier) on page 122 and 'as people of high rank, 
on page 385 of The Sexual Lives of Savages. 
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creator of the signs of wealth because of his central loca- 
tion in an enclosed system of exchange. Power deploys 
itself through the symbols of wealth by operating in the 
polygamous chief. The chief is the locus for a connection 
between power and knowledge where that knowledge takes the 
form of a primitive economic discourse based in exchange. 
All chiefs are obliged to have a great number of wives. 
In order to wield power and fulfil the obligations of his 
office, the chief' of an extended district must possess 
wealth and he can do this by marrying several native women. 
The chief is obliged to pay for everything, even for the 
services that are due to him and that could not be withheld. 
The brothers of each of his wives must contribute in the 
same way as any other brother-in-law. Therefore, a chief can 
multiply his wealth in direct proportion to the number of 
his wives. The opposite state of affairs would prevail if a 
woman were to take several husbands since this would not 
increase the number of her in-laws obliged to her but merely 
increase the household without increasing its wealth. This 
further demonstrates that the matrilineal system is such 
that women provide the means of enhancing the power and 
wealth of men. The husband becomes powerful through his wife 
and weaker through his sisters who are always placed to 
threaten his status and his very existence. 
When a chief comes to power, he inherits the late 
chief's widows who automatically become his own wives, while 
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their children become part of his household. The majority of 
the widows have passed through the hands of several husbands 
and are fairly old (Malinowski 1982a, p. 114]. In general, 
the wives of the chief can be divided into three groups. 
Firstly, there are those wives acquired from the chief's 
predecessor. These may be regarded as dowager tribute- 
bringers who cannot be repudiated. The second class of wives 
are those whom the chief married in his youth. These are 
women acquired and not inherited. The third class consists 
of younger women adopted in exchange for older ones who have 
died. The chief indicates his choice, and irrespective of 
her previous attachments, the woman is given to him [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p-1171. 
The chief is able to carry out many of his functions 
and to claim certain of his privileges only because he is 
the wealthiest man in the community. He can ensure the 
support of his subjects in expeditions, wars, festivals, 
etc. because he can pay for all these things. Power is 
plutocratic amongst the Trobrianders [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 111]. The chief is the most powerful person in the dis- 
trict because he is the wealthiest. He is the wealthiest 
because he is entitled to take many wives. For his real 
income a chief has to rely entirely on his annual marriage 
contribution. Each of his wives is more dowered than if she 
had married a commoner. 
Each chief has a district, comprising several villages, 
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which is tributary through marriage. Each village is ruled 
by the headman of the sub-clan which constitutes that vil- 
lage. The chief takes a wife from each sub-clan, and in the 
event of her death, she is replaced immediately by a woman 
from the same sub-clan. All the male members of this sub- 
clan contribute their share to the dowry. The sub-clan is 
represented collectively by the headman. Thus every man in a 
village works from a distance for his chief [Malinowski 
1982a, p. 1121. The wealth of the chief is then redistributed 
in payment for wars, expeditions and craft. This system 
invests the taytu with an economic value which it could 
never have if each native provided just for himself from his 
own garden. 
The relation between the polygamous chief and his 
wives, which is based in matriliny forms the economic macro- 
cosm for the Trobriand society. The relationship between the 
sister and her husband finds its economic possibility in the 
special ties that bind a brother to his sister. The broth- 
er/sister(husband) opposition forms the microcosm for the 
primitive economic system in the same way that the matrilin- 
eal conception of the brother/sister relationship formed the 
microcosm for the division of the clans. Primitive economics 
functions between the limits of these two. Monogamous mar- 
riage is grounded on the economic basis of the microcosmic 
function of the brother/sister(husband) relation. Polygamous 
marriage is based in the economics of the macrocosmic func- 
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tion of the clan as a collection of sub-clans which itself 
has its basis in the brother/sister relation which in turn 
is an asymmetric relation that has its origin in the mother. 
Between the limits of the clan and the brother/sister 
relation we find the realm of sex. Between the limits of the 
chief and the brother/sister(husband) relation we find the 
realm of wealth. This space contains the possibility of a 
primitive economics. The taytu become more than mere suste- 
nance once they are put into circulation. They circulate by 
their movement from the brother to the sub-clans and on to 
the chief, via the chief's wives, and back to the members of 
the clan as payment. The movement from the sub-clan to the 
chief is made possible and determined by the guiding codes 
that are available in the figures of the primitive episteme. 
The notion of the clan provides a limit to the economic 
responsibility of the chief. This limit has its origin in 
the topological aspect of convenience. The clan provides 
enclosure for the economy. The sub-clans are convenient to 
each other. Again, this economic model is strictly two- 
dimensional and the taytu, displaced through the chief, 
becomes the sign of value. 
In the establishment of value, the asymmetrical rela- 
tion between a chief and his wives occupies the central 
place. This place is reflected in the village layout by the 
fact that the chief's dwelling is the only one in the centre 
of the village. The chief/wives are enclosed by the conven- 
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ient asymmetrical relations of the chief's-wife/wifels- 
clansmen which is the brother/sister asymmetry. Taytu repre- 
sents the movement of yams from the enclosing circle of 
brother/sister(husband) conveniences that emulate the cen- 
tral one, to the central chief/wife asymmetry. The taytu are 
returned to the sub-clans as payments. The taytu have been 
displaced through the chiefs so that they are now the signs 
of value. The chief occupies the central place in the vil- 
lage and is therefore valued by that placement. In the same 
way that something becomes the sign of a positive essence by 
occupying the valued areas of the differentiated primitive 
space, the chief empowers yams with his own positive at- 
tributes so that they can function as the signs of wealth. 
In chapter three, it was suggested that a primitive sign is 
a thing in the world and is established by being related to 
the thing for which it is a sign in the field of the bounded 
relations of the epistemic figures. Yams become primitive 
, currency' in their relationship to the chief. The chief is 
the boundary through which yams must pass so that they can 
function as the sign for currency. The necessity of polygamy 
lies in this role that the chief has. His place in the 
economic order must be enclosed by the continuous circles of 
sub-clans and this is achieved through marriage with as many 
women of those clans as possible. Yams are 'exchanged' 
through the chief, or anyone of higher rank, where they 
cease to be agricultural products and become the signs of 
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wealth and power. They are then returned to the natives in 
the form of obligatory payments where they are transformed 
back to agricultural products in cooking. Each village 
represents its wealth through the elaborate display of its 
own yams which are the signs of its prosperity. 
This circulation of wealth and the creation of value 
have their possibility in the figures of asymmetry, conven- 
ience and emulation in the enclosed figures of the episteme. 
The shared regularity between the economics and sexual 
patterns is evident in the central place occupied by the 
chief/wife being equivalent to that occupied by the mother 
as the central place of emergence in the origin myths and 
equivalent to the central place of the brother/sister in the 
incest taboos. There is an equivalence between the roles of 
the conveniences of the sub-clans in the creation of value 
and the role of the clans in the kinship myths and the 
convenience of the domestic dwellings in the layout of the 
village. The village is structured to reflect these figures 
with the yam stores occupying the same place as the chief's 
house. Again we see the topological aspect of the organisa- 
tion of primitive knowledge. 
Power deploys itself in the Trobriand system through 
women who are conceived to be related to their brothers, 
through their mothers, in this very particular way with its 
sexual and economic aspects. In the area of the constitution 
of the brother/sister relation, we found the source of 
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sexual relations through the operation of the incest taboo. 
Here again, in this same space, we find the source of eco- 
nomic distribution through the operation of the special 
relation between brother and sister. This special relation 
has its origin in matriliny which provides the shared posi- 
tivity for sexual and economic activity. Thus we can con- 
clude that matriliny is a particular means for the deploy- 
ment of plutocratic power in the Trobriand society which 
does not exclude women but allows them to function as the 
means to that power without an end in it themselves. 
The source of power, in the Trobriand society, lies in 
the conception of the brother/sister relation where the 
sister transfers a power from her brother, who shares her 
nature, to her husband. The end manifestation of power here 
lies in economic wealth. Through economic wealth a man can 
display his status. This is most evident in the practice of 
the polygamy of chiefs. 
Power takes the form of the material control of re- 
sources. Wealth deployed through his wives invests a chief 
with power. However, this power is maintained by the taboos 
associated with the sacred person of the chief and his 
association with magical powers appropriate to his status. 
5.5 The archaeology of wealth. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault describes how objects 
became invested with value so that they could become part of 
an economics. He reminds us that there was no political 
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economy in the order of knowledge of the Classical Age 
because, at that time, the notion of production did not 
exist. However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
there is a domain of wealth. This domain contains the no- 
tions of value, price, trade, circulation, income and inter- 
est. It is the ground and object of 'economy, and is not 
applicable to questions deriving from a different type of 
economics: an economics organised around production or work. 
The analysis of wealth is useless without taking into ac- 
count the system from which it draws its positivity [Fou- 
cault 1970, p. 1661. This is a very important point and one 
entirely missed by both Malinowski and Weiner. 
Malinowski situated the domains of 'money' and the 
'division of labourl in the same place in his analysis. Con- 
cerns with the division of labour did not emerge until the 
Modern era. Nevertheless, he provides ethnographic detail an 
a 'primitive economics' that he maintains is found amongst 
the Trobrianders that includes both these themes [Malinowski 
19211. While he acknowledges the need for comprehensive 
economic analysis of primitive cultures, he does not ac- 
knowledge any possible discontinuities in such a discourse 
and promotes the type of retrospective analysis rejected 
above by Foucault. 
A boy receives seeds for his first yam exchange garden 
from the male to whom the harvest will go. Because of this, 
Weiner claims that the yams represent the labour invested in 
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them [Weiner 1976, p. 147]. However, the complex notion of 
Ilabourl requires the epistemological setting of the Modern 
episteme which is not present. Weiner does not demonstrate 
the reality of the yam as labour. Further, throughout her 
analysis, she ignores the fact that the Trobrianders had 
been greatly influenced by Modern Western culture by the 
time she got to them. She does not take seriously any 
affect this influence might have on traditional symbolic 
notions and her imposition of the notion of Ilabourl on the 
yam can only be regarded as arising from this epistemologi- 
cal confusion. 
A retrospective reading of a 'primitive economics' 
that would merely endow this area with the unity of a Polit- 
ical economy must be avoided. We can look at an example from 
the Renaissance where economic thought is restricted to the 
problem of prices and that of the best monetary substance. 
The question of prices concerns the absolute or relative 
character of the increasing dearness of commodities and the 
effect that devaluations or the influx of American metals 
had upon prices. The problem of monetary substance is that 
of the nature of the standard, of the price relation between 
the metals employed, and of the distortion between the 
weights of coins and their nominal values. These two types 
of problems were linked in that the metal functions only as 
a sign for measuring wealth because it was itself wealth. 
Just as words had the same reality as what they said, simi- 
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larly, the signs that indicated wealth and measured it were 
bound to carry the real mark in themselves. In order to 
represent prices, they themselves had to be precious [Fou- 
cault 1970, p. 169]. 
The two functions of money as a common measure between 
commodities and as a substitute in the mechanism of exchange 
are based on its material reality. As a measure it is sta- 
ble, recognised as valid by everyone everywhere and can be 
compared to the diversity of things that one wishes to 
measure. Money can only measure in the Renaissance if it has 
a reality that really exists. Money was a measure of wealth 
because it signified only its power to standardise wealth on 
the basis of its own material reality as wealth. This is the 
epistemological foundation that determined the domain of 
wealth in the sixteenth century [Foucault 1970, p. 170). 
Amongst the Trobrianders, there are three manifestations 
of money' as an object of a primitive economics but none 
of these instances function as a common measure between 
commodities. Money functions as the sign of wealth and the 
economy is based on (unequal) exchange through the higher 
ranks and not exact procedures of comparison. The range of 
commodities to be exchanged is extremely limited in any 
case. 
Trade follows customary rules which strictly determine 
what and how much shall be exchanged for any given article. 
All trade is carried on exactly the same way: given any 
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article and the communities between which it is traded, the 
natives know its equivalent prescribed by custom. A narrow 
range of exchangeable articles and the inertia of custom 
leave no room for a notion of free exchange. There is, 
therefore, no need for a medium of exchange in the form of 
money as a comparative measure of value [Nalinowski 1921, 
p. 14]. Malinowski does not employ a notion of money in his 
analysis since he defines money solely in terms of its 
function as a common equivalent. However, we need not aban- 
don the term in this way but employ it where it functions as 
a mechanism in an exchange. This is least obvious where 
yams, which are themselves food, function as money in food 
exchanges. The yam has the dual characteristic of being 
simultaneously food and the sign of wealth. It has this dual 
nature because it is itself valuable being food. Something 
can act as money in the Trobriand episteme because it is 
itself valuable. 
Firstly, money appears in the form of the valuable 
items of ornaments. In the Trobriand society this type of 
money takes the form of ceremonial axe-blades, necklaces of 
red shell discs, and armshells of the conus millepuctatus 
shell which are collectively known as vayqua. These objects 
have hardly any practical utility. However, they transmit 
their virtues when handled [Mauss 1954, p. 22]. The materials 
of which they are made are rare and difficult to obtain. 
They are durable and almost indestructible. At least the 
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most valuable and coveted of the vaygula have a name, a 
personality, a past, and a legend attached to them [Mauss 
1954, p. 221. They are owned as signs of wealth because they 
have a material reality and represent wealth on the basis of 
their own material reality as wealth. They are not measures 
but are themselves wealth. As a substitute in the mechanism 
of exchange, primitive money has the forms of these vaygula. 
A distinction can be made among vaygula between mwali, which 
are finely cut and polished armshells and soulava which are 
necklaces [Mauss 1954, p. 21]. The mwali go in a regular 
circular movement from west to east while soulava have a 
circular movement from east to west [Mauss 1954, p. 21]. 
Mauss believed that these vaygula, like the North-West 
American coppers and Iroquois wampum, are at once wealth, 
tokens of wealth, means of exchange and payment, and things 
to be given away or destroyed [Mauss 1954, p. 71]. In addi- 
tion, he regarded them as pledges, linked to the persons who 
use them and who, in turn, are bound by them. However, at 
other times they serve as tokens of money [Mauss 1954, 
p. 71]. 
The vaygua are only money in the sense that they have a 
material reality and function in the mechanism of exchange. 
It is not, however, a common measure between commodities. 
Since each thing is invested with its own value or 'vitali- 
ty' there is no need for a common measure. The value of each 
thing is manifest in that thing and crystallised in custom. 
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Because of this, the vaygua have only one function as money 
in a primitive episteme. 
Secondly, native women cease to be just objects of 
sexual desire and themselves enter into circulation as 
wealth in marriage. The practice of marriage is a form of 
the distribution of wealth. A woman represents wealth by 
being a sign for wealth that is in itself valuable and has a 
central role in the mechanism of exchange. 
Weiner claims that, in the marriage contract, the move- 
ment of women and yams to the husband's house represents a 
symbolic association between women and yams. Yams reproduce 
themselves in the gardens just as women are thought to do in 
childbirth. The movement of yams from the father and brother 
of a woman to her husband symbolises the transformation of 
her sexuality into a sexual union that produces a child 
provisioned with paternal identity. Sincethe sexual rela- 
tions between husband and wife can never be publicly dis- 
cussed, and since a father (or brother) can never acknowl- 
edge a woman's (his sister's) sexual behaviour, the yams 
exchanged through a woman 'speak the elemental words that 
constitute all men's immortality' [Weiner 1976, p. 210]. Now 
what could all of this mean? Firstly, we have seen that 
there is an absence of paternal identity and, further, 
sexuality can not be symbolised in the primitive episteme 
since the notion cannot emerge until the nineteenth century. 
By this very obscure phrase Weiner can only mean that women 
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(and not the fathers) control the continuity of dala identi- 
ty in ahistorical time. This contradicts her criticisms of 
Malinowski where she claims that continuity is available 
through the father. 
The third and most important manifestation of money is 
as raw yams. Yams raise a problem of monetary substance 
since they can be transformed by cooking into a perishable 
form of sustenance which is no longer a practical sign of 
wealth. The threat to wealth because of this nature of the 
sign has led to a series of taboos on cooking that especial- 
ly focus on unmarried couples eating together. Cooking is 
banned from the central place of wealth in the village since 
it represents a threat to the economic order. However, 
yams as the signs of wealth do not disappear altogether as 
a result of successive exchanges, continual circulation and 
consumption as food since they are agricultural products 
and are restored annually by the labour of the gardens. In 
this way, the energy invested in agriculture is a direct 
means of restoring the signs of wealth and, in light of 
this, it is not surprising that gardening is the focus of 
significant magic. It is at this level that the notion of 
Ilabourl enters a primitive economics. However, the concept 
of labour is not problematised in the primitive discourses 
on wealth. Successful gardening has its ultimate possibility 
in the correct application of the appropriate magic and not 
in the labour of man. 
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5.6 Gardening. 
Because of the function of yams in exchange, the Tro- 
briander's economy is involved in agriculture which produces 
that which is to count as the sign of wealth. Yams can be 
exchanged for fish and imports. The natives have to rely on 
the importation from other tribes of stone implements and 
pottery because of a lack of raw materials. 
Agricultural production involves the central role of 
the chief and especially the function of magic. The absence 
of a constitutive notion of labour in production is similar 
to the absence of the notion of reproduction in sexual 
activity which is also assigned to the role of magic. 
A man who plants and tends an exchange garden (which is 
a garden specifically planted so that its produce enters an 
exchange) does not own any of the yams which belong, from 
the time of planting, to the person to whom the harvest will 
be presented. There is no formal harvest for subsistence 
gardens and no public display of the harvest of the food 
yams. 
The guyalu (chief) has an influence over all the garden 
land within the district. This consists in the exercise of 
ceremonial privileges and arbitration in garden disputes. 
The towosi (garden magician) exercises complex magical 
functions over the gardens and has the ultimate responsibil- 
ity for a successful harvest. 
it is possible to make a distinction between the re- 
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sponsibilities of the guyalu and the towosi. The guyalu sup- 
plies the authority in the complex conditions of land ten- 
ure, in the frequent quarrels about gardening, and in the 
summoning and maintaining of communal labour. In the realm 
of wealth, the chief has his principal function in its 
creation and circulation. However, magic is the means where- 
by the substances that are to function as the signs of 
wealth are created and, in this area, the magician is the 
central figure. The towosi of each'village community has a 
direct causal influence in the production of the yam crop. 
Each stage of gardening is inaugurated by a magical rite 
that is performed by him. He orders the work that is to be 
done; supervises the way in which it is to be carried out 
and punctuates the work with the imposition of periods of 
taboo [Malinowski 1921, p. 4]. 
The chief summons a conference outside the house of the 
garden magician to open the. gardening proceedings. The 
village community brings a gift of selected food to the 
magician who performs the appropriate rites. The magician 
goes to the garden plots the following morning with the men 
of the village carrying axes wrapped in charmed leaves. The 
towosi strikes the ground of each plot with a ceremonial 
staff and utters a formula. After this the scrub is cut in 
the garden by the men only, and communal labour is often 
resorted to. The magician then has to decide when the next 
stage, the burning of the scrub and the clearing of soil, 
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has to begin. When he thinks that the cut scrub is suffi- 
ciently dry, he imposes a taboo on the garden work. Then, in 
a series of rites lasting about three days, he initiates the 
work of clearing the garden plot. The work of clearing is 
carried out by both men and women, working in families, each 
on its own plot. A very elaborate ceremony inaugurates the 
planting of the yams and each further stage is initiated by 
its own ceremony; the weeding carried out by female communal 
labour; the cleaning of the yam roots and tubers; the pre- 
liminary harvest of early yams; and finally the main harvest 
of late yams [Malinowski 1921, p. 5]. 
These magical rites give impulse to the growth of the 
plot; there is magic to make the seed tuber sprout; another 
rite to drive up the sprouting shoot; another to lift it 
from the ground; another to make it twine round the support; 
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magic to make the leaves bud, open and expand . The owner of 
-------------------- 
1. Tambiah outlines the structure of a Trobriand garden 
spell (with reference to the tapwana) in the following way. 
The belly of my garden leavens 
rises 
reclines 
grows to the size of 
a bush hen's nest 
grows like an anthill 
rises and is bowed down 




swells as with a child 
Note the presence of resemblance between a garden and a 
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the leywota (plot selected for the magical ceremony) has to 
work conscientiously to keep pace with the progress of magic 
and this plot provides a standard for the others. Thus, the 
towosi exercises an authority in the initiation of work by 
imposing taboos and sets standards by means of the leywota 
plot. The natives believe that he controls the forces of 
nature, and they also believe that he controls the work of 
man [Malinowski 1921, p. 6]. 
The authority and efficacy of the magical spells regu- 
late the work and production of the yam crops. The same can 
be said about fishing, building of houses or canoes and big 
trading expeditions. All these activities are dependent on 
the influence of the respective magicians. Malinowski as- 
signs an equal function to both the chief and the magician 
in agricultural pursuits. This is because he underplays the 
authority of the causal role of magic in primitive knowledge 
in favour of the hegemonic role of the chief. In the next 
chapter, I examine the origin of the magical authority in 
greater detail. 
5.7 Functions of a primitive economy. 
There are two functions that govern the economic lives 
of the natives and move gardening work from the concerns of 
each individual family to a collective problematisation. 
-------------------- 
Continued... 
pregnant woman [Tambiah 1968, p-191]. The Trobrianders also 
employ a resemblance between the human belly and the yam 
house [Tambiah 1968, p. 201 
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These two functions in the Trobriand culture are: the obli- 
gations imposed at marriage by rules of kinship and rela- 
tionship-in-law, and the dues and tributes paid to the chief 
[Malinowski 1921, p. 8]. 
We have already seen the complex system of gift ex- 
change involved in marriage. This involves the redistribu- 
tion of garden produce resulting in a condition where every- 
body is working for someone else. The whole community is 
enmeshed in A network of reciprocal obligations and dues. 
This system indicates the importance of the economic charac- 
ter of the natural produce of magic to the natives. 
In general, the transactions that follow from the 
produce of any male garden (a garden worked by one male for 
another) involve two men who are in an asymmetrical rela- 
tionship to each other, that is, son to father, sister's son 
to mother's brother, younger brother to older brother 
[Weiner 1976, p. 152]. Here we have another example of the 
role of the epistemic figures. Older men afford younger men 
the opportunity for security and access to valuables and 
magical knowledge that only older men possess. The amount 
and kind of magic spells that men teach their sons are 
relative to . the strength of the yam exchange relationship 
that a son enters into with his father. Magic is passed in 
this way from father to son. Men also purchase magic spells 
from anyone except their fathers since every Trobriander has 
an individual store of spells [Weiner 1976, p. 153]. 
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Through the effect of polygamy and through dues and 
tributes, about one third of the whole production of a dis- 
trict finds its way into the yam houses of the chief [Mali- 
nowski 1921, p. 8]. The value of these yams is portrayed in 
elaborate displays. The natives take great pride in their 
possession of yams and Malinowski claims that the custom of 
eating in public serves to prevent the suspicion of a scar- 
city of food being attached to the eater. However, this 
explanation is based in a view of native psychology which is 
rejected in an archaeological analysis. Instead, I argue 
that food is eaten in public since the consumption of the 
yams represents a threat to the order of wealth and, as 
such, is an appropriate locus for specific taboos. Taboos 
operate where there is a threat of a possible inversion of 
the order of things in the primitive world. In order for 
these taboos to be applicable, they must be subject to 
public scrutiny. There is a place appropriate to the display 
of yams as wealth and a place appropriate to their consump- 
tion. In the realm of sex, a taboo focuses on the body of 
man, with its dual sexual nature represented by the boundary 
between brother and sister. These two could not be left 
together unobserved. Likewise, in the realm of wealth, a 
taboo focuses on the body of the yam, with its dual economic 
nature represented by the boundary between the sign of 
wealth and food. Also, the yam must always be observable. 
The chief's yam house is of an open design so that all 
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may be able to see the produce. The primitive system of 
exchange enables the chief to be the only person who can own 
and display large quantities since everyone else is under an 
obligation both to their sisters and the chief. This allows 
him to be the most powerful person in the district by having 
the most elaborate and public display of wealth. 
The chief has a significant power located in his person 
in that he is able to transform food into objects of perma- 
nent value. He is the only person allowed this function. He 
is the stabilising force at the centre of the economics of 
the village and this stability is symbolised in his central 
location in the structure of the village. The vaygua (ob- 
jects of value) have no utility but are extremely highly 
valued by the natives. These form the basis of certain types 
of native trade and the chief retains the majority of them 
as symbols of his own wealth. These signs of wealth are not 
subject to the threat of destruction since they are of 
durable substance. 
The essential of a chief's power lies in his ability 
to enforce order and punish wrongdoers. He appoints special 
persons to carry out his judgments by inflicting punish- 
ment. The executioners must be paid by vaygua. More often 
punishment takes the form of evil magic performed on the 
guilty [Malinowski 1921, p. 10]. Further, because of his role 
as initiator of enterprises and ceremonies, the chief must 
be able to pay the leading actors and feed the participants. 
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He can fulfil both these conditions of the enforcer of civil 
order and master of ceremonies solely because of his large 
stock of yams and vaygua [Malinowski 1921, p. 11]. 
In summary, the chief functions economically as the 
locus for the yams produced in the district. He is the place 
of wealth in the primitive economies. In this place, perish- 
able goods are transformed into indestructible objects of 
value; goods are accumulated for tribal use which makes 
collective enterprises such as war, fishing and agriculture 
possible. 
The chief occupies the central place of the village and 
thus we can say that the centre of the village is the place 
of power and wealth. Far more native energy is given to the 
considerations of this place than that of the place of sex 
but, yet, they share the same positivity in the figures of 
the episteme in general. The economic organisation draws on 
the same figures as the primitive notions of kinship and 
clan-relations with the brother/sister(husband) relationship 
as a microcosm. The chief finds his wealth through marriage 
to other men's sisters and the basis of his power rests in 
this source of wealth. As his predecessor's nephew through 
his mother he shares an essence with him. This is how he 
comes to inherit the title. He occupies both the central 
stabilising place in the village and the central role in an 
economics in his ability to transform yams into the signs of 
imperishable value. 
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The function of money in a primitive society is as a 
substitute in exchange. This is a substitute that does not 
act as a common equivalent. Something can act as money 
because it is itself valuable rather than the sign of value. 
For this reason women may be described as 'money' in that 
they have a role in the mechanism of exchange. Primitive 
exchange of gifts is not based on a varying value (or free 
value) assigned to things related to supply and demand but 
on the value each thing has because of the place it occupies 
on the Trobriand model. The yams in the yam-houses form a 
circle of conveniences around the place of the chief and 
provide a stable enclosed boundary for an economics. Women 
have a definite value and enclose the larger area of the 
clans. The marriage ceremony represents their role in the 
initiation of a complex system of exchange. This is seen in 
the fact that marriage propriety focuses on the relationship 
of the couple to food and not on sexual protocol. 
Unlike my analysis, both those of Weiner and Malinowski 
are concerned with cultural meanings in terms of subjective 
desire. However, Weiner claims that, unlike Malinowski, she 
attempts to read objects of exchange as the Trobriander's 
symbolic representations of their own thoughts. Objects 
become highly significant because in their manner of presen- 
tation, quality, quantity and the like, they can be read as 
an objectification of desire and intent [Weiner 1976, 
p. 212]. 
232 
In order for the Trobrianders to read specific ex- 
changes as reflections of the thoughts and feelings of the 
participants, they must possess a system of interpretation 
and their signs must be able to represent thoughts. As their 
system of signs does not have this power, we have to con- 
clude that gifts do not reflect the feelings of the giver as 
they do in our own experience. 
Furthermore, in Weiner's understanding magical dis- 
courses provide the native with a realm that addresses 
itself to feelings in the form of desires to influence the 
states of others. The natives cannot effect their will over 
another person but they believe that it is possible to 
influence the disposition of others. Giving things to others 
and the use of magic spells are the two most effective 
persuasive devices available to every individual. The dynam- 
ics of exchange embody attempts to gain control over objects 
and persons. Exchange mediates the opposition between the 
self and others, while simultaneously it reinforces the very 
same opposition. Weiner holds that where Levi-Strauss saw 
exchange as the mediator of fixed opposed categories of 
relationships, she is suggesting that Trobriand exchange 
creates and reinforces oppositions of self-interest that 
coincide with the momentary overcoming of those oppositions. 
Exchange allows social space to be negotiable at the same 
time that personal space is inviolable. In contrast, magic 
is a mechanism that allows one person to intrude upon the 
233 
personal space of another. The possibilities for gaining 
power over other people are limited [Weiner 1976, p. 213]. 
Here Weiner accepts that the notion of 'personal space, 
is given to the natives. Her analysis is based on autonomy 
and has a very subjective element. This is a role that is 
not available in archaeology. It is extremely difficult to 
know what is meant when sh6 says that exchange gives scope 
to an ongoing process wherein the donor and the recipient 
may be continually re-evaluating the other's and their own 
condition [Weiner 1976, p. 213]. It is not clear what this 
could mean. This claim arises in the context of a system 
where custom dictates what that condition will be in terms 
of assigning a value to everything. Again we find Weiner im- 
porting notions from an inappropriate episteme into her 
analysis. In the next chapter, I examine how magic, espe- 
cially love magic, replaces the role of the will, and indeed 
individual properties, in desire. 
5.8 Conclusions. 
The concern of this chapter was to show that the primi- 
tive discourses on sex and those focusing on wealth had a 
shared positivity in the figures of the primitive episteme 
and that these realms were regulated by the same types of 
problematisations. We have seen that the economics of the 
Trobrianders finds its primary expression in marriage and 
this institution is organised around the distribution of 
food in a society under constant threat of war, hunger and 
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disease. In the previous chapter, it was shown that, in the 
myths on the origins of the tribe, the mother is in the 
central place of emergence. The significance of the mother 
is in her role as a common place for defining the nature of 
the brother and sister. The conception of the mother as a 
locus provides the possibility of the identification of the 
operation of an asymmetrical axis between the brother and 
sister. In this way, the figures governing the laws of kin- 
ship, which govern permissible sexual relations, give rise 
to a convenient series of asymmetric brother\sister rela- 
tions enclosing the stable central place of the emergence of 
the original mother (brother\sister). 
Likewise, in the realm of primitive economics there is 
an axis of asymmetry functioning between the chief and his 
wives. The chief, who occupies the place of wealth is 
enclosed by a convenient series of yam-houses representing 
the wealth of the district. In both these areas of dis- 
course, we see asymmetry, convenience and enclosure. 
Many of the events of public life that take place in 
the central place of the village refer to garden produce 
[Young 1979, p. 35]. Since this produce is the principal 
manifestation of wealth, we can say that wealth occupies the 
same place as sex because sexual activity has its most 
spirited manifestation in the centralised bukumatula. 
There is an antagonism between cooking and the accumula- 
tion of wealth which is regulated by the same concerns as 
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the fundamental antagonism between the brother and sister. 
The first arises from the threat to the primitive order 
because of the dual nature of the yam as both sustenance and 
the sign of wealth. This is an example of the imposition of 
the bounded spaces of the episteme on the yam. The second 
antagonism arises because of the dual natures that arise 
from the primitive conception of the origin in the mother. 
Both areas are the focus of publicly observable taboos. 
Cooking is always done in or around the dwelling. There is a 
taboo on cooking within the inner ring [Young 1979, p. 421. 
Eating as the act of the destruction of wealth never takes 
place in the same place as the accumulation of wealth. Thus 
there is a topological differentiation between the spaces 
for the increase and decrease of wealth. There is a taboo on 
the brother and sister coming together and both are assigned 
different locations in the world. 
In the examination of the discourses on sex which 
formed one axis of the enquiry, we saw that the regularity 
that emerged took the form of an opposition between the 
brother and sister who inherited a dangerously similar 
essence from their mother. The dangers of inversion to the 
order based on this unity are overcome by the imposition of 
a central sexual taboo. This regularity had implications for 
the deployment of power through an economics of exchange. 
Questions focusing on the way in which power deployed itself 
for the propagation and maintenance of such discourses 
236 
formed the second axis of the enquiry. We have now seen that 
the principal power technique for the distribution of wealth 
as the sign of power is marriage. 
In marriage the husband contributes nothing to the 
nature of his children. A brother sustains his own flesh and 
nature by providing sustenance for his sister and her chil- 
dren. In maintaining oneself, the native maintains many 
individual bodies since the notion of self is not confined 
to the individual person alone. Psychological interpreta- 
tions based in individual agency are supported by a concept 
of selfhood based in an individual body. This notion is not 
available in the primitive episteme and, therefore, Malinow- 
ski's psycho-biological theory is inadequate for an account 
of the formation of primitive discourses. The archaeologi- 
cal method can reveal this complex notion of selfhood that 
has many individual persona involved which is appropriate to 
the experience of sex, marriage and economics in the primi- 
tive world. 
This primitive notion of self, which is not the undif- 
ferentiated psychological self of the Modern episteme, is to 
be found in the set of rules and norms which find support in 
economic, magical and clan institutions. The experience of 
sex was characterised, in the previous chapter, in terms of 
the discourses on the clan, sub-clan and brother/sister 
where they refer to tabooed sex and where personal identity 
is retained in birth and death and is linked to one's sib- 
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lings. These forms provide the possibility for the Trobri- 
anders to recognise themselves as the subjects of those 
discourses. In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate how 
it is that the technique of gift exchange regulates the 
practice of marriage and constitutes the subject as a gift- 
giver. In the next chapter, I examine magical discourses and 
practices that both refer to sex and regulate its practice. 
There is a constant threat to the primitive world from the 
operation of love magic. The focus of the problematisation 
of systems of kinship and exchange in terms of a topological 
asymmetry provides magic with its most significant possibil- 
ity and darkest manifestation and thus furnishes this form 
of knowledge with the respect of the natives. I will now 
turn to a consideration of this primitive knowledge where 
all three realms of sex, economics and magic have a shared 
positivity in the primitive episteme and thus a shared 
condition of possibility. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
The Realm of Magic. 
'But no one who reads the histories can doubt that there 
have always been witches, and that by their evil works much 
harm has been done to men, animals, and the fruits of the 
earth... I [Kramer and Sprenger 1986, p. 248]. 
6.1 Introduction. 
Magic is found in the gap between man and nature where 
it has come to refer principally to human activities and 
states such as hunting, gardening, fishing, trading, sexual 
activity, disease and death. It is not derived from any 
observation of the laws of nature and as such has absolutely 
no claim on science. It is a primeval possession known 
through tradition. 
Malinowski provides a sociological account of magic in 
terms of a 'universal psycho-physiological mechanism' [Mali- 
nowski 1982b, pp. 79-84]. We have already seen that the 
archaeological analysis rejects psychological categories. 
The archaeological analysis of magic reveals the shared 
positivity between magical knowledge and the positivities 
that give rise to the discourses on kinship, sex and wealth. 
The archaeological examination of magic provides examples 
from the Trobriand episteme that refer to, reinforce and 
propagate these discourses. The powerful magical practices 
are surrounded by fear and form the principal location for 
both a knowledge of the primitive world and a threat to the 
order that that knowledge gives rise to. As in the cases of 
the other areas of menace in the primitive experience, the 
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possessor of magical knowledge has to keep many taboos. 
Amongst the sorcerers of the Trobrianders the spells 
reside in the magician's belly which is the seat of memory. 
When required the spells are summoned to the larynx which is 
the seat of intelligence and from there they are given 
voice. Magic is expressed in words and words have their 
specific location in the larynx. In this way, magic is en- 
shrined in the body of man and can only be handed from one 
to another by strict rules of initiation and instruction. 
Magic never resides in nature acting independently of man 
but dwells in him and works only for him [Malinowski 1982b, 
p. 76]. The Trobriander is an appropriate instrument for the 
operation of magic with his spatially differentiated body. 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how it is that 
magical discourses have their possibility in the figures of 
the episteme. Magic shares this possibility with the other 
discursive realms that have been explored so far. Further- 
more, magical practices are outlined in terms of the power 
axis where there are magical rites focusing on sex, garden- 
ing, birth, etc. which help to deploy and maintain those 
formations. Magic in the primitive world is the most immedi- 
ate and ubiquitous example of the operation of a link be- 
tween power and knowledge. Magic is powerful because it is a 
means for directly operating on the world. This causal 
nature gives it its prominent role and it possesses this 
character because of the properties of primitive knowledge 
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in general. 
6.2 Magical discourse. 
Tambiah believes that language is not just used with a 
communicative function in magical ritual. For instance, in 
Buddhist magical rituals words are chanted aloud that are 
not understood by much of the congregation [Tambiah 1968, 
p. 197]. These chants are not nonsensical and Tambiah at- 
tempts to formulate a general statement about the belief in 
the magical power of sacred words. There are three postu- 
lates about the value of magical words that are represented 
in Trobriand thought. Firstly, magic appeared with the first 
ancestors and was not invented or tampered with by man. It 
was handed over to man whose descendants inherited it in 
unbroken succession [Tambiah 1968, p. 183]. The Trobrianders 
believe in the primeval natural existence of magic. However, 
they also believe that magic can only retain its efficiency 
by an absolutely unmodified transmission. Any alteration 
from the original pattern would be fatal EMalinowski 1982b, 
p. 751. This is because primitive knowledge relies an tradi- 
tion rather than a form of reflection for its transmission 
and maintenance. Secondly, the Trobrianders conceive of 
magic as an essentially human possession. The human belly is 
the seat of magic which can only escape by being voiced 
[Tambiah 1968, p. 1841. Thirdly, the Trobrianders believe 
that magical formulae, once voiced, influence the course of 
events. This means that the first ancestors, or their equiv- 
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alents, instituted speech and the classifying activity. This 
aspect of magic corresponds to the domain of myth which 
relates stories about ancestors and magic. Man is the user 
of this propensity and this belief about magic broadly 
corresponds to the ritual or magical system itself, that is, 
the linguistic structure of the sacred words. Language has 
an independent existence and has the power to influence 
reality. This corresponds to the level of the behaviour of 
magicians, their sacred status, their links with ancestors 
and their special behaviour and preparations which make 
their rites effective [Tambiah 1968, p. 184]. 
Tambiah defines magical ritual as a complex of words 
and actions that include the manipulation of objects, and 
tries to show precisely the interconnection between words 
and actions. In doing this, he criticises Malinowskils views 
on language which can be roughly divided into two related 
theories, one pertaining to 'an ethnographic theory of 
language' in general and the other pertaining to the lan- 
guage of magic in particular [Tambiah 1968, p. 185]. The main 
feature of Malinowskils general theory was the pragmatic 
character of language where language was regarded as a hard- 
worked tool for practical living. Because he made no dis- 
tinction between language and speech, Malinowski viewed 
words as a part of action and equivalents to actions. lie 
believed that the effective force of general verbal acts lay 
in their ability to reproduce their consequences [Tambiah 
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1968, p. 185]. Malinowski was criticised for confusing the 
context of the situation with other levels of analysis 
pertaining to language. He had argued that words had no 
existence and that texts divorced from'context were meaning- 
less. Yet he provided word for word translations in Coral 
Gardens and Their Magic [Tambiah 1968, p. 185]. For Malinow- 
ski, the basis of verbal magic was 'the creative metaphor of 
magic' which he interpreted to mean that the repetitive 
statement of certain words were believed by the natives to 
produce the reality stated [Tambiah 1968, p. 186]. Malinowski 
concluded from this approach that magical language was 
objectively a delusion and sought a kind of rational justi- 
fication for the false use of magical language in individual 
psychology [Tambiah 1968, p. 186]. However, he also believed 
that language gave man a sense of power over his environ- 
ment. He believed that both ordinary and magical language 
engendered the belief in the creative force and pragmatic 
power of words which he traced to childhood experience 
ETambiah 1968, p. 186]. Tambiah holds that this biographical 
theory is question-begging because the notion of language is 
prior to a child's comprehension of language. Adults reply 
to sounds as meaningful and direct a child's efforts at 
communication and this results in the child learning the 
concept and use of language [Tambiah 1968, p. 186]. 
Tambiah claims that Trobriand magical language is 
intelligible language and is not qualitatively different 
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from ordinary language, but is a heightened version of it. 
The same laws of association that apply to ordinary language 
apply to magical language [Tambiah 1968, p. 188]. Further, he 
believes that Trobriand magic is a clear case of a system 
that combines word and deed. Therefore, an analysis should 
find a way of linking words and actions. 
The form of knowledge that corresponds to the primitive 
episteme is that of divination. Divination demands that the 
location of the sign be identified so that it can function 
as a sign and it can be transformed in meaning by being 
operated on with relation to the guiding codes of the epis- 
teme. We have seen an example of this when possessions are 
deflected through the mother so that they become the sign 
for the inheritor's wealth. Another example is available in 
the displacement of the yam through the chief so that it can 
function as the sign for primitive wealth. Here the sign 
finds its place within a particular boundary that can be 
manipulated. In the transformation of signs, the world of 
things can be changed since signs are themselves things in 
the world rather than ideational representations. This is 
how primitives effect change in a divinational context. 
The understanding of signs in the primitive world is 
not a question of interpreting the intentions of the speak- 
er. The meaning of the sign does not lie in an idiosyncratic 
idea in the mind of a speaker. The meaning of signs is 
contained in the larynx. The understanding of signs is in- 
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volved with their manipulation and the mode of their trans- 
portation into the world on the breath and from one place 
to another. Thus, topology is crucial to meaning. The manip- 
ulation from larynx to object takes the form of primitive 
magic where there is a desire to change the order of signs 
in the world and it is here that magic is efficacious. The 
sign of sickness can be placed where it had hitherto been 
absent; desire can be placed in the heart of the disinter- 
ested; a child can be placed in the womb of a woman. 
Tambiah differentiates between the semantics of ritual 
which is concerned with the manner in which spells are 
constructed and the pragmatics where the ritual is analysed 
in terms of how it relates to other activities, the context 
of the practice and its consequences for various segments of 
society [Tambiah 1968, p. 189]. In order to analyse the 
semantics of Trobriand magic, Tambiah employs Jakobson's 
notion of metaphor and metonymy. Metaphor is more than a 
conventional sign because it highlights a resemblance. I 
suggest that the metaphoric differentiations within resem- 
blance, outlined in chapter three, be added to this defini- 
tion, that is, asymmetry, enclosure, and continuity. The 
metaphoric function of language exploits the procedures of 
selection and substitution by which words replace one anoth- 
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1 
er in terms of semantic similarity [Tambiah 1968, p. 189] 
This means that the spell can exploit the metaphorical 
function of language, which makes the transfer from an 
attribute to a recipient. This is a normal use of language 
[Tambiah 1968, p. 189]. 
While metaphor is a form of substitution, metonymy is a 
case of a part standing for the whole on the contiguity 
(convenience) principle and complements metaphor [Tambiah 
1968, p. 189]. The constituent units of the recipient of 
magic are enumerated and the transfer is made to each of 
them. This metonymic technique transmits through the redun- 
2 
dancy that"is characteristic of oral discourse and causes 
the spell to be quite lengthy [Tambiah 1968, p. 1901. Both 
metaphoric and metonymic procedures are accompanied in magic 
by action. Objects are used as vehicles of transfer through 
contagious action. These vehicles express substitution 
(resemblance) and contiguity (convenience) principles 
[Tambiah 1968, p. 190]. This is the divinational set. 
Divinational knowledge is appropriate to a general 
episteme that is based on the topological imposition of 
asymmetrical opposition, enclosure and convenience. The 
operation of conveniences is acknowledged in magic with the 
1.1 have examined these substituting relations in chapter 
three. 
2.1 will be discussing this and other features of oral 
discourse in more detail in the next chapter. 
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use of mats to contain the flow of signs. We will come 
across examples of this in rites governing pregnancy and 
child birth. Enclosure is recognised by placing evil witches 
in the darkest recesses of the jungle outside the sanctity 
of the village. The central opposition between the brother 
and sister that defines the regularity of sexual taboos, 
kinship laws, permissible marriage, perversions, inheritance 
and economic practices is a boundary that is the focus of 
the central assault of dangerous love magic. Thus magic as 
divination, which is the primitive form of knowledge, 
threatens the very order of things while making the knowl- 
edge of that very order possible through the nature of the 
sign. The divinational figures of the episteme make the 
order of the primitive experience possible in its problemat- 
isation of sexual, economic and magical discourses in terms 
of the regularity of the brother/sister opposition while 
simultaneously providing the means for endangering that 
very order from within by the application of magic to elimi- 
nate the oppositions and collapse the primitive world into a 
single point. This tension provides primitive discourses 
with an essential dynamic space between the limits of pros- 
perous marriage on the one hand and the evils of magic on 
the other. 
For every magical rite there is a counter-rite. This 
corresponds to black and white magic. Amongst the Trobriand- 
ers every single magical act is believed to have a counter- 
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act which, when stronger, can eliminate the effects of the 
initial act. In certain types of magic, such as that con- 
cerning health and disease, when the sorcerer learns a 
performance for causing a disease, he will learn the formu- 
la to annul the evil effects at the same time [Malinowski 
1982b, p. 86]. The presence of counter-magic expresses the 
opposition manifested in magic between the twin forces of 
black and white, disease and healing, sorcerers and witches, 
love and hate. 
Malinowski does not regard the presence of these oppo- 
sitions in magical discourse to be consistent with Trobriand 
knowledge in general. on the contrary, the ability to ac- 
count for the failures of magic in terms of a lapse of 
memory, inaccuracy in performance or the presence of coun- 
ter-magic allows Malinowski to describe magic as a pseudo- 
science [Malinowski 1982b, p. 87]. He believes that it is not 
hard to detect the spurious character of this pseudo-science 
since it is based on the specific experiences of emotional 
states which are not based on reason. Magic is based on the 
belief that hope cannot fail nor desire deceive [Malinowski 
1982b, p. 871. 
It is not part of archaeological analysis to investi- 
gate discourses for a single manifestation of rationality or 
to demonstrate how they fall short of the rigorous nature of 
physics and mathematics which traditionally are taken as 
paradigmatic examples of the operation of reason. Archaeolo- 
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gy investigates discourses for the conditions of their 
emergence, propagation and maintenance. Magic has a shared 
possibility in the primitive episteme with the other dis- 
courses we have examined. Magic is not analysed for its 
logic so that it can be placed amongst native superstitions. 
It is examined to show its shared positivity in the episteme 
which characterises primitive reason. Malinowski's views 
concerning magic are based on the banal observation that 
magical knowledge is not scientific. Such an approach fails 
to account for the central role of magic in native dis- 
courses. 
6.3 The magical rite. 
It is possible to distinguish between magic which forms 
a system and that which consists of unconnected formulae. A 
system of magic is one in which a number of formulae form a 
consecutive whole. This whole is connected with activities 
which are part of a large organic total directed towards the 
same end. Garden magic forms a system since every formula is 
connected with some activity. No single formula of such a 
system is effective since they must all be recited succes- 
sively and each must mark off some phase of the given activ- 
ity [Malinowski 1982b, p. 211]. The most effective magical 
rite takes the form of a connected number of formulae. 
In Coral Gardens and Their Magic, Malinowski offers a 
detailed analysis of the language used in the magical spells 
of harvesting [Malinowski 1935 pp. 170-181]. Also, in Argo- 
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nauts of The Western Pacific, he shows by means of a lin- 
guistic analysis what sort of words are believed to exercise 
magical power. We have already observed the topological 
divisions of the anatomy of sexual desire between the ulula, 
the tapwana and the dogina in chapter four. We find these 
divisions again operating in the anatomy of the magical 
spell. Here Malinowski describes the ulula as short, cut- 
ting, pithy expressions; the key words of the tapwana are 
verbal and adverbial expressions of locality. The dogina 
contains explicit allusion to specific locations and shows 
the usual crescendo characteristic of the ending of spells. 
In the dogina the most outstanding trait is the use of 
onomatopoetic sounds. The belief in this type of convenience 
in oral signs results in the peculiarities of the language 
used in magical spells. 
The performance of magical rites in the primitive 
experience can be divided into two typical elements. First- 
ly, there is the delivery of the magical spell. The spell 
consists of phonetic effects which are taken to be imita- 
tions of natural sounds such as the whistling of the wind, 
animal voices, the roaring of the sea, etc. These sounds 
function as signs for the imitated phenomena. Further, words 
are used that invoke, state, or command the desired aim. 
This means that the sorcerer must mention all the symptoms 
of the disease which he wishes to inflict. Spells are built 
on the same pattern as the rites and the words are selected 
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for the substances of the magic. 
According to Malinowski in Magic, Science and Religion, 
the main virtue of all magic resides in the spell. The rite 
functions only to transmit the spell. It is in the formulae 
that the ideas concerning magic are found [Malinowski 1982b, 
p. 196]. The formulae contain frequent mention of ancestral 
names and many begin with long lists of such names as an 
invocation. The spells are passed from generation to genera- 
tion, inherited from father to son in the paternal line or 
from kadala (maternal uncle) to nephew in the maternal line 
which is the real line of kinship descent. 
Some magic is associated with a particular locality. 
These spells cannot be passed from any one person to anoth- 
er. All the systems of garden magic belong to this class as 
do magical spells connected with certain places endowed with 
magical properties. Examples of these spells are rain magic 
of the weika (grove) of Kasanali and the official war magic 
of the Kiriwina that is performed by the men belonging to 
Kuiabuaga [Malinowski 1982b, p. 197]. 
The class of magical spells that are not bound up with 
locations and can be passed from any one person to another 
is very small. To this class belong the spells of medicine; 
healing and inflicting illness. Love magic, magic for remov- 
ing the bad effects of incest, and canoe making magic also 
belong to this class but they have a location myth always 
associated with them [Malinowski 1982b, p. 197]. Consistent 
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with the knowledge of kinship, acceptable sexual activity, 
marriage and gardening, the knowledge of magical spells is 
involved in the same topological order: the more important 
magic is local both in character and transmission. 
There is an element in every spell to which there is no 
counterpart in ritual. These are the mythological allusions 
and references to ancestors from whom this magic has been 
received [Malinowski 1982b, p. 74]. In the case of any impor- 
tant magic, there is a myth accounting for its existence. 
These myths tell where and when a magical rite became the 
possession of man in general and how it became the property 
of a local clan. These are not strictly origin myths in the 
same way that the emergence myths of the clans are not 
strict accounts of origin, since the clans already existed 
underground. The primitive conception of the world with its 
perpetual enclosed spaces does not allow for a strict con- 
ception of genesis. This underlines the distinct priority 
that spatial concerns have over temporal order in the model. 
Magic was never invented. The spell, the rite, and the thing 
which they govern are coeval [Malinowski 1982b, p. 75]. 
Amongst the Trobrianders, all magic comes from a time when 
humanity lived underground and magic was a natural knowl- 
edge. It is part of the original endowment of man. The 
mythical references provide the primitive condition of 
validity for the magical rites in the same way that mythical 
references'provide the condition of validity for primitive 
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discourses in general. 
In The Foundation of Faith and Morals, Malinowski ad- 
dresses the problem of accounting for the tendency for dogma 
to develop into a story. The story is the means by which 
knowledge and beliefs are maintained and propagated in an 
oral culture. Malinowski claims that a knowledge of the 
mythological past supplies primitive man with both the 
incentive and justification for ritual action. It also 
furnishes both a body of indications and directions for the 
correct performance of sacred acts [Malinowski 1936, p. 13). 
Here Malinowski attributes myths with both the conditions of 
validity and the conditions for maintaining primitive 
knowledge and institutions. In Myth in Primitive Psychology, 
Malinowski directly addresses the role of myth in the lives 
of the natives where the primitive discourses are presented 
in a form that is involved with myth. 
Malinowski tells us that the Society for the Compara- 
tive Study of Myth founded in Berlin in 1906, which included 
such scholars as Ehrenreich, Siecke and Winckler, regarded 
the moon as the producer of myths in man's imagination. 
others, like Frobenius, regarded the sun as the subject 
around which myths were symbolically constructed and, then 
again, there were the meteorological interpreters who main- 
tained that wind, weather and the colour of the skies were 
the essence of myth [Malinowski 1926, p. 13]. In contrast to 
this extreme naturalistic account of myth, the Historical 
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School in Germany promoted the belief that a sacred tale was 
a true historical record of the past. This view, Malinowski 
correctly contends, endows primitive man with a scientific 
impulse for knowledge [Malinowski 1926, p. 15-16]. Since the 
primitive episteme is static and without an area for the 
possibility for reflection, this view of myths is anachro- 
nistic. Finally, there is the psychoanalytic interpretation 
that regards the myth as a day-dream of the race which can 
only be explained by ignoring nature, history and culture 
[Malinowski 1926, p. 18-19]. Such an approach is the counter- 
point to the present analysis. Malinowski concluded that 
myths are not symbolic but a direct expression of their 
subject-matter; they are narratives of a primeval reality 
[Malinowski 1926, p. 231. A myth is not an intellectual 
explanation but a charter of faith [Malinowski 1926, p. 23]. 
Indeed, we might concur by regarding myths as a proclamation 
of faith in the efficacy of the magical rite. They provide 
the ultimate ground of validity and objectivity appropriate 
to the forms of primitive knowledge. But this gives them an 
intellectual role despite Malinowski's claims. They have 
this function because oral discourses are grounded in tradi- 
tion rather than reflection. The obligations of the epistem- 
ic codes on knowledge provide all intellectual activity with 
an ultimate ground in either resemblance, representation, 
agency, etc. However, this ground is only articulated retro- 
spectively in archaeology and is not available to the par- 
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ticular actors. This foundation provides that which is to 
count as the appropriate form of reason for that episteme. 
We have seen this form of reason in the figures of the 
Trobriand episteme. 
Apart from myth there is another class of primitive 
discourse in the form of folk-tales. In Sex and Repression 
1 
in Savage Society, Malinowski addresses folk-lore in rela- 
tion to the typical sentiments of the matrilineal family 
[Malinowski 1927b, p. 104]. He also takes interest in stereo- 
typed modes of abuse in the form of incestuous swearing. The 
natives have three incestuous expressions: kwoy inam (cohab- 
it with your mother); kwoy lumuta, (cohabit with your 
sister); and kwoy umlkwava (cohabit with your wife). The 
first is a mild form of abuse, the second more serious and 
the third regarded as extremely abusive. Here, the cause of 
offence is proportional to the plausibility and the reality 
of the act [Malinowski 1927b, p. 106]. Malinowski summarises 
the distinction between a folk-tale, a legend and a myth in 
the following way. The folk-tale is a seasonal performance 
and an act of sociability: the legend opens up past histori- 
cal vistas: the myth comes into play when rite or ceremony 
-------------------- 
1. In this work Malinowski confesses to attempting to psy- 
cho-analyse the natives. He admits of his difficulties with 
orthodox techniques but is oblivious of the fact that the 
natives could not have constructed their selves in the same 
way as Freud's patients. I ignore Malinowskils analysis in 
terms of the repressed self and only make use of his writ- 
ings here for their ethnographic detail. 
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demands Justification, reality and sanctity [Malinowski 
1926, p. 391. We can conclude from this that sacred stories 
are not merely fictitious narratives but are a statement of 
the primitive reality. Myths are not to the Trobrianders 
what stories are to us. They are involved with producing 
truths in that society. Myths provide the conditions for the 
maintenance and deployment of primitive knowledge and the 
conditions for the validity of that knowledge. Wagner analy- 
ses myth as a metaphoric sequence that has power through 
setting up its own world of contradistinction where myth 
, remakes' the realm of morality and facts in its own terms. 
The power of a myth lies in its ability to elicit and compel 
the moral and factual without being of them [Wagner 1978, 
p. 33]. 
In mythology and legend, three categories can be dis- 
tinguished. First, there are myths on the origin of man and 
clan kinship; second, there are myths about heroic deeds, 
the establishment of customs and institutions; third, there 
are myths associated with definite forms of magic [Malinow- 
ski 1927b, p. 108]. 
In the first category, the matrilineal character of the 
Trobriand culture can be observed in the myths about the 
emergence of man, the establishment of chieftainship and 
totemic divisions. We have already seen that the first 
ancestor is always a woman, sometimes accompanied by her 
brother. This woman begins the line of her descendants by 
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exposing her sexual organs to the rain, drips of water from 
stalactites in grottoes, or a fish bites her while bathing 
in the sea [Malinowski 1927b, p. 109]. These myths reveal the 
spontaneous procreative powers of the woman. The father does 
not exist in any part of the mythological world [Malinowski 
1927b, p. 1091. 
In the second class of myths, the most important is 
that of Tudava, a hero born of a virgin who was impregnated 
by a drop of water from a stalactite. The introduction of 
agriculture is attributed to him but the main deed of the 
1 
hero is the slaying of an ogre 
In the third class of myth, there exists an intimate 
connection with magic [Nalinowski 1927b, p. 117]. Most of the 
super-normal power displayed by the heroes in myths is due 
to their knowledge of magic. Magic is dependent upon myth 
and almost every type of spell has its mythological founda- 
tion. Myth lives in magic. Magic shapes and maintains many 
types of institutions and practices and, in this way, myth 
exercises its power upon these institutions and practices. 
An important myth in this category, which I have already 
sketched in chapter four, concerns the origin of love magic 
which is involved with the matrilineal complex. 
Among the many forms of love magic, that of sulumwoya 
is the most important. It is very potent and the formula has 
-------------------- 
1. For an account of this heroic deed see pages 111-112 in 
Sex and Repression in Savage Society. 
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a high price when purchased by a native or used on his 
behalf. This magic is localised in two centres, one of which 
lies on the eastern shore of the main island and the second 
one on the western island of Iwa. A myth of magic and love 
connects these two places. We have already seen how this 
myth accounts for the origin of love magic in terms of an 
incestuous act between brother and sister. 
6.4 Magic and sex. 
Magic has a double relationship with sex: there is an 
association between magic and sex where sex is the object 
of its application; and there is a relationship between 
magic and the sex of the performer. Both of these connec- 
tions demonstrate the shared positivity between the realm of 
magic and the realm of sex. Both types of discourses have a 
regularity determined by the guiding themes of the episteme. 
The first type of connection between sex and magic, where 
sex is the focus of the magical rites, provides us with 
examples of similarly regulated discursive formations deter- 
mined by topological boundaries. The regularity is given in 
terms of a focus on the brother/sister boundary. In the 
second type of affiliation between sex and magic, where sex 
is related to magic in terms of the question of the sexual 
nature of the performer, we have examples of the operation 
of the axis of power. The problematisation of the sexual 
identity of the magical performer arises because of the 
presence of the divisions of the bounded figures of the 
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episteme. We have already seen that these two areas of 
discourses and power form the two axes which are the general 
focus of this particular archaeology. 
The first type of connection between sex and magic 
occurs where sex is the target of magical spells and offers 
an example of a shared regularity in terms of the division 
between brother and sister which is a motif central to the 
primitive problematisation of sex. The most prominent focus 
of magic in the field of sex is in the area of sexual de- 
sire. 
There are a number of different systems of magic oper- 
ating amongst the Trobrianders. Each system is identifiable 
by being able to be related to a particular place. The most 
famous one is that of Kayroliwa with the systems of Kwoygap- 
ani and Libomatu from the islands of Vakuta and Kayleula 
respectively being prominent [Malinowski 1982a, p. 314]. The 
magic of love, connected with the erotic life of the Trobri- 
anders and governing sexual desire, also belongs to a system 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 304]. Love magic is regarded as the 
only means of wooing. All success is attributed to the use 
of successful formulae while all failure is attributable to 
inadequate performance of the spells or the presence of 
counter-magic. Success in love is only attributed to precise 
and strong magic [Malinowski 1982a, p. 316]. All marriages 
are brought about by the application of magic. This is 
further evidence against Malinowski's claims that marriage 
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had a significant basis in sentimental attachment [Malinow- 
ski 1982a, p. 66-67]. The individual will is everywhere gov- 
ernable by magic and, therefore, has no significant role to 
play in the context of the operation of magic. 
Love charms have to contend with a magic of estrange- 
ment which acts in the opposite direction [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 319]. This is a form of black magic, bulubwalata. This 
magic acts upon the feelings and destroys the affection of 
one person for another. An effected woman leaves her house, 
her village and wanders away. It is worth noting here that 
emotions are also spatially involved where emotional close- 
ness is equivalent to physical proximity. A mild form of the 
magic causes a girl to leave her husband or lover and return 
to her own village. A strong form of this magic will cause 
the girl to run away to the bush and perhaps disappear 
forever [Malinowski 1982a, p. 319]. The magic of the bulubwa- 
lata cannot be undone by love magic. However, within its own 
system there is a possible remedy. The magician can recite 
formula towards north, east, south and west so that the 
magical virtue might reach the girl wandering in the bush 
and cause her to return [Malinowski 1982a, p. 322]. 
There is a class of dreams that are prescribed and 
defined by custom and these are expected of certain people 
by virtue of their position or as a consequence of magic 
that they have performed, or which has been performed upon 
them [Malinowski 1982a, p. 326]. A significant role is 
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played by visions of departed spirits in these standardised 
dreams. The appearance in dreams is one of the main ways in 
which these spirits manifest their existence to the living. 
The appearance may be sasopa (an illusion) or a real baloma 
(spirit). Real spirits always come with a purpose and under 
conditions that can be expected [Malinowski 1982a, p. 327]. 
All true dreams are in response to magic or to spiritual 
influence, and are not spontaneous. An important class of 
ancestral visitations are associated with the act of magic, 
in which we have seen spirits play a significant part. A 
magician is liable to dream about his enterprise under the 
control of spirits. Thus the master of the gardens will 
learn of an impending drought or storm [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 329]. Erotic dreams are the response to certain charms. In 
fact, dreams of a sexual or erotic nature are always at- 
tributed to magic. If a boy or girl dreams of sexual union 
with a person of the opposite sex it means that that person 
has performed love magic since it is characteristic that the 
dream takes place in the mind of the object of the spell and 
not in the mind of the performer [Malinowski 1982a, p. 331]. 
Dreams of an incestuous nature form a very important 
class and especially those concerning the brother-sister 
taboo. The occurrence of incestuous dreams associates sex 
and the magic of love with incest. However, incestuous 
dreams are always explained as an accidental misuse of magic 
or magic wrongly performed with regard to the dreamer 
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[Malinowski 1982a, p. 332]. 
In the second link between sex and magic, the sex of a 
magician is a relevant factor in the practice of magical 
rituals. The magician has immense influence over other 
tribesmen since magic is the most efficient and frequently 
used instrument for the deployment of power and persons with 
magical knowledge share in this power. Women are debarred 
from land ownership and many public privileges since they 
have no place in tribal gatherings and no voice in delibera- 
tions on gardening, hunting, fishing, war, overseas expedi- 
tions, trade, festivities and dances [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 31]. We might be tempted to conclude from this that women 
are entirely excluded from the exercise of power. In the 
realm of wealth, we saw that while men wield plutocratic 
power women determine its distribution and, in this way, 
retain a relationship to power. Furthermore, in chapter two, 
we saw that the figure of power appropriate to archaeology 
is not one that simply includes or excludes people. The 
power configuration appropriate to archaeology has a produc- 
tive nature. The realm of magic provides a regime of power 
most suited to the archaeological analysis since it is here 
that we find both men and women participating. In the area. 
of witchcraft, women are attributed a more potent capacity 
than men for evil which may be acquired through their sexual 
liaisons with evil beings. Their power functions under the 
cover of darkness and in the most hidden parts of the jun- 
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gle. Women have the capacity for a negative potency on this 
sinister side; a power that is always negative but must only 
be seen to be positive in the form of healing. 
In the field of magic, women have a power restored to 
them that prevents them from being mere objects in the world 
to be moved around freely. They have a further association 
with power in being in the place from whence children come 
and in their special relationship to their brothers. These 
three spatial characteristics form the problematization of 
the role of women in primitive thought. We have already 
examined the peculiarity of the relationship between women 
and their brothers and the singular role of women in propa- 
gation. Women also have a particular capacity for witch- 
craft. 
Women, in the field of megwa (magic), have a capacity 
for a special knowledge of the darker side of life and, 
therefore, the capacity for a special power. Fortune or 
failure, dearth or plenty, health or disease are caused by 
the appropriate magic correctly applied in the proper cir- 
cumstances. Magic consists of spells and rites performed by 
a person who is entitled by the fulfilment of several condi- 
tions to perform them [Malinowski 1982a, p. 35]. Magical 
power resides in the words of the formula and the function 
of the rite, which, as a rule, is simply to convey the 
magicians breath, charged with the power of the words, to 
the object or person to be affected. This is because, as we 
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have seen, words are things in the world like other things 
and have their own locations. The magical power of predic- 
tion lies in the ability to manipulate the boundaries of the 
things in the world. Here the words of the magician are 
located on the breath and are transported from inside the 
magician to a new location by breathing. This means that the 
place of the magician in the order of things is a key factor 
in the type of magic that will be practised. Women occupy 
their own place in the order of things and this place deter- 
mines the nature of the spell 
The most distinct allocation of magical powers to the 
sexes is to be found in the dreaded forces of sorcery. The 
magic of illness, health and death can be made by men and 
women alike but its character depends on the sex of the 
-------------------- 
1. Since magic is so intimately bound up with the activities 
which it accompanies, the division of functions between the 
sexes involves a corresponding division in magical perform- 
ance. The following table outlines these divisions. 
Division of Magic between the Sexes. 
Male: gardening, fishing, hunting, canoe building, exchange, 
weather, wind, war, safety at sea, wood carving, sorcery. 
Female: rites of first pregnancy, skirt making, prevention 
of dangers at birth, toothache, elephantiasis, swellings, 
affections of the genitals, abortion, female witchcraft. 
Mixed: Beauty magic, love magic, private garden magic 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 37]. 
We can see from this that the outcome of a task does not 
depend on the individual skills but on the magic involved. 
The role of the individual in knowledge does not function 
here. 
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practitioner. Men and women each have their own sorcery, 
carried on by means of different rites and formulae, acting 
in a different way on the victims body and associated with 
different beliefs [Malinowski 1982a, p. 38]. 
The male sorcerer's magic is much more concrete than 
the female's. The sorcerer's devices are restricted to his 
power of vanishing at will, of emitting a shining glow from 
his body, and of having accomplices amongst the nocturnal 
birds [Malinowski 1982a, p. 38]. However, a female sorcerer, 
or witch, who is always a real woman and not a spiritual or 
non-human being, has an invisible double who goes out on her 
nightly errands. She can fly through the air and appears as 
a falling star; she assumes the shape of a fire-fly, or a 
night bird or a flying fox; she can hear and smell at enor- 
mous distances; she feeds on corpses. This means that the 
female witch has the power to transgress specific bound- 
aries in space and subverts the assignation of limitations 
and values available in the episteme. She gains her signifi- 
cant powers in this association with vague boundaries. This 
ability to overcome the constraints of space empowers the 
magic of the witch. A witch ceases to be confined to a 
particular place in the world, since her invisible double 
can traverse distances in flight and can hear and smell 
across distances. This subversion of the ordered world is 
not practised openly but is done under the cover of dark- 
ness. 
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The disease that witches cause is almost always incura- 
ble and extremely rapid in its action reflecting the witch's 
greater efficacy. The power of the wizard is much less 
effective and he can only hope to inflict a lingering dis- 
ease. However, there is little chance of combating a witch 
even if the help of another witch is sought immediately. A 
witch may receive payment for healing but she must never 
undertake to kill for a fee. Here again she differs from her 
male counterpart who derives the greater part of his income 
from black magic [Malinowski 1982a, p. 39]. Male black magic 
is less threatening because it is more distinctly linked 
with the boundaries associated with the male body. 
Several systems of magic are hereditary, each in a 
special sub-clan, and such a system is possessed by that 
sub-clan since the time that the clan came from under the 
ground. This hereditary magical power is handed on in the 
female line, though it is exercised by men alone. In only a 
few cases can this hereditary magic be practised by women 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 351. Again we have an example of the 
female body acting as a means for the distribution of pow- 
ers. 
Female witchcraft is inherited from mother to daughter 
and an early initiation has to take place. Some women, in 
later life, are said to have sexual relations with non- 
human evil beings, or spirits, called tauvalu who bring 
epidemics and other ills upon the people. These tauvalu 
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further instruct witches in the arts of evil, and these 
witches are particularly feared [Malinowski 1982a, p. 40]. 
Such witches are known as yoyova [Malinowski 1982a, p. 3601. 
This is an example of an operation on the boundary of the 
female essence through the sexual orifices by spirits when 
women and evil spirits come together in sexual intercourse. 
Here we find wholly negative potential in the bodies of 
women that are moved towards the darkest possibilities of 
the primitive order. 
It can be seen from this brief outline that the sexual 
identity of the magician emerges from the particularity of 
the primitive order. Because each place in the world is 
assigned an essence and because each operation on signs is 
effected by a place in, the world, the place of the performer 
of the magical rite is relevant. Sexual identity is related 
to the general topology and, in this way, the sex of the 
magician enters into the concerns of the primitive deploy- 
ment of a regime of power through magic. 
6.5 Magic and reproduction. 
After magic has succeeded in bringing a couple together 
in marriage, since all things happen because of occult 
causes, the next call on magic is in getting the woman 
pregnant. We have already seen how the woman takes the 
appropriate steps to reproduce. Pregnancy is first indicated 
when a woman dreams that the spirit of one of her kinswomen 
brings her a child from the island of Tuma. 
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A pregnancy robe is made by the tabugu (the girl's 
father's matrilineal kinswomen) for the pregnant woman. Four 
garments have to be made: two long mantles and two skirts. 
one of the mantles is to be worn at the initial celebration 
of first pregnancy and the second when the mother first 
appears in public after giving birth. The two skirts are 
also for use after the birth [Malinowski 1982a, p. 181]. When 
the garments are completed, the work passes to the magical 
stage. Magic is an essential part of the production when 
something is to be endowed with definite properties and 
powers [Malinowski 1982a, p. 181]. 
In the magical rite, a mat is spread on the ground and 
the four pregnancy garments are placed upon it. The magician 
knells low over white lily-leaves sprinkled on the robes and 
speaks the magical words into both leaves and robes [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p. 181]. The spell is divided into the ulula, 
tapwana and dogina partitions. In the ulula, a white bird is 
invited to hover over the village. In the tapwana, this bird 
is invited to make the robe and all the parts of the child's 
body beautiful. In the dogina, the bird is invoked to empow- 
er the creek and the water hole to whiten the woman's face 
when she bathes there [Malinowski 1982a, p. 182]. The four 
robes, together with the leaves, are then covered with 
another mat so that the magic might not be dispersed. The 
use of mats is significant. We have seen that magical formu- 
lae have a definite location in space. Since they originate 
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in the larynx and are transmitted on the breath, the magi- 
cian has to place her mouth close to that which is to be 
charmed. The mat an the ground has the function of separat- 
ing that which is to be charmed from the continuity of the 
world in general. The world is a vague and, therefore, 
powerful boundary which cannot easily be manipulated by the 
witches spell. The mat prevents the ineffectual dispersal of 
the spell into the ground. Likewise, the mat placed on top 
prevents the spell from being dispersed into the air. The 
use of the mat provides a well defined boundary which is 
easily altered during the magical ritual. 
on the day following the charming of the robes, the 
pregnant woman is escorted to the seashore (or water hole 
for inland villages) by the tabula (paternal relatives) 
EMalinowski 1982a, p. 184]. If a woman is of high rank, she 
will be carried all of the way to the shore EMalinowski 
1982a, p. 185]. The expectant mother walks on a bridge made 
from the arms of her tabula from which she jumps down into 
the water and is thoroughly cleaned by the tabula splashing 
her [Malinowski 1982a, p. 185]. After this drenching, she is 
brought on to the shore and placed on a mat. From this 
moment on, she is completely isolated from the earth and 
must not touch the soil with her feet [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 1861. It is important that the mother should not be 
allowed to touch the ground. Contact with the ground would 
result in an effective operation on her body as a boundary. 
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An operation on this boundary would cause the magical charms 
that invest the pregnant woman's body to leave and would 
also cause the fetus to become associated with a location 
other than the mother. By isolating the mother from the 
continuity of the world in general, stable qualities can be 
maintained in the unborn child. 
The bathing ceremony is followed by beauty magic which 
has no direct connection with pregnancy or the pregnancy 
robes [Malinowski 1982a, p. 187]. Only after the beauty magic 
has been performed can the pregnancy rite proper, the in- 
vestment with the long robe, be carried out. The tabula 
place one of the pregnancy robes on the shoulders of the 
pregnant woman and the formulae used in the making of it are 
repeated [Malinowski 1982a, p. 188]. 
The pregnant girl is carried to her father's house and 
she is placed on a small raised platform. It is customary 
for a woman of the rank of chieftain to be carried to her 
maternal uncle's house where she is placed on a high plat- 
form [Malinowski 1982a, p. 188]. While seated on the plat- 
form, she must remain motionless, she must not speak and any 
food that she eats must be placed in her mouth since she is 
not allowed to touch it. Water for washing her skin is 
brought to her in a wooden bowl or else she is carried back 
to the water's edge and placed on a mat. After sunset, she 
is allowed to rest in her father's house. The next day she 
must resume her position on the platform and observe all of 
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the previous day's taboos. This ceremonial vigil is repeat- 
ed for between three and five days [Malinowski 1982a, 
p. 188]. These taboos focus on the boundary between the body 
of the pregnant woman and the world in general. They func- 
tion to maintain a separation between the body and the world 
when the woman is in this vulnerable condition. We have 
previously seen how the taboos of incest and those concern- 
ing food have likewise focused on vulnerable boundaries. 
The pregnant girl may then return to her husband's 
house for a few more months; or she may remain in the house 
of her father or maternal uncle. She dresses in the saykeulo 
(pregnancy mantle) until it is worn out which is usually 
after about two months [Malinowski 1982a, p. 189]. Malinow- 
ski attributes the purpose of the ceremony to whitening the 
skin of the pregnant woman since the saykeulo keeps the sun 
off the skin [Malinowski 1982a, p. 191]. There is a minor 
ceremony where the father of the pregnant woman chooses some 
particularly good food and carries it to certain women who 
are known to possess evil magic that blackens the skin of 
the expectant girl. He gives these women the food in an 
attempt to forestall any evil intentions that they might be 
harbouring [Malinowski 1982a, p-1901. However, the whiten- 
ing of the skin is not its entire function. I suggest that 
the function of this cumbersome mantle is to maintain a 
distinct boundary around the body of the woman which is the 
place which characterises the nature of the child. This 
271 
mantle is invested with magical properties which assist it 
in this function. We can see from this example that the 
focus and efficacy of primitive magic is aimed at the main- 
tenance and alteration of the bounded regions of the epis- 
teme by operating on the signs for those places which them- 
selves have a definite location in the world. 
The work, the magic, and the ritual are performed by 
the female relatives of the father. The mother's brother, 
the brother, and the other maternal kinsmen of the pregnant 
woman distribute the food immediately after the ceremony. If 
she is a woman of high rank she is carried onto the central 
place of the village. After the ceremony each one of the 
tabula who has been working on the robe and taking part in 
the ceremony receives a heap of food. Sometimes there are 
additional payments (pemkwala) to the house of the paternal 
aunt [Maiinowski 1982a, p. 189. 
The ritual bathing, the ceremonial investment with the 
pregnancy mantle, the magic of whiteness and of beauty are 
only performed during the first pregnancy. However, the use 
of the mantle belongs to every subsequent pregnancy but on 
these occasions the mantle is made by the woman herself 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 192]. 
About the time of the ritual bathing, the prospective 
mother begins to observe food taboos. She forgoes fruit 
kavaylula (delicacies) such as banana, mango, apple, almond, 
pawpaw and breadfruit. Fruit are banned since they would lie 
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like excrement in the belly of the child who would soon die. 
Certain species of fish are also restricted from the diet; 
those are species that are difficult to haul out of the sea 
since this would mean that the child would not easily be 
brought into the world [Malinowski 1982a, p. 193]. Here we 
have two very good examples of the operation of resemblance 
in the form of convenience in native thought. In spells in 
general, the substances used in the magical rites, as the 
means of ritual transference of the spell, are associated 
with the aim of the magic. Light substances are used in 
magic to make light, white substances to whiten, etc. 
[Malinowski 1978, pp. 452-453]. Lightness of skin (with the 
exception of albinism) is on the same side of the asymmetri- 
cal division of the world as strength, vigour and vitality 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 248]. The child inherits its nature 
directly from the mother and therefore, the whiter the 
mother the better the child. Thus the aim of pregnancy magic 
is to improve the nature of the unborn child by whitening 
the skin of the mother. 
During the later stages of pregnancy, sexual inter- 
course must be abandoned since it is thought that the penis 
would kill the child. Otherwise the pregnant woman leads a 
normal life almost up to the time of her confinement. only 
when the saykeulo is worn Out Must she keep out of the sun 
and, therefore, abandon the heavier work in the garden [Mali- 
nowski 1982a, p. 193]. 
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In every pregnancy, the woman takes up residence in her 
father's or maternal uncle's house after about eight months. 
This custom is associated with the fear of evil magic which 
surrounds a woman in childbed. This evil called vatula bam 
(the paralysing of the uterus) can only effectively be 
warded off by the woman's maternal kinswomen [Malinowski 
1982a, p. 194]. The pregnant woman's mother is the appropri- 
ate person to look after her at this time. The male rela- 
tives gather around the house and set up a yausa (watch) 
against any sorcerers attempting to cast the vatula bam 
magic. This sorcery is actually attempted and carried out by 
male sorcerers. The formula is recited and the house is ap- 
proached by the sorcerers as near as the circumstances will 
allow [Malinowski 1982a, p. 1941. 
At the time of birth all of the male relatives have to 
leave while some female kinswomen come in to help the moth- 
er. The pregnant girl is made to squat on a raised bedstead 
with a small fire burningunderneath it. This is done to 
make her blood flow. At the critical moment the woman is 
placed on a mat on the ground. The newly born is received 
onto the mat. The baby is allowed to be born without inter- 
vention from anyone in attendance. They do not take hold of 
it and it is never pulled out or manipulated [Nalinowski 
1982a, p. 1951. Here we have another example of the reluc- 
tance of the natives to alter the vulnerable boundary of the 
baby by touching its body during this crucial moment. 
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If the labour is very difficult, the natives ascribe 
the fact to the magic of the vatula bam and they summon 
someone who knows vivisa (counter-magic). If the vivisa 
fails the child is manipulated as a last resort. 
There is a taboo on sexual intercourse between the new 
mother and her husband which, in its strictest occurrence, 
lasts for about two years while the child is still a wayway. 
A breach of this taboo brings about the death of the child 
[Malinowski 1982a, p. 197]. This taboo does not represent 
some primitive technique for limiting the number of children 
born into a household since we have already seen that sexual 
intercourse is separated from reproduction in primitive 
thought. The taboo focuses on the still vulnerable boundary 
between mother and child and prevents the father coming 
between these two. The term wayway does not distinguish 
between the fetal condition before birth and the infantile 
condition after birth. The absence of a strict conditional 
distinction is parallelled in the emergence myths where 
people existed fully formed underground. There is an absence 
of a physiological theory of human development which corre- 
sponds to the absence of a biological theory of reproduc- 
tion. I have already alluded to the fact that reproduction 
may be regarded as a form of exchange rather than production 
since the spirit is passed through the body of the woman so 
that it can participate in the world in the form of flesh 
and blood. No new life is created at birth since the spirit 
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already existed before emerging from the mother. This weak 
notion of origin in birth is similar to the weak notion of 
genesis in general that is available in the emergence myths 
where the ancestors already existed underground. The topo- 
logical figures of the episteme do not allow for a precise 
notion of origin or, indeed, a notion of finitude. What we 
have is a system of interchanging places. Magic is involved 
in the exchanges of places operating on the spirit which is 
birth. Magic is also concerned with the exchange of yams 
which we have seen is the basis of wealth. 
6.6 Magic and wealth. 
In the Trobriand society, megwa is very intimately 
associated with economic life. All important economic activ- 
ities are surrounded by magic especially where those activi- 
ties are involved in chance or danger. We have seen how the 
production of yams is intimately involved with the primitive 
economics based in exchange and gardening provides an exam- 
ple of an economic activity completely involved in magic. 
one of the most obvious threats to the garden is posed by 
the weather and this is subject to a large number of spells. 
During the performance of certain garden spells the 
mouth of the magician is held quite close to the elements of 
the charm so that his words can't go astray (Malinowski 
1982b, p-1921. This is because, as we have seen, words are 
involved in a topological order with everything else in the 
world. They have an ontological reality. The spell is re- 
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peated over and over [Malinowski 1982b, p. 192]. This is 
consistent with the redundant nature of an oral practice 
which will be examined in the next chapter. 
origin stories have an economic dimension and are 
amongst the most coveted and valuable kinds of knowledge 
since settlements of land disputes are made by the recita- 
tion of the genealogy of the land from the tabu (a discrete 
named kinsperson). The knowledge of the history of the land 
should only be known by those men who control the land 
[Weiner 1976, p-40]. The genealogies of the land are far 
more detailed than personal genealogies and must be traced 
to the original founders. The recitation of land history is 
a means of argumentation. Claims are rewarded on the basis 
of the accuracy of memory. This recitation also takes place 
in magical spells. 
Garden magic is the most conspicuous of all magical 
activity amongst the Trobrianders. Malinowski has recorded 
two systems of this magic: that of the village of Omarakana 
called kailuebila which is considered to be the most power- 
ful; and the momtilakaiva system associated with the four 
small villages, Kupuakopula, Tilakiva, Iourawotul, and 
Wakailuva [Malinowski 1982b, p. 198]. 
In the Omarakana system of garden magic there are ten 
magical spells each associated with a particular stage in 
gardening activity: digging new ground, cutting scrub, 
burning dried scrub, etc. The typical form of spell consists 
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of three parts. First, the introduction called ulula (lowest 
part of a stem); second, the body of the spell called tapua- 
la (the flanks); third, the dogina (the tip). The listing of 
ancestors is always contained in the ulula [Malinowski 
1982b, p. 199]. Briefly, then, this is the structure of a 
spell in garden magic. This division was already demonstrat- 
ed in the bodily functions governing sexual intercourse and 
in the spells regulating pregnancy magic. This configuration 
regulates the structure of a spell in magic, the structure 
of a plant in economics and the structure of the body of man 
in sexual activity. 
6.7 Conclusions. 
In these last three chapters, I have tried show how the 
operation of the Trobriand episteme determines the ways in 
which native themes are problematized, the limitations of 
the patterns of knowledge that emerge and the shared posi- 
tivity of that knowledge in central oppositional figures. 
This is not just a structuralist opposition between left and 
right. I have not been concerned with simple binary opposi- 
tion but with the generalised pattern of the opposing spaces 
of the primitive world and the techniques for the mainte- 
nance of their separations, which take the form of myths and 
taboos. Examples of these took the form of the body of man 
being divided between the sexual nature of brother and 
sister which is maintained by a strict taboo. The sister, as 
a mother, is divided between her own nature and the nature 
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of her children. 
The native village is divided between the place of 
wealth and the place of food in the form of cooked yams. The 
yam is itself divided between food and wealth and, again, 
there is a strict taboo maintaining this division. The form 
of knowledge appropriate to these convenient spaces is that 
of divination available in native magical rites. These 
examples revealed the three aspects of the Trobriand epis- 
teme which were the presence of asymmetrical forms of resem- 





'In character, the Negro is best described as an overgrown 
child: vain, self-indulgent and fond of idleness, but with a 
1 
good heart... 1 
7.1 Introduction. 
I have been looking at the application of the archaeo- 
logical method to the local centre of the Trobriand Islands. 
That study has revealed the inextricable interconnectedness 
of the realms of sex, wealth and magic in terms of their 
shared possibility in the figures of the episteme. I inves- 
tigated this primitive episteme in terms of the two axes of 
knowledge and power which were appropriate to the method. We 
have seen that there is an absence of any unities relating 
primitive knowledge to individual agency and we have also 
seen many examples of the archaeological components, out- 
lined in the opening chapters, present in the Trobriand 
discourses. 
The fact that I have selected a specific centre reduces 
the strength of my claims for the occurrence of these 
motifs of the episteme in the more general primitive experi- 
ence. Despite my not having any universalist claims on the 
truth, nevertheless, I will now examine the more general 
features of primitive knowledge and go some way towards 
-------------------- 
1. From a nineteenth century British school textbook on 
geography. Quoted in Le Pan's The Cognitive Revolution in 
Western Culture (see bib. ). 
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positing the Trobrianders' experience as a microcosm for a 
broader theory of primitive knowledge. 
7.2 Towards a more general theory. 
Malinowski holds that in their general level of cul- 
ture, the Trobrianders may be taken as representative of the 
majority of savage races [Malinowski 1921]. He believed that 
their distinct forms of economic organisation were represen- 
tative of the forms of the primitive experience in general. 
He was justifiably criticised for making this kind of unsub- 
stantiated generalisation. It is obvious that there are a 
great many differences between the many primitive societies. 
These discontinuities must be kept in mind while speculating 
how widespread the figures of the primitive episteme, out- 
lined in this study, might be amongst primitive peoples. 
This means positing a more general primitive episteme. I am 
proposing a distinct discontinuity between primitive expe- 
rience and the experiences of the Renaissance, Classical and 
Modern epistemes outlined in the opening chapter. This is a 
form of a relativistic thesis. 
Bloch addresses such relativistic themes. He claims 
that Radcliffe-Brown inherited two key propositions from 
Durkheim; firstly, that society is an homogeneous, organised 
and self-reproducing entity; secondly, that the categories 
of understanding are social in origin [Bloch 1977, p. 279]. 
This theory of the social-origin of cognitive systems has 
largely gone unchallenged, according to Bloch, because it is 
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linked to the belief that different cultures or societies 
have fundamentally different systems of thought. Now, if we 
believe in the social determination of concepts, this leaves 
the actors with no language to talk about their society and, 
therefore, no means of changing it, since they can only talk 
within it (Bloch 1977, p. 282]. Cultural relativists such as 
Durkheim, Boas and Levi-Strauss tell us that notions such as 
time, which we feel to be self-evident, can be experienced 
in other cultures in totally different ways, as perhaps 
static or cyclic. If a claim such as this were true it would 
justify the conclusion that all aspects of culture are 
relative [Bloch 1977, p. 282]. However, rather than a whole 
range of different concepts of time for different cultures, 
Bloch claims that there are only two notions of time. on the 
one hand, there is the concept of linear durational time 
and, on the other hand, there is a concept of a static 
notion of time (cyclic) [Bloch 1977, p. 282]. Although I have 
not really been concerned with the notion of time, this 
argument could easily be extended to include native notions 
of space which are of more concern to me. Bloch identifies 
Wittgenstein as someone who would claim that communication 
with creatures with a fundamentally different system of 
ideas and life is not possible and surely, Bloch argues, 
people with a different concept of time (or space) would 
pose problems equivalent to communicating with animals 
[Bloch 1977, p-2831. Since some form of communication with 
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other cultures is possible this must mean that relativists 
like Wittgenstein, Levy-Bruhl and Foucault are incorrect. 
Bloch's argument is not persuasive for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is partly based on Wittgenstein's thought that 
if lions could speak we would not understand them. Wittgen- 
stein was notorious for using thought experiments like this 
for his own arguments and there is a distinct danger of 
their misuse in the context of a different argument. Bloch 
exemplifies this danger well. If a lion could speak then it 
would cease to be a lion. Even Bloch himself eventually 
dismisses this type of zoological argument. 
Communication between the anthropologist and the na- 
tives of an alien culture does take place but Bloch does not 
show that this represents nothing more than a translation of 
the native concepts into a form of our own rather than a 
significant inter-epistemic meeting of minds. It has not 
been shown that communication takes place at a shared level. 
This would involve the project of demonstrating a shared 
positivity. Therefore, Bloch's-case remains unproven. 
However, more reasonably, Bloch employs examples from 
syntactical and semantical studies of language which would 
seem to suggest that the logic of languages implies a notion 
of temporality and sequence which is the same for all speak- 
ers [Bloch 1977, p. 2831. I accept that psychological and 
syntactical tests would fail to substantiate the claims of 
anyone who supports a discontinuity thesis. However, it is 
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surely question begging to problematize cultural relativity 
either within a logical framework, which posits a singular 
cumulative rationality, or within a psychological framework 
which assumes a unified self. Bloch's manner of arguing 
simply underlines the need to replace these explanatory 
unities, which cannot escape a cumulative rationality, so 
that a field of possible discontinuities can emerge. I have 
been at pains in the opening chapters to show what such a 
replacement involves. 
I have not been arguing that the forms that constrain 
the knowledge and experiences of the members of a society 
are to be found either at the level of 'culture' or Isocie- 
tyl. I have been arguing that these forms are found at the 
level of the lepistemel. I have tried to outline that level 
and its productive potential for the society of the Trobri- 
anders. I have used the writings of cultural or social 
relativists, such as Levy-Bruhl, only where their interests 
co-incide with archaeology. While I believe that we can only 
talk within our epistemes, this does not mean that change is 
impossible. Potential for change is built into the epistemic 
1 
figures . We have seen that there is no potential for criti- 
cal reflection built into the primitive model which is 
fairly static. It is beyond the scope of the present work 
-------------------- 
1. Foucault provides an examination of the potential for 
change in the Renaissance and Classical epistemes in The 
order of Things. 
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to examine this potential in any detail. I will confine 
myself to the mere speculation that the most likely source 
of change lies outside in the form of writing. I am merely 
arguing for difference rather than explaining it. 
The fact that the divinational figures occur at the 
level of the episteme means that the notion of the lepis- 
teme, replaces the notions of 'culture' or 'society' as 
valid unities for identifying the extent of a significant 
shared experience. This implies that the. figures may be 
acceptable for experience that is broader than the local 
centre of the Trobrianders. It would be ridiculous to claim 
that there are no cultural differences in the modern epis- 
teme. These differences are manifested in their most obvious 
form in terms of national boundaries. However, archaeology 
does not recognise these differences as epistemologically 
significant. In the same way, there are cultural differences 
within the primitive experience but many of these may not be 
epistemologically significant. It is obvious that a wider 
investigation would show that the patterns of possession of 
different forms of knowledge vary; techniques for inheriting 
power and wealth vary; specific sexual taboos and mores 
differ; institutions supporting marriage have varied mani- 
festations. However, we can postulate the general figures of 
the episteme as constants across all primitive experience 
even in the presence of these ideological differences. 
Ideological differences constitute differences in 
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content while causal theories and understandings of space 
and time constitute formal differences. Le Pan holds that 
the anthropological tradition has denied the existence of 
formal difference and has assumed that human intelligence 
forms subconscious systems which follow principles of 
thought common to all humanity [Le Pan 1989, p. 3]. We have 
seen that this assumption is denied in archaeology which 
posits formal differences (discontinuities) in the history 
of man's knowledge and experience while largely ignoring 
ideological content. 
Le Pan believes that Goody is almost alone in his 
appreciation of the possibility that different processes may 
exist in different societies [Le Pan 1989, p. 4]. This view 
is at variance with Bloch's claims about the prevalence of 
relativistic theses in anthropology. Indeed, we can go 
further than Goody by claiming that it is these very differ- 
ences in forms of thought, postulated by the thesis of 
epistemic gaps, that can be used to characterise the differ- 
ences between societies. 
Hallpike, in The Foundations of Primitive Thought, 
argued that different peoples often employ predominantly 
different cognitive processes but the prevailing anthropo- 
logical assumption remains that the cognitive processes 
employed by primitive peoples and those employed in the 
modern experience are the same. Le Pan feels that it is 
extremely unlikely that the thought processes of all the 
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peoples of the world have been identical for the past one 
million years. It seems reasonable to expect that men would 
have been perpetually altering their cognitive processes [Le 
Pan 1989, p. 6]. However, it is broadly supposed by anthro- 
pologists that no alterations in cognitive practices have 
accompanied the cultural changes of the last forty thousand 
years. Le Pan cites Beattie's work as an example of this 
presupposition [Le Pan 1989, p. 6]. In criticisms of Frazer's 
theory of magic, Beattie claimed that nobody in their senses 
could believe that all things share a common quality, and 
that all things that have once been in contact are continu- 
ally affecting one another. In such a world, everything 
would all the time be affecting everything else and this 
would be chaos. Here, Beattie is assuming that to be in 
one's senses means to think with the logical processes 
habitual to modern society. 
In the context of this debate, Le Pan contends that the 
best defence of the mainstream position, that the thought of 
primitive peoples does not differ in form from our own, is 
that put forward by Evans-Pritchard Me Pan 1989, p. 7]. 
Evans-Pritchard believed that the Mande were dominated by 
an overwhelming faith which prevented them from making 
experiments and from generalising contradictions between 
tests, verdicts of different oracles and between all of the 
oracles and experience. When objections were raised these 
could not be well expressed by the language of that culture. 
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Any objection, if translated into Zande modes of thought, 
would serve to support their entire structure of belief 
since their mystical notions were regarded as eminently 
coherent, being inter-related by a network of logical ties; 
they never too crudely contradict sensory experience but, 
indeed, experience seems to justify them. 
Le Pan questions Evans-Pritchard as to what he means by 
the Azande being 'overwhelmed' by faith. He asserts that 
primitive peoples cannot in any sense be considered to be 
living in a sort of trance. The difference is not in the 
degree to which they believe, but rather in the way in which 
they believe; a matter of form rather than content [Le Pan 
1989, p. 8]. According to Le Pan, the reason the Zande never 
become fixed on the contradictions between belief and expe- 
rience is because, apparently, they employ cognitive proc- 
esses that are different from our own. While Evans-Pritchard 
is prepared to allow that other people may think in a more 
mystical fashion than ourselves, he is loath to admit that 
that thought is any less logical, if logical at all [Le Pan 
1989, P-91. 
Evans-Pritchard demonstrated that Zande modes of 
thought formed a closed system which is a project different 
from showing that they formed a logical system [Le Pan 1989, 
P. 103. it is easy to blur the distinction between the 
underlying logic that often characterises the relationship 
between a society's belief system and its social structure, 
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and the intentional logic of conscious thought [Le Pan 1989, 
p. 11]. This kind of example helps to support the archaeolog- 
ical claim that there is a general discontinuity between 
modern and primitive experience. However, the question of 
the nature of significant differences within a primitive 
episteme remains to be examined. 
Foucault's notion of the episteme involves temporal 
classification since, in The Order of Things, he outlines a 
linear configuration of epistemes stretching from the Ren- 
aissance through the Classical to the Modern. A primitive 
episteme does not belong to this linear model but to its own 
space. It is not simply pre-historic since it is not con- 
fined to a pre-cultural past. It pertains to my argument 
that the notion of the primitive is a feature of contempo- 
rary cultural life. This perception of the contemporary- 
primitive is primitive in terms of the concept of differ- 
ence, which is central to the archaeological approach, and 
does not necessarily imply a reduced degree of sophistica- 
tion. The primitive is not necessarily a preliminary condi- 
tion to our history. The concept of the primitive in archae- 
ology is extra-historical rather than pre-historical. It is 
to be recognised for itself while at the same time it is not 
isolated from the other archaeological eras since the histo- 
ry of primitive societies is related to our own history by a 
series of discontinuities. 
It is well beyond the scope of this present work to 
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provide a detailed examination of every primitive society. 
However, Evans-Pritchard's comparative study, in The Mor- 
phology and Function of Magic, between Trobriand and Zande 
magic, on the surface, seems to undermine the thesis for a 
broader application of the primitive Trobriand episteme by 
pointing up what he regards to be significant differences. 
But on closer examination these differences do no occur at 
the archaeological level. 
Evans-Pritchard agrees that both Trobriand and Zande 
'white' magic came into the world with man and do not belong 
to nature [Evans-Pritchard 1962, p. 622]. Both forms of magic 
are regarded as precious cultural possessions which derive 
their powers from man's knowledge of tradition and absti- 
nence, in the form of sex and food taboos, precede all acts 
of magic. Trobriand and Zande magic have a shared structure 
but there is a different emphasis placed on the component 
parts by the two societies [Evans-Pritchard 1962, p. 623]. 
Here Evans-Pritchard regards the efficacy of magic to lie in 
abstinence imposed by taboos. The significance of a taboo is 
to impose these forms of sanction. I fail to see how absti- 
nence empowers magic in this way and instead have treated 
the notion of taboo as a primitive technique for the mainte- 
nance of a vulnerable fundamental boundary which has a 
regulative role in discourse. 
We have seen that, for the Trobrianders, it is the 
spell that is the essential part of magic, known only to the 
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practitioner, and handed down unaltered. However, Evans- 
Pritchard claims that in Zande culture it is the material 
element in the magic that is the essential component and 
known only to the practitioner [Evans-Pritchard 1962, 
p. 626]. He regards this difference as significant. At an 
epistemological level, however, this difference is not 
profound since we have seen that, in the primitive episteme, 
words and, in this case the formulae of the spell, are re- 
garded as things in the world amongst others. They have a 
material reality. Words are not abstract signs that refer to 
objects but are themselves objects in the world that occupy 
a particular place. The ontological difference between words 
and pieces of wood and feathers that exists in the Classical 
and Modern epistemes has no significance in the primitive 
episteme. 
Another supposed significant difference that Evans- 
Pritchard points to is that of the role of tradition. He 
distinguishes between everyday myth based an personal histo- 
ry and socially inherited myth. Evans-Pritchard admits that 
there are myths amongst the Azande accounting for the origin 
of a magic but generally there are no traditional stories 
accounting for the existence of magic [Evans-Pritchard 1962, 
p. 630-6311. He regards the personal stories of experiences 
in magic as having the function of providing the validity of 
the magic for the Zande native. Here Evans-Pritchard is 
conflating the conditions of validity, which he construes in 
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terms of empirical demonstration to oneself which seems 
extraordinary, with the conditions for the emergence, main- 
tenance and propagation of magic in traditional forms of 
knowledge, which are its conditions of possibility. In this 
study, I have been primarily interested in the separation of 
the conditions for the validity of magic in general, which 
we find in the divinational figures of the episteme, from 
the conditions of validity which we find in the function of 
the myth. Empirical demonstrations, such as those referred 
to by Evans-Pritchard, belong to the Modern Age and it seems 
unlikely that the Azande are practising them in the form of 
personal histories. 
My aim here is not to reduce the plurality of all 
primitive societies to that of the Trobrianders but rather 
to point up general similarities in function and occurrence 
while allowing for differences. After all, it must be remem- 
bered that archaeological analysis emphasises difference. It 
is the discovery of differences at the level of the positiv- 
ity of the episteme that would undermine my tentative thesis 
for the more general manifestation of the epistemological 
figures and these are not present in such comparative analy- 
ses as those of Evans-Pritchard. 
While my emphasis in examining the Trobriand episteme 
was on the whole set of primitive figures, anthropologists 
have isolated the operation of complementary opposition in 
many primitive societies as having a particular importance. 
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Needham tells us that there are traces of opposition in Meru 
origin myths. Further, the dual division of the clans is 
concordant with a division of the Imenti into the two group- 
ings of the Nkuene and the Igoki: the Nkuene being on the 
north and the Igoki on the south [Needham 1973, p. 112]. 
Needham offers further examples of symbolic terms in which 
pairs of opposites are analogically related by the principle 
1 
of complementary opposition 
There are further examples from Neurland where, during 
sacrifices, the spear is brandished in the right hand of the 
officiant [Evans-Pritchard 1973, p. 92]. This type of spear 
symbolism figures prominently among the Nilotic peoples; 
among the Shilluk; among the royal emblems of the Anuak; 
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The spear is an extension of the right hand, which stands 
for the strength, vitality and virtue of the person. It is a 
projection of the self, so that when a man hurls his spear 
he cries out 'my right hand'. This is an example of the 
extended, or differentiated, self that we saw was the sub- 
ject of experience in the Trobriand Islands. The spear being 
an extension of the right hand stands for all that the right 
hand stands for [Evans-Pritchard 1973, pp. 94-95]. For the 
Nuer the right arm stands for masculinity and hence for the 
paternal kin and the lineage. When the carcasses of oxen 
sacrificed at marriage ceremonies are divided among the kin, 
the right fore and hind legs are the portions of the fa- 
ther's brothers and sisters and the left fore and hind legs 
are the portions of the mother's brother and sisters [Evans- 
Pritchard 1973, p. 95]. The left side symbolises weakness and 
consequently femininity and also evil [Evans-Pritchard 1973, 
p. 95]. We saw this type of association between evil and 
women amongst the Trobrianders. 
When Nuer deform the horns of their favourite oxen, 
with which they identify themselves, it is always the left 
horn which is trained downwards. If the right is trained at 
all it is trained upwards [Evans-Pritchard 1973, P-963. 
For the Temne, east provides the primary orientation; 
it is where life started. West is associated with death e. g. 
cemeteries -are on the west of a village [Littlejohn 1973, 
p. 2911. Further, amongst the Themne there is a rule govern- 
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ing the uses of the hands. The right hand serves the upper 
half of the body, particularly the mouth, and the left hand 
serves the lower half, particularly the genitals and anus. 
The right hand only must be used while eating and when 
cleaning the anus only the left hand may be used. Also, 
during sex play only a man's left hand may touch the woman's 
genitals [Littlejohn 1973, p. 292]. These examinations reveal 
a basic social opposition corresponding to the hands. This 
opposition is that of being-in-proper-relations-with-others 
and not-being-in-proper-relations-with-others [Littlejohn 
1973, p. 292]. 
Further, amongst the Temne witchcraft is explicitly 
connected with the left. Witches are known to grow a special 
organ low down on the left-hand side of the trunk, called 
ankunto. This is the region of the body where hate develops; 
hate makes the ankunto grow, and this is the source of the 
evil power of the witch [Littlejohn 1973, p. 293]. . 
Sleep and death are situations in which a total rever- 
sal occurs with respect to the attribute of power that the 
Temne confer on the hands. During sleep and death the. left 
hand becomes strong having the capacity to exert a crushing 
weight. For the Temne, weight is a virtue of truth [Little- 
john 1973, p-2971. 
Wagner exploits Levi-Strauss's observation that New 
Guinea and its neighbouring regions present, to an extraor- 
dinary degree, a differentiation between brother and sister. 
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From this he argues that there is a more general scheme by 
which men and women are allocated to tangential but distinct 
and self-contained 'spaces, within a social unit. The exist- 
ence of discrete male and female 'substance' lines, and the 
transmission of unit-affiliation through one sex or the 
other, can also be seen as coherent analogues of this system 
[Wagner 1972, p. 39]. Wagner employs the Daribi as an example 
of a group who recognise a major subdivision of adult socie- 
ty into the wezibi (group of women) and the bidizibi (group 
of men). These categories are independent of the reckoning 
of genealogical ancestry or the partitioning of society into 
exogamous units; they may refer to the composition of a 
single unit or they may include the whole society since they 
reflect a set of complementary status distinctions that are 
characteristic of the social system as a whole [Wagner 1972, 
p. 39]. The male/female distinction also represents separate- 
ly transmitted essences so that we can identify the wezibi 
and bidizibi as distinct 'lines'. Male and female transmit 
separate but complementary substances to their offspring 
[Wagner 1972, pp. 39-40]. Examples of such substances of the 
body are maleness and femaleness. Amongst the Trobrianders, 
we saw the native concern with the transference of essence 
between a mother and the child in her womb. 
The Daribi also distinguish between two general catego- 
ries of food; meat, which is believed to have a nutritious 
value, is distinguished from vegetable food, which is con- 
296 
sidered to be a mere palliative against hunger. Men exchange 
vegetable foods with women, whereas they exchange meat, 
together with other valuables, for women. We have seen how 
women were are involved in Trobriand exchanges. ' Virtually 
all interaction between Daribi men and women occurs in the 
context of the production and preparation of food, or in the 
context of sexual relations [Wagner 1972, pp. 41-42]. 
Topological concerns exist amongst the Daribi since 
almost all living spaces are marked off in more or less 
restricted male and female spaces. In the more substantial 
dwellings the separation is well marked. Men occupy the 
upper floor of the two story longhouse and women the lower, 
and in the single story version, a wall divides the house 
into a 'front' facing eastwards which is occupied by the men 
and a 'rear', occupied by the women [Wagner 1972, p. 42]. 
Within each clan or sub-clan the men and the women form 
separate social bodies [Wagner 1972, p. 43]. 
The subdivision of the social space amongst the Daribi 
is also reflected in the sexual division in labour and in 
ownership [Wagner 1972, p. 43]. Further, men who occupy the 
upper floors are associated with tree-tops, activities in- 
volving trees and arboreal creatures; women who inhabit the 
lower floor are associated with ground crops, activities 
involving the preparation of ground and gardening and with 
aquatic creatures and insects [Wagner 1972, p. 44]. 
Complementarity characterises the clan as the largest 
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distinct and permanent unit in the Daribi society. Members 
of a clan share a common obligation to contribute to the 
bride-prices of clan members and, in this way, share the 
inheritance rights of their wives [Wagner 1972, p. 47]. Clan 
1 
members inhabited a single house and made a common garden, 
so that males and females of the whole clan could cooperate 
as complementary groups [Wagner 1972, p. 47]. 
We have seen how the primitive Trobriand episteme 
posits the circular places of complementarity. By generalis- 
ing the occurrence of this figure, it means that the epis- 
teme, without establishing a universal truth, provides a 
form of reason through which primitive man experiences his 
world and his particular form of differentiated selfhood. 
The self is subject to the same divisions as the rest of the 
world. His village embraces a centre of stability for the 
community rather than an ego which he cannot posses. Magical 
discourse is the form of knowledge appropriate to the circu- 
lar figures for the organisation of primitive experience. It 
does not provide an interpretation of the world or a reflec- 
tion of a primitive rational. It is simply the form of 
knowledge that has its necessity in the figures of the 
primitive episteme. 
7.3 Magic. 
The divinational figures that characterise the Trobri- 
-------------------- 
Before contact with Europeans. 
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and episteme have consequences for a knowledge of nature in 
the primitive world in general expressed as magic. They also 
have consequences for the nature of the spoken word. Writing 
has no possibility for emergence in an unclosed episteme 
such as the one outlined above. Orality dominates any primi- 
tive space where such an unclosed figure operates. 
The circular configurations of asymmetry, continuity, 
convenience and enclosure have consequences for a primitive 
knowledge of nature. The primitive world is covered with 
signs in their own place and this place must be located. 
Therefore, to know the world is to locate these signs in the 
world. Hence, it is not possible to act upon a sign without, 
at the same time, acting upon the thing that is indicated by 
it. A knowledge of magic, which is the deciphering of the 
location of signs and the acting on them by the specifica- 
tion and manipulation of a boundary, is inherent in this 
way of knowing. The location of the signs of nature must be 
discovered and this makes magic possible in a primitive 
episteme. In other words, magic as an operation on the world 
by an operation on the signs of the world, has its condi- 
tion of possibility in this model. In this way, speech is 
power in witchcraft if language is understood as a system of 
signs. 
In the Renaissance episteme, the interweaving of lan- 
guage and things has the consequence that writing has a 
privilege over speech. It is the primary character of lan- 
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guage to be written in the Renaissance. However, amongst the 
Trobrianders language is located in the mouths of the speak- 
ers so speech has a possibility while writing has not. 
Examples of the location of the spoken word are available in 
chapter six in rituals associated with pregnancy. In the 
primitive experience, there is no difference in kind between 
marks and the spoken word in the sense that there is a 
difference between observation and accepted authority. The 
process is the same. Nature and the spoken word are inter- 
twined with one another. Language inheres in the world 
amongst the plants, rocks and animals. It takes part in the 
convenience of the world and must be studied itself as a 
thing in nature. Language has its own continuities, asymme- 
tries and enclosures and is not analysed it terms of mean- 
ing. This interweaving of language with the world also 
occurs in the Renaissance episteme. 
I postulate, then, the presence of a model, similar 
to that of the Trobrianders, which is amenable to divina- 
tional manipulation in any society that successfully prac- 
tices magic. Tambiah supports this kind of move when he 
identifies the presence of the three characteristic notions 
about Trobriand magical ritual in the Bible and in Buddhism. 
We saw that these were the appearance of magic with the 
first ancestors; magic is an essentially human possession; 
and magical formulae have a causal influence. This allows 
him to form a general statement about the widespread belief 
300 
in the magical power of sacred words. He claims that no book 
on religion or the origin of language fails to refer to the 
ancient belief in the creative power of the word [Tambiah 
1968, p. 182]. 
7.4 Writing. 
In the Classical Age it was thought that writing prop- 
erly began when an attempt was made, firstly, to represent 
one of the constitutive elements of something or secondly, 
to represent one of the circumstances that constantly at- 
tended that something or, thirdly, to represent some other 
thing that that something resembled [Foucault 1970, pill]. 
These three methods produced three techniques. The represen- 
tation of a constitutive element gave rise to the curiologi- 
cal writing of the Egyptians (a bow for a battle, a ladder 
for a siege). The representation of circumstances gave rise 
to the more perfected hieroglyphics which employ some nota- 
ble circumstance (God is represented as an eye since he is 
all powerful and sees everything). The representation of 
resemblances between things formed symbolic writing. This 
technique makes use of resemblance. For example, the sun 
rising in the morning is expressed by a crocodile whose eyes 
are just level with the surface of the water. These types of 
writing soon faded out since because their signs multiply by 
distant analogies they encouraged the imaginations of the 
people using them rather than their powers of reflection 
[Foucault 1970, P-1111. Innovations are impossible within 
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this model and the concern of the learned is to maintain a 
respect for tradition. These two characteristics also per- 
tain to the primitive model of language in speech. 
With alphabetic writing the history of man is changed 
since it does not matter that letters do not represent ideas 
because they can be combined together in the same way as 
ideas, and ideas can be linked together and disjoined just 
like the letters of the alphabet [Foucault 1970, p. 112]. It 
is very easy to learn the alphabet because of its small 
number of elements. Everyone can devote the time to reflec- 
tion which the hieroglyphic people wasted in learning how to 
write. Hence, it is within language that progress arises. 
Language was of all the signs the one having the property of 
being sequential. It drew out into sequential sounds the 
simultaneity of representation and thereby temporal succes- 
sions were established. This makes science as the naming of 
each representation possible. Knowledge and language are 
interwoven in the Classical Age because of this sequential 
possibility. 
In the Renaissance episteme, resemblance constitutes a 
sign and gives the sign a particular value as a sign. It 
signifies by resembling what it is indicating. It indicates 
another resemblance which is an adjacent type that allows 
the recognition of the first. Every resemblance receives a 
signature. The totality of signs slides over the circles of 
resemblances. The signs form a second set of circles which 
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is an exact duplication of the set of circles of the resem- 
blances of things. However, this set of resemblances of 
signs is displaced by one figure. In this way, the sign of 
sympathy is in analogy; the sign of analogy is in emulation; 
emulation has its sign in convenience; and that of conven- 
ience is in sympathy and, thus, the circle is closed. The 
signatures have exactly the same nature as what they denote 
only that they are distributed differently. It is this 
displacement that makes possible the revelation of Renais- 
sance knowledge in writing [Foucault 1970, p. 29]. 
In the primitive episteme, the figures do not form a 
complex closed set like the figures of the Renaissance 
episteme. Asymmetry gives rise to emulation and the sign of 
emulation is in convenience. The sign of convenience is in 
further separations. The closure of the Renaissance epis- 
teme allows for the possibility of a displacement in an 
identical pattern of resemblances. However, closure is not 
guaranteed in the primitive episteme. 
A sign is a thing in the world amongst others and can 
act as both a sign and a thing. The sign emulates its anti- 
podal sign and the system is two dimensional and open as 
opposed to the three dimensional and essentially closed 
pattern of the Renaissance. The deployment of asymmetrical 
oppositions operate on a two dimensional table. Because of 
this a set of signs cannot be abstracted or isolated and 
identified as writing since, because of its lack of closure, 
303 
it would not have the autonomy of hieroglyphics, curiologi- 
cal or symbolic writing despite its infinite accumulation. 
The impossibility of the emergence of writing in the primi- 
tive episteme has significant consequences for the nature of 
the knowledge available; the nature of learning as an oral 
tradition; the lack of techniques for reflection; and the 
maintenance of tradition. All these consequences we find 
amongst oral cultures in general. 
7.5 Orality and primitive discourse. - 
The problematization of aspects of primitive personal 
experience and the way in which that experience can be 
thought is effected by the absence of writing. Many of the 
features taken for granted in discourses among literates 
have no possibility in non-literate societies. Writing has 
no possibility in the figures of the Trobriand episteme and 
this has consequences for the nature of the particular 
discourses of that episteme and primitive discourses in 
general. 
once any piece of knowledge is acquired in a primitive 
culture without writing it must be repeated constantly or it 
will be quickly lost. Therefore, fixed formulaic thought 
patterns are essential for wisdom and effective administra- 
tion of authority [Ong 1982, p. 24]. The fixed figures of the 
episteme provide the necessary static possibility for knowl- 
edge. The knowledge made possible within this figure takes 
the form of more or less exactly repeated set phrases or set 
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expressions such as proverbs in verse, magical chants, 
cliches, etc. The Trobrianders exist in a wholly oral cul- 
ture and they have no knowledge whatsoever of writing and no 
possibility for its emergence within their own experience. 
The same can be said of many other societies. Orality does 
not function as a form of positivity for what counts as 
primitive but, rather, it does indicate the presence of the 
operation of epistemic figures. 
Further, primitive words have no visual presence, even 
when the objects they represent are visual. Words are not 
visual metaphors [Ong 1982, p. 31]. Oral peoples commonly 
consider words to have great power. This is the source of 
the power of magic, that is, the nature of the word. Ong 
claims that the source of magical power in the spoken word 
lies in the fact that it is an event, and hence power-driven 
1 
[Ong 1982, p. 32] . However, archaeology shows us that the 
source of the power in magic is based in the fact that the 
manipulation of the sign is the operation on a vital bound- 
ary and as such an operation on the world. We saw examples 
of this in the operation of love magic. Since falling in 
love is an event in the primitive experience it is always 
regarded as coming about because of the operation of magic. 
-------------------- 
1. We can distinguish between oral signs for things in the 
world, that is, signs that allow the world to be known and 
the spoken word. Signs are things in the world while oral 
signs are events that have a place in the world. The oral 
sign is not a visual phenomenon but a thing in the world 
amongst other things. 
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Love cannot occur without magic: they are inextricably bound 
together. 
The problem of retaining and retrieving spells about 
sex and love in a primitive context is overcome by the 
application of mnemonic patterns that are shaped for ready 
oral recurrence. The rites must come into being in rhythmic 
balanced patterns, in repetitions, in alliterations and 
assonances, in standard thematic settings (conflicts, gath- 
erings, meals, etc. ), in proverbs which are constantly heard 
by everyone so that they come to mind easily [Ong 1982, 
p. 34]. For example, a chief articulates sets of relevant 
proverbs out of which he can produce equitable decisions 
[Ong 1982, p. 351. Non-formulaic, non-patterned, non-mnemonic 
ideas are lost since they cannot be recalled effectively. 
Therefore, primitive experience is intellectualised mnemoni- 
cally [Ong 1982, p. 36]. Thus we have a limit on the way in 
which language must be given to a primitive person so that 
it can be used and retained. 
Because of the presence of orality in primitive socie- 
ties, some general features of the discourses can be out- 
lined. Firstly, in primitive discourses expressions are 
additive rather than subordinative. Oral structures serve 
the convenience of the speaker while chirographic structures 
serve the organisation of the discourse itself. Written 
discourse develops more elaborate and fixed grammar than the 
grammar of oral discourse since oral discourse has a fuller 
306 
existential context surrounding it [Ong 1982, p. 38]. Oral 
expressions carry a burden of epithets and formulae and 
therefore have an aggregative weight in place of the analyt- 
ic weight of written discourse [Ong 1982, p. 38]. 
Secondly, since an utterance vanishes immediately it is 
uttered, redundancy is necessary and is more natural to 
thought and speech than linearity. Orality has evanescence, 
a relationship with time. In some forms of acoustic substi- 
tute for verbal communication such as African drum talk, 
redundancy causes eight times as many words to be used on 
the drums than in the spoken message [Ong 1982, p. 40]. 
Therefore, oral discourses tend to be much more repetitious 
than written ones. 
Thirdly, because primitive societies must invest a 
great deal of energy in repeating over and over again what 
has been learned over the ages, a conservative frame of mind 
is created. The time and effort invested in repetition 
inhibits intellectual experimentation. Thus, knowledge is 
hard won and as such precious, and the primitive society has 
a high regard for those who specialise in conserving it. 
These are the elders who can recall myths and the witches 
who know and can recall ancient spells. Writing frees the 
mind of the task of memorising and, thus, allows time for 
speculation and original reflection. This is a luxury not 
available to the primitive who refrains from reflection. In 
primitive cultures originality takes the form of a novel 
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interaction with the audience each time a story is told. 
Narrators introduce new elements into old stories and the 
variations on a myth can be increased indefinitely Eong 
1982, P. 421. 
Fourthly, primitive cultures conceptualise and verba- 
lise all of their knowledge with close reference to the 
human lifewarld, assimilating the world of things to the 
more immediate interaction of human beings. This is because 
the analytic categories of the other epistemes that depend 
on writing to structure knowledge are absent. Primitive 
cultures are extremely agonistic in their verbal perform- 
ances, and, indeed, in their lifestyles. Writing creates 
abstractions that disengage knowledge from the sphere of 
human struggles. Writing separates the knower from the 
known. However, orality situates knowledge in human interac- 
tion. Proverbs and riddles are used to engage others in 
verbal and intellectual combat [Ong 1982, p. 44]. Oral cul- 
tures are agonistic in both the uses to which knowledge is 
put and in the celebration of physical behaviour. For exam- 
ple, there are many vivid descriptions of sexual encounters 
amongst the Trobrianders [Malinowski 1982a, p. 286-2871. 
Fifth, primitive knowledge depends on achieving a close 
communal identification with the known. The separation of 
the knower from the known in writing sets up the conditions 
for objectivity. Primitive objectivity is enforced by formu- 
laic expressions. The individual's reaction is not subjec- 
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tive but encased in the communal reaction [Ong 1982, p. 46). 
Therefore, the forms of objectivity of the later epistemes 
is not available in the primitive episteme and, thus, we 
have a different form of knowledge in oral discourses and a 
different type of knower. 
Sixth, primitive societies are homeostatic in that the 
natives live almost entirely in the present. The forces 
governing homeostasis arise because orality has no diction- 
aries and few semantic discrepancies. Words acquire their 
meanings only from their actual habitat which ranges through 
facial expressions and gestures to the setting in which the 
word occurs. Meanings come out of the present [Ong 1982, 
p. 471. 
Therefore, the form of primitive knowledge is condi- 
tioned by orality. Orality grows out of natural powers that 
are not structured by the technology of writing. oral cul- 
tures know an autonomous discourse in fixed ritual formulas 
and prophesies [Ong 1982, p. 78]. Writing presents utterances 
and thought as uninvolved, self-contained and complete and 
thus encourages a sense of noetic closure. Primitive utter- 
ances are not autonomous in their contexts and do not par- 
take in such closed figures. Ong suggests that writing and 
especially print provides this closure [Ong 1982, p. 132]. 
However, this analysis holds that writing was possible only 
because of the closed figures of the Renaissance episteme 
which we find in early literate cultures. The primitive 
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episteme, because of the dependence of the sign on the 
context of the utterance, does not have this closure and 
therefore does not have writing. 
7.6 Orality and the primitive episteme. 
Goody examines oral cultures for the role of the indi- 
vidual in the creative process [Goody 1977, pp. 19-35]. The 
archaeological analysis rejects the contribution of creativ- 
ity to the nature of knowledge while not dismissing such 
creativity altogether. The question is not whether creativi- 
ty is possible in an oral society but whether any possible 
creativity could effect the forms in which knowledge and 
experience are given to the primitive native. For Durkheim 
the highest intellectual activity was essentially social and 
knowledge was regarded as cumulative. As in archaeology, it 
was the collective manifestations of categories of creativi- 
ty in which Durkheim was interested. A consequence of such 
an approach is to deflate the contributions of specific 
individuals. His theoretical foundations attribute as much 
as possible to collective factors. Goody rejects a Durkhoi- 
mean-type thesis and assigns a large significance to the 
creative role of the individual in changing the shape of the 
frame-works of both literate and oral societies [Goody 1977, 
pp. 32-331. 
Archaeology avoids the separation of the world into the 
oral and the literate, the magical and the scientific, the 
religious and the secular. These unities of anthropology 
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which form two worlds, one oral, magical and religious, the 
other literate, scientific and secular are based on the role 
of subjectivity and are replaced in an analysis by the 
archaeological unities of the episteme. These unities take 
the form of a common discursive structure in the primitive 
domain and are expressed in terms of the enclosed divina- 
tional figures of asymmetry, continuity and convenience. In 
this way, we can say that orality has its possibility in the 
figures of the primitive episteme and this orality regulates 
the shape of the knowledge presented in it. Orality is not 
that which gives rise to the possibility of primitive 
cultures. The epistemic figures have this function. Like- 
wise, literacy is not that which gives rise to the Modern 
experiences of that same episteme. Agency has that function. 
Orality, literacy, scientificity, secularism, etc. have 
their possibility in the epistemic figures rather than 
creating those epistemes. Orality and its role in shaping 
knowledge is an effect of the open figures of the epintemo 
and not the cause. 
A 
The concern of this thesis was not to address tradi- 
tional problems of a cumulative rationality but to addros3 
archaeological-type projects that arise with respect to a 
primitive era: to show the guiding metaphorical codes of the 
episteme in the epistemological figures; to show the diacur- 
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sive formations that allow the primitive guiding figures to 
give rise to bodies of knowledge and practices; and to show 
the limitations of primitive discursive and nondiscursive 
realms. This project allows a primitive society to be de- 
fined in terms of the degree to which its discursive forma- 
tions conform to the epistemological figures of a primitive 
episteme. 
I hope that I have shown that the replacement of a 
model of meaning based in the subject allows for the possi- 
bility of an anthropology based on the study of the way In 
which concepts function with respect to native discourses 
and the way in which those discourses are related to funda- 
mental metaphorical figures. The movement from a concern 
with 'meaning', which relies on the role of the subject, 
towards a concern with 'discourse, signifies a move from an 
intentionalist analysis to a material analysis that finds 
its explanatory entities in socially and culturally doter- 
mined epistemic phenomena. 
Malinowski confused knowledge and experience in the 
same way Wittgenstein attributes this confusion to De- 
scartes. Bachelard speaks of a move from Descartes' solitary 
cogito to the communal cogitamus, and from individual exist- 
ence to social surexistence. He also speaks of the community 
of truth based on a corationalism. This move from the per- 
sonal to the interpersonal is a move from the merely psycho- 
logical to the genuinely epistemological [Gutting 1990, 
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p. 261. This is a move which must be made in order to make 
archaeology function at a level beneath that of subjectivi- 
ty. The history of knowledge written at this level opens up 
an important new dimension for knowledge of ourselves. This 
knowledge is only available by rejecting Malinowskils uni- 
versalist notion of reason supported by traditional philoso- 
phy and by rejecting the privileged role assigned to the 
individual that we find in his work. 
I have tried to apply some of the principal elements of 
Foucault's writings to the traditional objects of anthropo- 
logical study. It is difficult to classify the nature of 
Foucault's work. He can be regarded as a philosopher, a 
social historian, a literary analyst or a social and politi- 
cal critic. It is equally difficult to pigeonhole the nature 
of my present work for those interested in such classifica- 
tions. In my view, Morris is correct when he tells us that 
anthropological studies have suffered unduly from the ef- 
fects of the unnecessary schisms and specialisms that have 
developed within academia [Morris 1987, p. 2]. This criticism 
may be directed against all disciplines that have the human 
condition in general as their object of study. Morris be- 
moans the separation of sociological and anthropological 
concerns. This point may be extended to include historical 
and philosophical areas of interest. I have tried to strike 
a balance between philosophical and anthropological con- 
cerns. This represents reaching a harmony between theoreti- 
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cal insight and empirical detail. Anthropologists could 
criticise philosophers for offering no detail from examples 
taken from the real world while philosophers could be dis- 
satisfied with anthropological studies that are only empiri- 
cal observation. In light of this, it is not difficult to 
anticipate philosophical criticism of this work that focus 
on a supposed lack of abstract generalisations and anthro- 
pological criticisms claiming that there are too many 
present. It is easy to imagine philosophers agreeing that 
the results are not of sufficient philosophical interest. 
Despite such criticisms, and even in spite of them, I hope 
to have contributed to the broadening of the field of prob- 
lematisation in philosophy. That is something that Foucault 
succeeded in achieving. It is equally easy to imagine the 
adherents of more traditional approaches in anthropology 
disagreeing both with the possibility of the removal of the 
subject from its traditional place and with the Durkhoimean- 
type drawing of broad conclusions from a small empirical 
sample. What then of categorising it as comparative history? 
By sketching the limits, problematisations, regularities and 
power regimes of the primitive experience we can be led to 
appreciate more fully the limits of our own contemporary 
knowledge forms. Such a project is not a history of knowl- 
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